Palestinian Terrorism in 2010: Report by the Israel Security Agency [30.12.2010]

In December 2010, the Israel Security Agency (ISA) published a report summarizing data and trends concerning Palestinian terrorist activity in 2010. [1]  According to the report, the decrease in the number of terror attacks during 2009 continued in 2010. There have been no suicide bombings for two consecutive years. There has also been a decrease in the number of rocket attacks launched from Gaza into Israel, and in the number of Israelis killed or injured as a result of these attacks.

This article presents a brief summary of the ISA report and discusses its main findings as part of the IDI Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter’s coverage of trends in the fight against terrorism.

In December 2009, the ISA published a report summarizing data and trends concerning Palestinian terrorist activity in 2009. [2]  According to that report, there were no suicide attacks in 2009, and there was a sharp decrease in the number of rocket attacks launched from Gaza into Israel, as well as in the number of Israelis killed or injured as a direct result. The 2009 report also described the current state of the terrorist infrastructure in the Palestinian territories, and the connection between Palestinian armed groups, international terrorism, and the funding of terrorist activity.

The decrease in terror attacks continued in 2010. During 2010, 798 terror attacks were recorded by the ISA (as opposed to 1,354 in 2009).   As in 2009, there were no suicide bombings. The decrease is also reflected in the number of terror-related deaths (9 as opposed to 15 in 2009) and injuries (28 as opposed to 234 in 2009). This brings the total number of Israelis killed in terror attacks since the beginning of the second Intifada (September 2000) to 1,187, and the number of injured to 8,050.

The report also mentions a decrease in the number of rocket and mortar shells fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip. During 2010, 150 rockets (as opposed to 569 in 2009) and 215 mortar shells (as opposed to 289 in 2009) were fired into Israel. According to the ISA, this brings the totals rockets and mortar shells fired into Israel from the Gaza Strip during the period 2005-2101 to 6,166 rockets and 4,612 mortar shells.

With regard to the West Bank and Jerusalem, the ISA report points to a similar trend, noting a continuing decrease  in terror attacks in these areas as well. During 2010, there were 455 terrorist attacks in the West Bank and Jerusalem (as opposed to 626 in 2009, 893 in 2008, 946 in 2007, and 1,309 in 2006). The report also indicates that as in 2009, the vast majority of these attacks (88%) were unorganized and isolated events (often characterized by the throwing of Molotov cocktails). The ISA report, however, also notes that although there was a decrease in the amount of firing incidents during 2010 (16 incidents as opposed to 20 in 2009) there was an increase in the number of Israeli casualties resulting from these attacks, which included five fatalities.

According to the ISA report, throughout 2010 Iran continued to act as a main supporter of  Palestinian terrorist organizations and was the main supplier of weapons being smuggled into the Gaza Strip (via Sudan and the Sinai Desert). Iranian support also included terror financing and the training of terror activists in Lebanon and Syria.

The report also cites the positive counter-terrorism efforts of the Palestinian Authority security services against the activity of the Hamas in the West Bank.

The 2010 ISA  report shows a continuing decrease in terrorist activity in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This decreasing trend may be related, among other things, to changes in the political and economic circumstances in the Palestinian territories, “combat fatigue” on the Palestinian side, and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures taken by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In any event, this “success story” raises the question of whether continued designation of the situation in the West Bank as an armed conflict by the Israeli officials meets international criteria. It may be argued that the power that international law affords states to resort to military means in order to combat terror is applicable only in  “highly volatile” situations. According to this position, low-level terror threats should, according to this position, be addressed through law enforcement (as Israel did from 1967-2000), rather than through military means. It should be noted, however, that the report’s findings should be not be accepted unconditionally. The report does not elaborate on the number of planned attacks thwarted by the security services of Israeli and the Palestinian Authority. Such statistics could have shed a greater light on the potential for terror activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which may, in turn, impact the classification of the conflict.

1. 2010 Annual Summary: Data and Trends in Terrorism
   
   
2. For discussion of the 2009 Report, see Issue 13 of the Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter.