The State of Israel is on the verge of a historic undertaking: the enactment of a full constitution. During the 16th Knesset, for the first time since the founding of the state, the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, headed by MK Mickey Eitan, made significant progress toward drafting an Israeli constitution.
Just prior to the elections for the 17th Knesset the Constitution Committee completed the introductory stage of this process. Now that the 17th Knesset has begun its term, the Constitution Committee, to be headed by the newly appointed MK Prof. Menahem Ben-Sasson, will be entering the historically decisive phase: that of choosing between various alternatives for the sections intended to delineate Israel's governmental and political system, to determine the identity of the state and, above all, to establish the nature and content of Israel's Bill of Rights.
The Constitution Committee under Ben-Sasson has its work cut out for it. In each of the areas mentioned above the committee will be dealing with highly controversial issues.
In recent years we have witnessed the emergence of a meaningful constitutional discourse that has given expression to a broad range of opinions. A few important facts should be noted in this regard - facts whose assimilation into the Israeli collective consciousness is an essential condition for the constitution's enactment.
Firstly, history shows that constitutions have always, in all parts of the world, been approved or established at critical historical junctures, such as political revolutions, in the aftermath of wars, or upon the fall of an old order and the rise of a new one. Israel's constitution, if passed, will be, apparently, the only one ever enacted at a less-than-critical historical moment. We are the only ones ever to have sought to formulate so important a document against the background of a pre-existing, pre-formed political system. It is therefore imperative that the constitutional document be accorded legitimacy by as broad a population base as possible.
Theoretically, and perhaps even practically, a majority in favor of the constitution could be assembled by representatives of a portion of the Israeli public - for example, representatives of the secular-liberal parties, etc. But an endeavor of this nature would not ensure ratification of the constitutional text by various existing minorities; it would actually undermine the entire process and render it meaningless.
THE ISRAEL Democracy Institute has submitted to the Knesset leadership a complete constitution draft based on principles of compromise and consensus. We, fellows at the institute, in drafting our proposed constitutional document under the leadership of former Supreme Court president Meir Shamgar, have devoted tremendous amounts of time, energy, and emotional and intellectual effort to formulating a model that demands compromise on the part of each of Israeli society's major component groups, while also securing for each of these groups significant benefits.
Criticism has been voiced in the pages of this newspaper of the institute's proposed constitution. This criticism has been heard by us, and it is being attended to elsewhere by parties across the political and ideological spectrum. Some have lodged criticism of our proposal from the liberal standpoint, while others have criticized it from the opposite perspective. It should be emphasized that no one from the Israel Democracy Institute who took part in formulating the draft constitution is happy with the final product. Each of us, had it been left up to him, would have drafted a completely different text.
However, the text to which we are all signatories does represent a spirit of concrete compromise without which, in our opinion, no constitution will ever be enacted. Had each of us not displayed the willingness to make concessions, even pa