This position paper addresses one of the most urgent and disputed issues on the Israeli public agenda. Given the decision of the Israeli government in June 2004 to adopt the “disengagement plan,” which involves dismantling all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in northern Samaria, it seems appropriate that three of my original points are given added emphasis.
1. In its analysis of the political “danger zones” that an evacuation process could potentially create, the report drew attention to a weakening of the level of commitment to the state and its institutions (as opposed to the level of national commitment, which has remained strong) of many members of the younger generation of settlers, as a result of a weakening of faith in the state and of conflicts with state institutions. It is not anticipated that this attitude will necessarily be expressed in violence, but there is a fear that “civil rebellion” may ensue: refusal to carry out orders or to pay taxes or symbolic actions such as the tearing up of identity cards, etc.
In recent months this concern has intensified. Discussions that I have held, and statements that have been made in the media in recent months, reveal that the “post-state” attitude is becoming increasingly prevalent among many members of the “settler” camp (this expression includes not only the residents of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, but also their supporters inside the Green Line). Occasionally this attitude takes an overtly anti-Zionist tone, as witnessed in the remarks made in the Hatzofeh newspaper by Arutz 7 talk-show host Adir Zik: “If the Israeli government does succeed in carrying out expulsion, ‘transfer,’ and uprooting Jews from their homes in the land of their forefathers, then the Zionist state will lose the right, which it undemocratically appropriated to itself, of representing and speaking for the Jewish people.” The spread of this attitude among highly ideologically motivated young people in particular is liable to lead to a situation in which the main social outcome of the evacuation process is the adoption by these young people of an isolationist stance reminiscent of that of the ultra-Orthodox – perhaps even reaching the level of an active struggle against the Israeli elite, on the model of the “Hasmoneans vs. Hellenizers” struggle during the Second Temple period.
It is important to pay attention to the significance of such an attitude and to its possible implications: a political struggle against the prevailing attitudes of the Israeli elite is of course legitimate, but care must be taken that its methods do not lead to the collapse of the national home. It is particularly important that the settler leadership itself expresses a clear stand against this kind of attitude. The deep trauma, not to be denied or underplayed, occasioned by the uprooting of a person from his home, must not be allowed to result in the destruction of the entire national home; just as those devastated by the deaths of their sons in the territories and who did not believe in the need for us to retain control of the territories have not, up to now, initiated civil rebellion.
2. With regard to the report’s recommendations for the political system, emphasis was placed on the vital need for any decision regarding dismantling of settlements to be made by a clear and unequivocal majority. Unfortunately, this has not been the case up to now. The disengagement plan obtained governmental approval via a process which even the strongest supporters of evacuation could not countenance: firstly, due to the fact that a decision was at first sought only from Likud members; secondly, due to the fact that this decision itself was ignored, despite the original commitment to comply with it; and thirdly, due to the creation of an artificial governmental majority via the dismissal of several ministers who threatened to oppose the plan.
If the evacuation decision process continues in this manner up to the point of final determination of the future of the settlements in question, then the decision’s very legitimacy will be in doubt, while the settler camp will have increased motivation to oppose the evacuation through non-democratic means as well. It is therefore crucial that the final decision regarding the future of the settlements be made by the Israeli public in a clear and unequivocal manner: via national referendum or by the Knesset (not merely via a governmental decision which represents only part of the public), and in any case via a special majority (even if not an overwhelming one), not a majority based on a fraction of a percentage point.
It should also be remembered that the main argument of those opposed to evacuation – and one likely to influence many Likud members not necessarily committed to the sanctity of Gaza and the northern Samaria settlements – is the unilateral nature of the plan. It is not the purpose of this report to deal with the political question of whether an agreement with the Palestinians regarding evacuation is feasible. On the other hand, it is clear that the lack of such an agreement, which would require the Palestinians to be responsible for “security arrangements” in the areas evacuated, is another factor which intensifies public opposition to evacuation in general. Thus, it is logical to re-examine the following possibility: even if there is no Palestinian “partner” for a permanent agreement to include relinquishing the Palestinian “right of return,” might there, nevertheless, be a partner capable of entering into a specific agreement regarding “evacuation in return for security”? A positive answer to this question and its actualization through an agreement of this kind would certainly be capable of raising the level of public support for evacuation.
3. One of the original report’s main recommendations was that the settler camp be given “ideological compensation,” rather than merely financial compensation. The report recommended that the primary form of this compensation be the possibility of the settlers’ rebuilding their homes within the settlement blocs to remain in Judea and Samaria, thereby giving them the sense that their long struggle was not entirely in vain. Based on discussions that I have held on the issue of “ideological compensation” during the months that have passed since the report’s publication, it appears that the main “ideological compensation” would stem from another source: the trend toward strengthening and ensuring the Jewish character of the state. It appears that a great part of the settler camp’s opposition to evacuation is based not merely on the natural disinclination of the settlers to see their homes and communities destroyed, but also on their fear that the anticipated evacuation would be a stepping-stone, perhaps a decisive one, on the way to a general diminishing of Jewish-Zionist identity in Israel. The trend toward legitimizing civil marriage and the sale of pork, gaining momentum precisely during the period in which the “disengagement plan” is the subject of public debate, considerably heightens this concern.
It is important that the months leading up to the anticipated decision regarding evacuation and its implementation should be used to conduct broad-based national dialogue on the Jewish character of the state – via Basic Law or through discussion and policy decisions which prevent Israel from becoming a bi-national state or a state devoid of any clear Jewish-national character, within the Green line. Policy should also ensure that Jewish values are respected within Israeli public frameworks. It should be emphasized here that discussion of this kind is necessary irrespective of the evacuation issue; but its importance increases during a period in which evacuation is high on the national agenda.
Consensus regarding the long-term Jewish character of the state is unlikely to entirely prevent conflict over the evacuation dilemma; the forcible removal of people from their homes and the destruction of their communities are bound to meet with opposition. But there is a chance that such consensus would calm the furore engendered by the evacuation process and reduce the settlers’ motivation to take dangerous steps and increase the settler leadership’s motivation to oppose such steps. Moreover: the principal value of such a course of action would be the opportunity it affords to prevent an isolationist stance from taking hold within the national-religious public after evacuation takes place.
Yair Sheleg
Jerusalem – Sivan 5764, June 2004