Israel’s political system is in a state of deep crisis. The symptoms of this crisis are all too evident: ongoing political instability;uncertainty regarding government policy on issues of existential importance; attacks on the very legitimacy of the parliamentary system; and, above all, a groundswell of anti-political sentiment among broad sectors of the public, who display less and less trust in democratic institutions. A number of factors now combine to form a tangible threat to Israel’s democratic system, which include the disintegration of the larger political parties, the malfunction of the three branches of government and the dysfunctional interaction between them, excessive personalization of politics, and the recent disruption of the delicate balance between the need to preserve the integrity of the law and the imperative of effective government.
The harsh reality in which our parliamentary democracy has become mired testifies to a growing incompatibility between an Israeli society, whose profile and needs are changing, and its democratic institutions, which are charged with encompassing and addressing these changes and needs, but that have, nevertheless, remained rigid. Enlightened and developed democracies adapt their structures and modes of operation to the changing needs of their societies; Israel has not. It has become urgent to enact a series of changes in order to regain the balance between political representation and governmental effectiveness.
Many of Israel’s political problems stem from the weakness of Israel’s legislature. Due to the fact that only about 90 of its 120 members – which decreased to a record low of 80 following the last elections – are available to perform parliamentary work at any given moment, the Knesset lacks the resources and the independence necessary to enact quality legislation.[1] As a result, the Knesset no longer functions as the primary arena for molding the normative foundations of Israeli society that it is meant to represent. Nor does it fulfill its critical function of oversight. Unlike the legislatures of the OECD parliamentary democracies, Israel’s Knesset does not serve as the government’s “watchdog”; we have, instead, an anomalous situation in which the government serves as the watchdog of the parliament.
The operational failures of the executive branch are rooted in longstanding structural features of the Israeli governmental system. The most prominent feature is over-centralization, which is eroding the efficiency of the executive branch and its agencies that are already overburdened by accumulating demands. A related factor is the failure to assimilate the values of transparency and accountability. The symptoms of malfunction that characterize our executive branch include stagnation, rigidity and, at times, an utter inability to implement government decisions.
The lack of transparency and accountability so characteristic of a centralized system are fertile ground for corruption and for the improper exploitation of status and power. Unfortunately, those responsible for upholding the integrity of the law treat the symptoms, but not the causes. The so-called “gatekeepers” of Israeli democracy – in particular, the Attorney General and the State Comptroller, but also the Supreme Court and, in a different capacity, the media – have imposed more and more restraints, creating a patchwork of rules, regulation, and legislation that stifle initiative and creativity. These gatekeepers make unorthodox use of the powers placed in their hands, becoming “veto players” who tighten the leash and impair executive efficiency.
The primary casualty is governance. The current system ties the hands of any government elected to carry out its declared policies. When one adds defective governance to political instability, and when the consequences of the structural flaws that are intrinsic to the executive branch are combined with the failures of oversight that characterize the legislative branch, the temptation to resort to a quick fix – e.g., switching to a presidential system – becomes irresistible. However, the artificial transplant of a centralized system, such as the presidential model, especially without a federal component, is exactly the opposite of what is required for a system suffering from over-centralization in the public sector, and the disintegration of the party infrastructure in the political arena. A presidential regime would reinforce the power and responsibility of individuals instead of separating powers and decentralizing authority.
In order to strengthen representation in the legislative branch and improve governmental effectiveness, and in order to ensure a proper and effective balance between the three branches of government, rehabilitation must begin with an array of reforms, the most prominent of which are structural adjustments to the legislative branch.
Three principles constitute the common thread that runs through the various proposals presented in this essay:
- The need to reinforce the existence of large political parties as the primary mediators of representative government in a parliamentary democracy.
- The need to decentralize administrative power.
- The need to expand civilian participation in political processes and decision making.
Another key assumption implicit in the proposals contained herein is that sooner or later, they must be integrated into the comprehensive framework of a constitution for Israel. Only the consensual adoption of a modern constitution, including a full bill of rights and an integral depiction of the mechanism of government, can ensure that these changes, as well as additional revisions of a similar nature that may be proposed by others, will prove to be lasting contributions toward a better political system.
With regard to the legislative branch, the requisite changes may be divided into two categories: first, electoral reform aimed at restoring large parties in the political arena and strengthening the bond between voters and their elected officials. Second, structural and regulatory changes geared to improve the legislature’s functional capacity. Among other things, I propose to:
- Raise the qualifying threshold for gaining seats in the Knesset.
- Introduce regional representation into the electoral system.
- Institute the “priority right” for the position of Prime Minister according to which the leader of the faction that receives more votes than any other leader is designated Prime Minister on election night.
The reforms envisioned for the executive branch seek to decentralize authority and hasten the adoption of accountability and transparency as the guiding values for policy implementation in the public sector. According to this view, the government should not involve itself in implementation; rather, its role should be to formulate policy, set standards for implementation, allocate resources, provide oversight, and measure and evaluate implementation. As is the case in the developed OECD democracies, executive agencies should be created to put these principles into practice. In addition, I argue that the status of local government should be redefined so as to enable substantial devolution of responsibility to municipal authorities.
Finally, in order to restore the desired balance between the need to fight corruption and the necessity of effective administration, I argue that it is necessary to modify the roles of the gatekeepers in the legislative and executive branches, and to adjust the scope of justiciability within the court system.
Click here to download the complete document