Chapter Five: Summary and Recommendations

Unlike the evacuation from Sinai, it would seem that a decision to evacuate settlements in Yesha is more likely to be acceptable today to Israeli society at large (as opposed to the evacuees) for two reasons. First, because there is already a precedent for it, but mainly because Israeli society is tired of war and therefore more willing to make painful concessions. Moreover, while pressing security issues were not a factor in the decision to evacuate Sinai, it seems that security problems would play a very large part in a decision to evacuate Yesha today and certainly in public pressure to make such a decision.

Yet, these very same facts are likely to aggravate the distress and intensify the resistance of the opponents of withdrawal and evacuation. They are likely to feel not only betrayed ideologically by their ideological adversaries, but also abandoned by an Israeli society that has caved in to terrorism. They would feel that not only had they been the ones long paying the main price for living with terrorism, but that they were also going to pay the price for surrendering to terrorism. For this reason and because massive evacuation of tens of thousands of settlers would, in any event, be a political and social trauma, it is very important that in taking such a decision, the political establishment and the public social entities take steps to temper as much as possible the evacuees’ anticipated crisis.

Political Recommendations

• National consensus: Determining this issue by as broad-based a national consensus as possible is recommended. The determination should be made by a “special majority” defined in advance, whether the decision is to be made by the Knesset or by a national referendum. This “special majority” must not, however, be too dramatic. Although this recommendation might be rejected because it could afford a minority veto power, it is important to remember that the evacuees stand to lose their homes and substantial components of their world while others continue their daily lives undisturbed.

• Communication between the evacuees and the evacuators: There should be a running dialog between the government and those earmarked for evacuation, with heavy emphasis on the settlers’ contributions to society. It is especially important to keep the lines of communication open with the political and religious leadership of the settlers, not only at the political-governmental level, but also on the broader plane of public and media discourse.

• A step-by-step process: Evacuation should be a gradual process that allows people time to absorb the tidings of evacuation, to prepare for it intelligently and to make their peace with it. It is true that this process will also allow the opposition time to try to thwart the move, but the advantages of the step-by-step, graduated method are greater than the dangers inherent in lack of preparation. A “surprise evacuation” is likely to cause harsh reactions even on the part of moderates who would not ordinarily respond this way.

• Compensation for evacuees: There should be an “ideological compensation” in the form of emphasis on how their sacrifice has contributed to the state – by expanding Israel’s borders through additional blocs of settlement and providing the bargaining chip for a peace settlement. At least for this latter reason, there is clear preference for evacuation in the context of a final agreement over evacuation based on an interim agreement or unilateral withdrawal. The candidates for evacuation must be welcomed back into the national consensus, after years during which they were severely denounced by many prominent groups in society.
Evacuees should be offered “surrogate settlements,” i.e., new settlements should be created to which the settlers can be relocated en masse, and preferably within Yesha. This would temper the inevitable social crisis as well as give the evacuees the feeling that their life’s work has not been in vain, as they will have succeeded in expanding the borders of the state to some degree.

• Number of evacuees: The number of evacuees should be limited as far as possible.

• The disposition toward extremists: Constant tabs should be kept on marginal groups that are capable of violence. This should be carried out in conjunction with the Yesha leadership and even with local leaders in especially sensitive areas. Prospective reactions to an evacuation scenario anticipated on the part of the FSU immigrant population in Yesha should be researched separately, as the combination of this sector’s extremely hawkish position and their blatant anti-government stance is likely to create a radical reaction to evacuation.

• The actual evacuation procedure: Continuous contact should be maintained with the general and local leadership in Yesha, including those figures who are considered to be radical ideologues, because they are the people who may be able to influence their followers not to resort to violence. Likewise, the evacuation forces must maintain maximum credibility by honoring their agreements with the settlers and, of course, they must avoid using unnecessary force.

• The evacuee leadership: Yesha leadership is strongly admonished to tighten the reins at all levels down to the lowest, in order to prevent as far as possible extreme reactions from even marginal groups. The political, rabbinical and educational leadership must also sharply caution their followers in advance against any scenario that involves violence, not only against the evacuation forces but also against Arabs or Jewish politicians. From an educational and moral standpoint, taking a stance against any sort of seditious behavior (even if it does no bodily harm to the evacuators) is advisable. It makes great public sense not to involve soldiers from Yesha in carrying out evacuation, but at the same time any refusal to obey orders, inflict damage on military equipment or any other expression of insurrection must be unequivocally denounced a priori. The settler leadership must remember that Israeli society must function even after the evacuation crisis, painful as it may be, and nothing – not even evacuation – justifies shattering society.

Social Recommendations

• Reduction of uncertainty and ambiguity: Clear, timely statements should be made regarding the circumstances and conditions of evacuation, the evacuation schedule, the kind of compensation, etc.

• The character of compensation: Evacuees should not be given money to buy housing but should be offered alternative housing that has been arranged in advance, preferably in communal settlements similar to the ones in which the evacuees lived formerly.

• Professional assistance in coping psychologically with the crisis: This assistance is no less important than monetary compensation. Not only should the individual suffering from evacuation trauma be supported, but so should the communities and the communal frameworks that give succor to the individual.

• Open government support for the evacuees: The government – and non-political public figures as well – should declare loud and clear and in every forum that evacuees are not “extortionists” and should publicly emphasize their pain and the crisis they are experiencing, as well as express empathy for their straits.

• The nature of compensation negotiations: Both the government and the settlers should refrain from a humiliating haggle over money in the compensation negotiations. The settlers are bound to lose in the long run (through emotional and public fallout) even if they gain in the short run (a monetary windfall).