▪ Arye Carmon: The issue before us is at the heart of the most problematic rifts within Israeli society, and I would like to demonstrate this to you. When my friend Prof. Ravitzky initiated, a long time ago, the process of contending with this dilemma, the intention was one of empathy. The idea of raising the issue of the political and social significance of evacuating settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza was free of any hint of antagonism or anything of that kind. In a scholarly arena such as the Israel Democracy Institute, the question that arises in connection with an issue of this type is that of the meaning of democracy in the context of a dilemma that deeply divides Israeli society. By the time the project had reached maturity, the political constellation had changed [formation of the Sharon government], and I thought that perhaps it would be a mistake to raise the issue at that time, for a very simple reason: had we raised the issue, we would thereby have associated ourselves with a specific political camp. We seek to avoid this since we do not belong to any political camp.
The issue came up again when the Israeli government announced its adoption of the “Road Map” and began making advances in this direction. The present government also adopted a different tune. We thought that even if the issue wasn’t on the immediate agenda, it would, nevertheless, be worth debating. I think that the ethos of the Israel Democracy Institute is that of the middle road, the golden path, the route of dialogue. This ethos is actually translated at the Institute into strategy, both at the research level and in terms of public activity. Sitting around this table are several witnesses to this approach, from the domain that we refer to as “constitution by consensus.” When this issue is raised people tend to react cynically. We live in a reality in which a slim majority would be able to impose a constitution, and from the outset, we chose the difficult path of involving sectors in this effort which seem unlikely to cooperate. I very much hope that the present discussion will be free of styles of speech that can result in verbal sparring.
▪ Yair Sheleg: When Prof. Ravitzky asked me to write this report I had butterflies in my stomach, for two reasons: As a matter of principle, this issue is fundamentally one of expelling people from their homes. I mention this in the introduction as well: the word “pinui” (evacuation) is a euphemism. Ultimately we are talking about uprooting, about expelling tens of thousands of people from their homes. This is not a trivial matter from any point of view, whether political or ideological. On a personal level, many of my best friends, several of whom are sitting here today, live in these places. So, the feeling I had while writing such a report was very unpleasant. My willingness to do it came from a sense that it is not for nothing that this subject is so hotly disputed: the issue of Israel’s continued control of Judea, Samaria and Gaza brings us to a variety of difficult questions relating to morality, policy, security and demography, even apart from the fact that the evacuation of settlements is at stake – and so there is no choice but to dive in. And if we have already made the decision to dive in, I think that it’s best that someone with real empathy, affinity and a deep connection to the people who live in these places does so.
The report has three components. First, it points out several potential danger zones in the political response to a decision to evacuate, and this response is divided into two categories: the first, identified as “extremist settlers and their supporters,” could translate into a difficult scenario of violent terrorist action against Arabs during the process leading up to evacuation or into attacks on IDF forces during the evacuation itself. The second category, which would involve a broader swathe of Israeli society, could see a civil rebellion which could lead to the removal of forces or to the removal of their equipment and symbols of State sovereignty. A situation such as this could plunge Israeli society into a very deep crisis.
The report’s second component is the social significance of the evacuation. There would be implications for individuals, for communities and for the communal and ideological enterprise that they have created, and this also must be addressed.
The third component is the recommendations. In this context I would like to emphasize several things. Firstly, the point of departure: the reaction of the settlers and their supporters to evacuation will swing between two poles: that of personal-communal-ideological outrage against the evacuation and that of the settler population’s basic connectedness to Israeli society. In order to prevent the sense of outrage from overcoming that of connectedness, Israeli society must also work to strengthen the bond between itself and the settler population.
The second point to emphasize is the report discusses “ideological compensation,” not just financial compensation. Ideological compensation in my view is not merely the recognition of the settlers’ contribution to the state, but first and foremost the effort to evacuate as few settlers as possible and to transfer willingly, of course, all those who are interested to the settlement blocs that would remain in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Another matter, which was not taken up in the report but which occurred to me after the report had been written is if Israeli society does make the decision to evacuate settlements based, in great part, on demographic reasons, it will be important to include within Israeli public discourse elements of strengthening the Jewish character of the State of Israel in other contexts, beyond the expedient of settlement evacuation. All of this should be achieved by legislating Basic Laws or by other mechanisms that strengthen the Jewish character of the state. Within the context of evacuation and settler reaction to evacuation these mechanisms may serve to moderate the emotional response to evacuation by giving it a significance possessing an element of “positive” compensation from the perspective of the settlers themselves. I think that this would be the most important form of “ideological compensation.”