Dr. Arye Carmon:
The completion of the disengagement process can be considered a victory for democracy in Israel. Heavy clouds that threaten the concrete implementation of the three branches of government’s decision were removed. After all that’s said and done, it’s difficult for each group involved not to look within and evaluate what happened. The Yesha Council held on to the irrational, transcendental view that the disengagement would not occur. Supporters of the disengagement need to ask themselves fundamental questions regarding the consequences of the act and whether all of the steps taken towards deciding about the disengagement were legitimate.
The IDF played a very important role in completing the disengagement and in preventing violent clashes. But still, we need to clarify to what extent the army can be used in executing government decisions that are not directly related to the security of the State of Israel.
When examining the results of the disengagement, anyone who is a ‘Champion of Democracy’ must praise the Yesha Council’s behavior in the amount of restraint they exhibited during the disengagement.
Adv. Dan Meridor:
In the disengagement process, democracy was put to the test. The main question was whether borders of countries should be decided democratically, by a majority vote, or by religious beliefs – not allowing for a democratic resolution. Some say that regardless of the majority vote, the Israeli government does not have the right to give up what was given by God. However, allowing religion to determine a country’s borders is to replace democracy with fundamentalism. That, along with the idea of soldiers’ refusal challenged the very right of the elected Knesset members to make a decision. Overall, the disengagement was certainly a great victory for democracy.
There was concern/fear that soldiers and policemen would disobey orders resulting from the government’s decision that was approved by the Knesset and by the Supreme Court. In the end, there weren’t many who refused. The army and the police worked well together. Almost no force was used, except in extreme cases. Part of the reason for this was the large numbers of policemen and soldiers that were present. That was certainly a smart decision.
The leaders of the settlers should not be praised for not breaking the rules, although whatever the process, they did help in calming down heated spirits. They too successfully passed the test.
One couldn’t have expected anything different from the media. All elements of a drama were there. Like a Greek tragedy, the ending was known in advance. As for the army spokesperson, he should be commended for opening up to the media. The army has undergone a transformation. In the past, the army would want the media to stay out and not interfere, and they would shy away from media coverage. Today, the army needs to know that the media is integral. The army can’t win a war on the field and lose on the screen. The decision of working together is certainly a reasonable one. There was vast media coverage and the IDF’s work was not interfered with. In general, the media played a positive role.
Regarding the government, one major flaw is that why we are disengaging was not made clear. Was it because terror could be better handled if we left? Was it because we paid a high price for settling Gaza? Was it because of outside pressure? Or perhaps because of demographic reasons for the long run? The reason makes a difference; leaving under the pressure of terror has different consequences than leaving regardless of terror out of concerns for the long run. We can’t afford to keep Gaza and stay democratic. There are 1¼ million Palestinians in Gaza. Not giving them equal rights is not democratic, nor Jewish. Winning against terror in Gaza meant losing a Jewish and democratic state in the long run. But there has never been a clear statement about this from the government, and there needs to be a good reason in order to remove people from their homes.
External actors were of minimal importance to the disengagement. The uniqueness of this decision is that it was dependent solely on Israel. The usual negotiating attitude, usually present in Israeli politics, of ‘I’ll do X if you do Y’ was not there. Cooperation from the Palestinian side smoothened the operation, but Israel would have gone ahead with it anyway. The real test of the Palestinians is now. Israel passed the test of democratically carrying out the evacuation. Now it’s time for the Palestinians to prove that they can take advantage of their sovereignty. They have been given an unprecedented historic opportunity. The focus of the media will likewise shift from Israel to Palestinian behavior. Will they create a unified leadership? This is an important point to follow.
Perhaps the biggest miscalculation during this time was that the media and some commentators made it seem as if many settlers would take extreme measures to fight the disengagement, and they would harm democratic procedures. The warnings seemed alarming and severe. Massive steps were taken by the government for this not to happen. The fact that it didn’t happen does not necessarily mean that the predictions were not correct. The soldiers were emotionally well prepared and well educated to make the disengagement run smoothly. Foreboding predictions did not come to pass.
Professor Aviezer Ravitzky:
In the weeks preceding the disengagement, it seems as if the IDF and the police adequately prepared. The government acted legally, yet poorly - and unfairly. The Prime Minister’s behavior did not reflect the amount of decency one would anticipate for such a situation, although it was democratic. The Yesha Council’s decision to foil a democratic decision is certainly objectionable.
During the disengagement, the IDF and the police both acted impeccably. It’s hard to believe that the two entities that supposedly aren’t necessarily democratic, acted so well. They also prevented numerous confrontations. At this point, the government acted fine. As for the settlers, different groups acted differently. They basically break down into three groups. 1. A number of settlers left their homes out of their own will, carrying out the government’s democratic decision. 2. Some settlers nonviolently refused to leave, which wasn’t un-democratic, but was certainly not in its spirit, and 3. There were some who violently refused to leave, while threatening and posing as a threat. The latter did not act democratically.
The domestic media did provide fair coverage of the disengagement, although they emphasized extreme situations and provocations which provided an exaggerated sense of crisis, more than was actually present.
The government erred in the way it handled itself. After the Prime Minister’s political party, the Likud, voted against the disengagement, he also fired two ministers. In addition, not enough dialogue was conducted between the government and the settlers and likewise between the government and the Palestinians. However, the government did excel in this necessary, historic, innovative “break-through” of reducing Israel’s borders. Control over the Palestinians hurts both the Palestinians and Israel.
In hindsight, the largest miscalculation made regarding the disengagement was about the refusal of soldiers. Forecasts seemed far more grim than they actually were; in reality, barely any soldiers refused.
Professor Avi Ben-Bassat:
Settlements in “Yesha” (which stands for the Hebrew initials for Gaza and the West Bank) originated out of an ideology, accepted by many citizens in the State of Israel. Despite that, many settlements were built by circumventing democratic procedures while disregarding standard rules. Decisions concerning the evacuation of settlements from Gaza were supported by a majority of government members and MKs; yet, this process was also accompanied with a deviation from government norms and standard rules, as seen when the Prime Minister fired two ministers who simply did not share his view.
A majority vote on any controversial issue and the fortification of democratic rule require the decision making process to be flawless.
Professor Yedidia Z. Stern:
In general, reasonable democratic lines were crossed prior to the disengagement. Antidemocratic behavior was exhibited by part of the religious leadership and political leaders (for example, the Yesha Council) of circumventing the law. One such example is the stopping of busses in Kfar Maimon. Despite disquieting concerns, it was unwarranted. The prime minister fired two ministers who did not hold the same opinion as he. Such a dramatic event of consequence should not be done in such a dubious way. Moreover, the prime minister broke his promises, which is undemocratic in itself. The Yesha Council tried to amplify concerns for their actions, yet was aware of lines that should not be crossed. The IDF and the police extensively prepared out of a democratic ethos as executing and not deciding upon the disengagement.
During the disengagement, The IDF and the police also worked very well, practically flawless. However, the mere use of soldiers against citizens is a strategic danger – tomorrow they could be used against Arabs, Orthodox Jews, or any other group of citizens. Individual settlers carried out a heroic feat of giving in to the government de facto. That was the real test of democracy. In this context, the meaning of religion is not diminished because of their democratic act. It just means that they were not willing to go after ‘brand name’ or extremist rabbis. In the end, the number of soldiers who refused to carry out the disengagement was approximately 60, which is less than the amount of refusals from the left who served in Lebanon. This fact, however, doesn’t indicate that the future of this matter can be predicted. The settler movement, the Yesha Council, acted outstandingly during the disengagement. They risked their political asset in order to stop the masses from clashing with democratic entities. The Israeli public exhibited a high level of sensitivity and social solidarity, which is important for the strengthening of democracy.
The Supreme Court should not have been involved in such a decision to begin with. Their decision was also made as a ‘matter of fact,’ without visiting the settlers or showing consideration towards them. This should have definitely been done better.
The domestic media provided fair coverage during the disengagement.
The government erred in that they didn’t openly explain the advantages of the disengagement, or ‘sell’ the disengagement as a kind of ‘package deal’ of democracy and Judaism together. They could have explained the disengagement in a way that serves the nature of the State of Israel as a Jewish nation. In addition there was not enough ‘outreach’ to the settlers. In this case, symbols were of more importance than personal interests, yet the disengagement lacked symbols.
The government excelled in its performance and determination.
One miscalculation made by certain Rabbis was that they thought if they threaten the government, the public would side with them. This was a practical, educational and ideological mistake. The government can’t afford for the issue of borders to amount to the argument of religion and state, and not just security.
Professor Asher Arian:
“At a basic level, the disengagement doesn’t really change anything because the structure of electoral competition remains the same. In my opinion, it didn’t effect the polarization that exists in Israeli society. A third of the Jewish population is still wedded to the idea of retaining the Land of Israel, a quarter is willing to relinquish to the Arabs, and the middle half is somewhere in the middle.
But the disengagement did do something that’s potentially important. It gave a boost of confidence to the Israeli public about the government’s ability to perform. For years it has been argued that the government of Israel has been overwhelmed, that the agenda was too crowded, and the situation was simply ‘ungovernable.’ The disengagement is a good case of when the government wants to do something – it can! The IDF and the police deserve high grades for their performances, which should lead to higher levels of trust in these institutions on the part of the Israeli public."