Reinventing Israeli Democracy

Governance in Israel, the lifeblood of democracy, is in the throes of a deep crisis. The nature of this crisis is patently clear: incessant political instability, uncertainty concerning government policy on existential issues, indications of the potential collapse of the parliamentary system and, above all, the rise of anti-political sentiment – that is, the growing aversion to politics and the increasing mistrust of democratic institutions of large segments of the public. The abolition of the flawed method of direct elections by the Knesset did not rectify the distortions that it had created. The disintegration of the larger political parties, the operational dysfunction of each of the three branches of government and the defective communication between them, the personalization of politics, and the disruption of the balance between the need to safeguard the integrity of those in high office and the need for effective government, combine to form a tangible threat to Israeli democracy.

The harsh reality in which our parliamentary democracy finds itself is a result of the ever-widening gap between the changing profile of Israeli society and the rigid character of the democratic institutions, which are meant to respond to these changes. Advanced democracies adapt their structure and function to the changing needs of their societies. Israeli democracy has not done so. A comprehensive plan to amend the governance process requires the formulation of a vision that specifies the practical steps necessary for the realization of its goal – to achieve a correct balance between representation and effective governance. Currently, both representation and governance are replete with failures, defects and flaws in the legislative branch – the legislature – and in the executive branch.

The Knesset, with only 90 members available to perform ongoing parliamentary work, lacks the resources required to produce quality legislation. The Knesset no longer functions as the primary arena for molding the normative foundations of Israeli society, which it is meant to represent. The factions in the Knesset are not obligated to adhere to the ideological platform of their parties. Moreover, the Knesset does not fulfill its important function as overseer of the government. Unlike parliamentary legislatures in OECD countries, the Israeli Knesset is not a government watchdog. The anomalous situation that prevails here is one in which the government serves as the watchdog of the parliament.

The operational failures of the executive branch in Israel have been embedded in the structure of the government for many years. They are a direct result of over-centralization, which gnaws away at the effectiveness of the executive branch and its agencies that are already overburdened by the accumulating demands placed upon it, and which is a factor related to its failure to assimilate the values of transparency and accountability. The glaring symptoms of the failures that characterize our executive branch include stagnation, rigidity, and, at times, an inability to implement government decisions.

The absence of transparency and accountability, so typical of centralized regimes, serves as fertile ground for corruption and for the exploitation of status and position. Unfortunately, the “sentries” responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the government treat the symptoms and not the causes. They have imposed more and more restraints, creating a patchwork of rules, over-regulation and, sometimes, legislation that stifle initiative and creativity. These “sentries” make extreme use of the powers placed in their hands to the extent that they become veto artists, who undermine operational effectiveness.

The primary casualty is governance. The hands of a government elected to carry out its stated policies are tied. When defective governance is combined with political instability, and the intrinsic structural failures of the executive branch are combined with the results of the failures of the regime, which are manifested in the impaired functioning of the legislative branch, there is increasing temptation to seek magic solutions, such as the adoption of a presidential system of government. However, the artificial transplant of a centralized system, such as the presidential system, is exactly the opposite of what is required for a system suffering from over-centralization in the public sector and the disintegration of the party infrastructure in the political arena. A presidential regime reinforces the power and responsibility of individuals instead of separating powers and decentralizing authority.

In order to both strengthen representation in the executive branch and to increase the effectiveness of the government and its “sentries” – beginning with the courts – and in order to ensure a proper and effective balance between the three branches of government, the crisis must be resolved through recovery processes that rely on an array of reforms in the legislative branch.

Three principles unite all these proposals to form a coherent, integral whole:

• The reinforcement of political parties as the primary mediators of representative government in a parliamentary democracy.
• The decentralization of governmental-administrative power.
• The expansion of civilian participation in political processes and decision making.

The completion of the constitutional process and the adoption of the Constitution by Consensus are mandatory!

The series of improvements required in the legislative branch may be divided into two components: first, electoral reform aimed at restoring and creating large, strong political parties, which will strengthen the relation between the voter and the elected; second, the enhancement of the legislature’s ability to function by implementing structural and regulatory changes, such as raising the electoral threshold, introducing regional representation into the electoral process (some members of the Knesset will be elected by geographical area), and establishing the principle of “majority rules” (whereby the leader of the faction that receives the most votes becomes Prime Minister).

The reformation of the executive branch is based on the implementation of the most important values in the public sector: the decentralization of power and responsibility, and the assimilation of accountability and transparency. The government will not be directly involved in this process; it will establish policy, determine performance standards, allocate resources, and oversee, assess and evaluate performance. Similar to advanced democracies of OECD countries, Israel, too, will set up executive agencies that will be responsible for applying these principles. The status of local government will be redefined and then established in the Constitution. It will be based on a modern definition of authority and responsibility, which will strengthen the principle of decentralization in the relationship between central and local governments.

In order to restore the balance between safeguarding integrity and fighting corruption, on one hand, and maintaining effective administrative and political processes, on the other hand, it is imperative to effect changes in the performance of the “sentries” of the legislative branch (State Comptroller), of the executive branch (Attorney General and the State Attorney) and of the judicial branch (in the application of judicial doctrine).