In the twenty-five years of its operation, the Yesha Council – the formal leadership of the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (the term Yesha represents the initials of the Hebrew words for Judea, Samaria and Gaza) – has created an image of itself as a powerful organization which has enjoyed great success in achieving its goals. These goals were to influence government policy and to make its mark on the political, foreign relations and social agenda of the State of Israel. The construction of the security fence and the disengagement plan – the two processes on which this study focuses – are good examples of the Yesha Council’s involvement and influence on Israeli politics. This position paper is an attempt to enter into the Yesha Council’s unknown world, to understand who comprises it, what its sources of power are, and to examine whether and how the Yesha Council’s story can instruct us about the ways political struggles are conducted in Israel.
The purpose of this study is to encourage citizen involvement and participation in politics. Although Leiman-Wilzig has contended that “the rate of participation in public protest in Israel is exceptionally high” and that “the Israeli public sees protest as a means with sufficiently reasonable chances of influencing decision makers and of getting what it wants from the political system,” (Leiman-Wilzig, 1992: 149-150) and Yael Yishai has argued that “more than 400 public, political, professional and social organizations declare that their efforts are rewarded” and that “a high percentage of citizens acknowledge ‘belonging’ to a public organization” (Yishai, 2003: 216-218), my impression is that alongside the increase in the importance of civil society, there has been a decline in the level of political participation by average Israeli citizens. This is so despite the growing ability of citizens to have an impact on decision-making, which is itself the result of several factors: increased democracy within the parties and the expansion of the bodies that choose the parties’ candidates for the Knesset, tremendous developments in communications and technology, and the constitutional revolution that has given ordinary citizens “standing” with regard to almost any issue. Yet most citizens feel that they lack any influence, that political processes are dictated by some “force majeure” and that politics is a system that cannot be fundamentally changed, except perhaps marginally.1 The purpose of this study is to demonstrate not only that it is possible to influence politics, but also that there is actually more than one way of doing so.
The Yesha Council attained the image of a group with the potential to influence politics in particular and our lives in general. The council accomplished this through various methods, from its organizational style to methods of operation. This study therefore contributes not only to an understanding of politics, but also to a comprehension of the role and importance of citizens as the wielders of political influence – or as actors with the potential to wield such influence. First, as stated above, this paper is an attempt to shed some light on a group that is perceived as one of the most influential non-parliamentary organizations in Israel, and to identify – through an analysis of two of its campaigns – the secret of its strength. Second, this paper presents a variety of methods of action through which it is possible to have a practical impact on politics and on decision makers, rather than just enjoy theoretical influence.2 Third, through the description of the Yesha Council and its struggles, I have attempted to present the complexity of political struggles in general, their dynamics and their dynamism, and then to describe the degree to which every political organization needs to be able to change and to adapt itself, its strategy and its tactics, and the methods by which it deals with changing circumstances. I have attempted to give the reader, who views the issue from an external perspective, an understanding of the impact – sometimes short-term, sometimes long-term and sometimes only after the fact – exercised by various elements that are active in the political field. This will in turn lead to an understanding of the challenges faced by extra-parliamentary groups and other elements that seek to influence politics – such as, for example, the need for patience and an ability to read the changing political map correctly.
The two processes on which the study focuses – the security fence and the disengagement plan – are, at the time of this writing, still in their formative stages, and it appears that they are far from being concluded. This study is therefore only a glimpse into each of them, within a defined period that begins with the first appearance of the idea and continues through critical stages of its development, ending in the establishment of a formal reference point. Thus, the analysis of the campaign regarding the security fence ends with the government’s approval of its full route in October 2003. The analysis of the struggle against the disengagement ends with the Knesset’s approval of the main points of the plan on 26 October 2004, followed by the approval in a first Knesset reading of the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law (Evacuation-Compensation Law) on 3 November 2004.
The security fence, defined as the largest infrastructure project ever undertaken in the State of Israel, was put on the national agenda at the beginning of the Palestinian uprising in September 2000 by then Prime Minister Ehud Barak. He raised the issue after reaching the conclusion that “there is now no Palestinian partner” and that the State of Israel must unilaterally withdraw to defensible borders. Three and a half governments and two Knessets have come and gone since then, but because of its security importance and its political significance, the security fence issue continues to arouse all the various groups in the political system as well as the public, the law enforcement authorities, the army, and the media. The disengagement plan was, when first placed on the national agenda in December of 2003, subjected to ridicule and harsh criticism from right and left – and granted very limited trust from the public, the military and the media. Nevertheless, it has become – over the course of 2004 – the Israeli government’s leading (and only) political plan. Between the inception of the political process established to resolve the Israeli Palestinian conflict at the 1990 Madrid Conference and through the 2003 appearance of the disengagement plan, Israel went through five prime ministers, seven and a half governments, and five Knessets. But the implementation of the disengagement plan represents the first time – and this is what makes the plan so special and important – that the Israeli government is directing a comprehensive plan that goes beyond a redeployment from areas in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to include the actual evacuation of Jewish settlements. At the time of this writing, no elections have been announced – but the “earthquake” which the plan caused even before it passed a third reading in the Knesset, and the public protest which followed it, have already made their mark. Adopting the plan led to an intense upheaval within the political system, the establishment of a new government, the creation of a deep break within Israeli society and within the army, and an intensification of the split between religion and state. Most significantly, we have seen the beginning of a far-reaching and significant public debate regarding basic issues, such as the nature of the common denominator and shared goals of the various groups comprising Israeli society; the rules of the public protest game in Israel; and the question of authority – is it given to those who rule on Jewish law or to democratically chosen leadership? At the same time, this upheaval has also set the stage for the inevitable debate regarding the stability of Israeli democracy and of its future.
The historical, political, social, economic, security-related and international importance of both of these processes, and their implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for Israel’s global status, for the country’s future identity, and for the composition of the political system – each sufficiently explain the need for a deep analysis of these two political struggles. However, beyond the content and importance of the political initiatives themselves, the presentation and step by step analysis of these political processes as a continual progression – from the beginning of the idea’s birth through its arrival at the stage of practical execution – is more generally important in terms of developing an understanding of the manner in which decisions are made in Israel and of the reasons why particular decisions – and not others – are made.