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by Ido Rosenzweig and Yuval Shany

Introduction

IDF Publishes the Conclusions of Five Internal Investigations of Incidents that Occurred During "Operation Cast Lead"
The IDF has recently published the conclusions of five internal investigative teams assigned to investigate certain IDF actions and methods, which were allegedly carried out during the conflict, "Operation Cast Lead," in violation of the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) and of the IDF Code of Ethics.[1] The separate investigative teams which were headed by IDF Colonels, concluded their investigations without making operational findings. However, according to the reports, there were a few errors and incidents that indicated inappropriate conduct. According to the investigations, such mistakes were unavoidable and could occur in any combat situations in which military forces are forced to engage in battle in urban centers, and when civilians are used as human shields by the adversary.

Background

On December 27, 2008, Israel launched an attack on Gaza in response to Kassam rocket attacks on Israeli territory. This was the beginning of "Operation Cast Lead," a conflict between Israel and Hamas militants that persisted for 22 days. During this armed conflict, more than 1300 Palestinians were killed and the civilian infrastructure in Gaza suffered widespread damage.[2] Thirteen Israeli soldiers and civilians were killed during the hostilities.

During and after "Operation Cast Lead," certain allegations were made claiming that several IDF attacks and some of the means and methods it used violated IHL rules (and the IDF Code of Ethics). These included firing at UN facilities; shooting at medical facilities, buildings, vehicles and crews; attacks directed against civilians, buildings and infrastructures; and the use of shells containing white phosphorous.

According to IDF standing orders, internal investigations must be conducted following every IDF operation. On January 18, 2009 (after the cessation of hostilities), the IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. General Ashkenazi, appointed special investigative teams headed by Colonels, which were not part of the chain of command in the operations that they were assigned to investigate. The conclusions of these five investigative teams were published by the IDF on April 22nd, 2009.

In conformity with usual practice, a summary of each investigation has been presented to the Military Advocate General, who is authorized to decide whether additional inquiries are required or whether there is a basis for opening another type of investigation. Moreover, due to the great import of the conclusions of the investigations and the opinion of the Military Advocate General, they will be presented to the Attorney General for review.

IDF spokespersons asserted that the five investigations are supplementary to the other investigations that are routinely undertaken following all IDF operations and to additional processes of verification or investigation taking place at various levels within the IDF.

The Reports

Firing upon UN and international facilities – On January 6, 2009, the IDF fired in the direction of an UNRWA school, Al-Fahoura. The attack allegedly caused the death of 43 people. Although there were many allegations regarding this incident, on February 2, 2009, the UN humanitarian coordinator in Jerusalem confirmed that IDF mortar shells fell in an adjacent street, and not inside the school compound, and that the only casualties of that attack among the Al-Fahoura students and personnel were three students, who were outside of the compound at the time of the attack.[3]

Moreover, on January 15, 2009, the IDF shelled the UNRWA headquarters, injuring 3 people and destroying tons of food and fuel intended for 750,000 Palestinian refugees.[4] A special inquiry mission was appointed by the UN Secretary General to investigate the circumstances of this incident.[5]

Regarding the Al-Fahoura incident, the report of the investigative team, which was headed by Col. Itzik Tureman, concluded that the IDF used minimal and proportionate retaliatory fire (to counter mortar shells fired by Hamas from the vicinity of the school), using the most accurate weapons that were available to the soldiers on the scene, and that all the shells fired by the Israeli forces landed outside the school grounds.

As regards the damage to UNRWA facilities, the investigative team concluded that IDF forces came under fire near these structures and, consequently, there was an exchange of fire in the area. Furthermore, the IDF returned fire only after an IDF armored bulldozer suffered a direct hit from anti-tank fire, and contrary to the allegations made, no one was injured during this incident.

The report concludes that in one incident, a soldier was found to have fired at a UN vehicle in breach of the IDF rules of engagement, and according to IDF Spokespersons, the soldier in question has already been court-martialed. Other than in that incident, the IDF did not open fire with the deliberate intention to hit a UN vehicle or facility in any of the incidents under investigation.

Shooting at medical facilities, buildings, vehicles and crews – These allegations were investigated by a team headed by Col. Erez Katz. The report concluded that the mother and child clinic, which the IDF targeted, was used by the Hamas as a weapons storage facility. Moreover, despite the fact that the building was not identifiable as a clinic and contained no identifying markings, the IDF had, nevertheless, warned the residents of the building prior to the attack.[6] The report also mentioned that in some incidents, the IDF forces refrained from attacking medical vehicles that were being used illegally by Hamas.

Attacking and injuring non-involved civilians – The report focuses on three major incidents in which non-involved civilians were allegedly attacked. The first incident took place on January 1, 2009, when the house of Nazar Riy'an (a senior Hamas operative who on the day prior to the attack called for the renewal of suicide attacks against Israel) was targeted. This attack resulted in the death of Riy'an, his four wives and 11 of their children. In the second incident, a truck containing oxygen tanks was struck, which resulted in the death of eight Palestinians. According to the IDF, four of the casualties were civilian bystanders. The third incident was an attack on the Al-Daia family residence in Gaza on January 3, 2009, which was conducted on the basis of intelligence information and resulted in the death of 21 members of a single family.

The report of the investigative team, headed by Col. Tamir Yedai, concluded that Riy'an's house was a legitimate military target due to Riy'an's involvement in terrorist attacks against Israel, and to the fact that the house was used as a weapons storage facility. Moreover, despite having received appropriate warnings, the Riy'an family did not evacuate the house.

With regard to the second incident, the investigation concluded that the attack on the truck was the result of an intelligence error, which led the commanders to believe that the truck was carrying rockets from a Hamas manufacturing facility to a rocket launching site.

As for the third incident, it was concluded that the attack on the Al-Daia family house was the result of an error in the warning process. Although it was believed that the family had been issued several warnings before the attack, it turns out that the warnings had been delivered to the wrong address and, consequently, the family had not received any advance warnings.

The use of weaponry containing phosphorous – During the conflict, the IDF used weapons containing phosphorus. Although the IDF considers the employment of such weapons to be lawful,[7] the IDF suspended the use of white phosphorus on January 7, 2009 in response to extensive criticism in the international media regarding its use.

According to the investigation team, lead by Col. Shai Alkalai, the IDF used the white phosphorus in conformity with the rules and principles of IHL and more specifically, while respecting the restrictions that apply to munitions with incendiary characteristics. The IDF's use of white phosphorus was designed to create smoke screens for operational purposes and was, therefore, not illegal.

Damage to infrastructure and the destruction of buildings by ground forces – The IDF destroyed and damaged numerous buildings and infrastructure during the conflict. The report of the investigation team, headed by Col. Adam Zusman, found that no non-involved civilians were harmed during the demolition of buildings and infrastructure. Moreover, in many cases, Hamas and other militant groups were responsible for significant material damage, which was actually the result of their practice of placing booby traps and storing explosives in the structures in question. The report also concluded that there were no instances of intentional harm to civilian infrastructure, and also no incidents in which structures were damaged as punitive measures or without operational justification.

Conclusions

The investigation reports emphasize the complex and asymmetrical situations in which a state is placed while fighting a terrorist organization like the Hamas. When a terrorist organization operates within dense urban centers, rendering non-involved civilians de facto human shields, there are both unfortunate casualties and inevitable operational errors.

Still, the quality and authority of the IDF internal investigation reports are not beyond challenge. While the decision to appoint senior officers who were not directly involved in the operations under investigation is judicious, the ability of the teams to examine policy decisions adopted at the highest decision making level (such as certain target selection decisions) is unclear. Moreover, it is not clear how the investigative teams were able to gather all the pertinent evidence and information without entering Gaza and interviewing the Palestinians, who may have witnessed the incidents under investigation.

Notes

[1] http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/doctrine/ethics.htm

[2] See the Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter, February 2009 for a discussion on the general jus ad bellum framework of that conflict.

[3] www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1061189.html

[4] www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29558&Cr=gaza&Cr1=unrwa

[5] See an extensive discussion on the conclusions of this Board of Inquiry in this month's newsletter.

[6] It is unclear why the IDF report notes that the building was not identifiable as a clinic and contained no identifying markings. The fact that the IDF issued warnings to these facilities suggests that there was a knowledge about the nature of these facilities and, therefore, unless their protected status was removed as a result of the military use of the facilities, these buildings and vehicles are protected and must not be considered as a legitimate military target. Chapters IV – VI of the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field

[7] According to the Third Protocol of the Convention on Conventional Weapons