There are several different kinds of settlement in Yesha, as noted in the Introduction. The most obvious distinction is by type of settlement, i.e., town or community settlement. There are four settlements that have earned the title “city”: two of these are secular and two are ultra-Orthodox. The two secular cities are Ma’aleh Adumim (28,120 inhabitants)[7] and Ariel (17,464 inhabitants). The two ultra-Orthodox cities are Modi’in Ilit, known as Kiryat Sefer (22,927 inhabitants) and Betar Ilit (21,554 inhabitants). One other settlement exceeds the 10,000 mark – Givat Ze’ev adjacent to Jerusalem, whose population reached 10,946 in June 2003. The rest of the settlements in Yesha have four-figure populations at most, numbering in the thousands and not tens of thousands.
Yet, the distinction between cities and community settlements is more notable for the social implications of the trauma of evacuation, as elucidated in chapter three. The distinction between cities and community settlements is less relevant to the intensity of political opposition to evacuation, except for the fact that community settlements are by nature more homogenous and possess more highly developed community organizations, thus making it easier to organize a political struggle than in the cities. But the distinction that is most relevant to the nature of political reaction has to do not with the type of settlement but with the nature of the settlers, and especially their motivation for settling and staying in their communities.
In this context, one can find three main types of settlement: quality of life settlements, moderate ideological settlements and extremist ideological settlements. (Later on, other “special” kinds of settlement will be noted.)
Quality of life settlements are those whose residents came to live in Yesha because of the material benefits accompanying settlement there, mainly generous grants that allowed an urban family from central Israel to buy a spacious house, often with a garden, for the price of an average apartment in a crowded apartment building in an Israeli city. Most of these settlements are secular and are usually adjacent to the Green Line, since their residents wanted to continue working inside Israel proper.
These settlements include:
• Ganim and Kadim in the Afula area
• Tal-Menashe, Hinanit, Shaked, Reihan and Hermesh, which are close to Wadi Ara and are part of the buffer settlement plan separating the Arab villages in Wadi Ara from the Arab villages in Samaria
• Alfei Menashe, Nofim, Barkan and Oranit that are so close to Kfar Saba that in the past they were marketed to potential buyers as “settlements five minutes from Kfar Saba”
• Ofarim and Alei Zahav, close to Petach Tikva
• Givon and Har Adar, just northwest of Jerusalem, and Adam and Anatot, just to the northeast of Jerusalem
• Shima’a, Tene, Eshkolot, Naguhot, Telem and Adora in the southern Hebron hills, just south of the Green Line and Be’er Sheva
• Dugit, Nissanit and Elei Sinai in the north of the Gaza Strip and relatively close to Ashkelon.
A total of 25,000 inhabitants live in these settlements. In addition are the three secular urban settlements in Judea and Samaria – Ma’aleh Adumin, Ariel and Givat Ze’ev – whose total number of inhabitants reaches 54,000. Most of the people living in these three towns are secular Israelis who were motivated to move there for economic reasons, although some went to live there for ideological reasons.
In contrast, the moderate ideological settlements were established to fulfill the ideal of settling the Land of Israel and not for reasons of material gain (though these people also received the bonuses). Most of these are religious settlements, though there are a few mixed religious-secular communities. One of their distinctive characteristics is that the founders got together on their own to found the settlement and then sought the appropriate authorities to validate their initiative. This differs from the usual pattern whereby the national institutions in charge of settlement organize the placement and population of new settlements. While in the later stages quite a few settlers came for quality-of-life reasons such as housing benefits, these people also identified with the ideological basis of the settlement.
These settlements include:
• Shavei Shomron, Kedumim, Karnei Shomron and Tzofim, all on the road that leads from Kfar Saba to Shechem
• Elon Moreh and Bracha, close to Shechem
• Avnei Hefetz and Einav, close to Tul Karm; Elkana and Pedu’el, close to Petah Tikva
• Neveh Tzuf, Ateret, Talmon, Ma’aleh Levonah, Mikhmash, Ofra, Beit El, Psagot, Kokhav Hashahar, Dolev, Eli, Shiloh, Rehelim and Shvut Rachel in the Binyamin region
• Efrata, Alon Shvut, Kfar Etzion, Rosh Tzurim, Geva’ot, Neveh Daniel, Elazar, Bat Ayin, Karmei Tzur and Tekoa in Gush Etzion
• Beit Hagai, P’nei Hever, Otniel, Carmel, Maon, Yatir and Sussiyah in the southern section of the Hebron hills
• Most of the settlements in the Gaza Strip: Neveh D’kalim, Netzarim, Kfar Darom, Ganei Tal, Katif, Netzer Hazani and Atzmona (Bnei Atzmon).
A total of 60,000 inhabitants live in these settlements.
The third type of settlement belongs to the extremist ideological camp, and most of their inhabitants belong to the national-religious camp. What is the nature of this extremism? The main difference between them and the moderates is their attitude towards the state, i.e., the principle of the supremacy of the state. The religious settlements in Yesha arose from a Zionist ideology that attached great importance and even religious significance to the establishment of the State of Israel; settling the Land of Israel was just a tool in the service of the state. But among some groups of settlers over the years, the means towards the end – the goal of settling the Land of Israel, and especially Yesha – became a value in its own right, to the point where it eclipsed the value of the supremacy of the state that it was supposed to serve. Most of the religious settlers today try to influence the state to adopt their point of view through restrained demonstrations and sometimes, in their bitterness, even through violent demonstrations, as do other Israeli pressure groups that perceive their situation to be dire (such as the unemployed). But ultimately, the settlers know that the justification for settlement is acceptable only if they are depicted as acting in the national interest (as they interpret it). Therefore they are careful to avoid treading on the authority of the state and its institutions on their way to accomplishing their goals.
Yet, there is a minority among them who have deviated from this principle – either because they always really believed that settling the land (and especially Judea and Samaria) takes precedence over the value of the state or because the drawn-out confrontations with governmental authorities over the last thirty years caused them to adopt the bitter viewpoint that the State of Israel had betrayed Zionism. There are even some among them who have adopted a post-Zionist outlook, according to which Zionism was nothing but an entity that contained the seeds of calamity. In their perspective, Zionism is not the realization of the “authentic Jewish redemption” but merely the Jewish return to the Land of Israel as a political haven.