Israel: A Society of Immigrants

There are several models of cultural absorption, each yielding a different outcome:

• In the assimilation model, immigrants adopt the values of the dominant culture, whether voluntarily or in response to the demands of the new society, with the goal of fashioning themselves after members of the host society.
  
• In the integration model, immigrants adopt some of the new cultural patterns of the receiving society while retaining certain patterns of their old culture, due to a desire to preserve their former identity, if only in part, and the need for a sense of continuity, belonging, and self-esteem.
  
• In the segregation model, immigrants retain their former patterns of behavior and do not adopt the new patterns of the receiving society. As a rule, this type of model comes to the fore when the majority group in the host society refuses to accept the newcomers, or when the latter are opposed to the culture of the new society.
  
• In the marginalization model, the cultural shock experienced by new immigrants leads to feelings of loss, estrangement, lack of belonging, and alienation. As a result, they are unable to form a connection with the dominant majority and are shunted to the margins of society.

In addition to these models, the unique characteristics of the particular migrant group and the economic, political, and cultural changes in the receiving society must be taken into account. These factors, taken in combination, have a decisive effect not only on the absorption process but on the society as a whole.

Following the mass immigrations of the late 1940s and early 1950s, Jews of Asian and North African origin (henceforth Mizrahim) made up 40% of Israel's Jewish population. But the demographic shift in Israeli society was not reflected in the balance of power, and the ruling elite remained largely Ashkenazi.

Since the aliyah of the 1950s, the Mizrahim had been discriminated against politically, as demonstrated by their lack of representation in the corridors of power. Likewise, they were ranked in the lower echelons in terms of income level, standard of living, and occupation. Their feelings of injustice and discrimination came to a head in the Wadi Salib riots of 1959, which began with a chance confrontation between the police and a resident of Haifa's Wadi Salib neighborhood and quickly escalated into a series of violent demonstrations throughout the city. While this was a one-time, localized event, it had ramifications for Israeli society as a whole: first, the riots led to a rise in electoral support for the Herut movement among Jewish immigrants from North Africa; and second, the conflagration marked the beginning of the emergence of class consciousness among Mizrahi Jews.

In the early 1970s, the confluence of ethnic and social-economic rifts found potent expression in the founding of the Israeli Black Panther movement, led by second-generation North African immigrants and residents of Jerusalem's Musrara neighborhood who were protesting what they saw as the Establishment's disregard of social problems. To achieve their central goal of narrowing the social-economic gap, the group used violent tactics, including furious demonstrations and confrontations with police. Not only did they object to the conditions granted them by the state compared with those of the Ashkenazi Jews who had arrived together with them in the early years of the state, but they sought the same treatment as the Russian immigrants of the early '70s; toward this end, they demanded government assistance to improve the living conditions of second-generation North African immigrants, who were still languishing in poverty. This situation led to bitter tensions between new immigrants (from the 1970s) and earlier arrivals (from the 1950s), as illustrated in figure 3 (below) from the 2007 Israel Democracy Index: In 1975, a record 69% of the population characterized relations between new and longstanding immigrant populations as “not good” or “not at all good.”

While the Black Panthers did not achieve major successes on the political front, the '70s and early '80s were marked by fierce tensions between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as a result of the publicity garnered by the movement and the social-cultural awareness that it generated. As shown in figure 1, in 1971 (one year after the movement's founding), one-half of the population (51%) characterized relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as either “not good” or “not at all good.” While this figure dropped somewhat by 1975 (to 45%), it was still high.

Figure 1: Relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, 1972–2007
“Not good” and “not at all good” (Jewish sample only; percentages)

*From 2007 Democracy Index: Cohesion in a Divided Society - p. 81, figure 44

In 1977, the social protest of the Mizrahim spread to the political arena, sweeping the Likud party to power in the Ninth Knesset. First- and second-generation immigrants, believing that the Likud under Menachem Begin would faithfully represent their interests and reduce the social-economic gap, gave the party their vote. Perhaps it was their sense of victory that created an atmosphere of reconciliation: in 1978, one year after the so-called “political upheaval,” only 38% of Israelis described relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as “not good” or “not at all good.”

Following this brief respite, however, the worsening economic crisis of the early 1980s saw a widening of the social-economic divide, adding to the friction between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. In 1981, 44% of the public characterized relations between the two groups as “not good” or “not at all good.”
During the 1980s and 1990s, a change took place in the social-political sphere with the founding of such religious- and ethnic-oriented parties as TAMI (Movement for Jewish Tradition) in 1981; and SHAS (World Union of Sephardi Torah Guardians) in 1984, dedicated to “restoring the crown [of Sephardi Torah observance and ethnic pride] to its former glory.” With its stated goal of rectifying the economic and social discrimination inflicted, in its view, on generations of Mizrahim in Israel, Shas also drew a connection between Israel's ethnic and social-economic divides. The party's strength grew during the 1990s amid the worsening of tensions in these areas; in the elections to the 15th Knesset in 1999, Shas won 17 seats, a fact that amply demonstrated the centrality of ethnic friction in the social-political discourse. In fact, whereas in 1989 only 21% of Israeli respondents felt that relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim were “not good” or “not at all good” (with 28% responding similarly in 1993), by 2000 the situation had deteriorated to the point where 52% held that the ethnic divide was still present and that relations between the groups were not good. 

Since 2000, public opinion concerning relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim has stabilized somewhat, although the figures themselves are not encouraging: 2003 saw a record 57% who characterized relations between the groups as “not good.” While there was a slight decline in 2004 in the proportion of respondents selecting “not good” (47%), the percentage has been rising steadily since then (to 55% in 2007).

An analysis of relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in 2007, broken down by country of origin of the respondents, paints a similar picture: As shown in figure 2, 59% of Israelis of Asian and North African origin describe relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim as “not good” or “not at all good,” as opposed to 42% of respondents of European or American origin who hold this view—a gap of 17%. Interestingly enough, Israelis hailing from the CIS further underscore the problematic relationship between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim, with 63% labeling it “not good” (this may be due to the differential treatment given to immigrants from the CIS, causing them to stress the differences between the two groups; see below for further discussion of this disparity).

Figure 2: Relations between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim by Country of Origin
“Not good” and “not at all good” (Jewish sample only; percentages)

*From 2007 Democracy Index: Cohesion in a Divided Society - p. 81, figure 45

Thus, while the North African immigrants of the 1950s have integrated into Israeli society, the ethnic divide still plays a key role in the prevailing political discourse in Israel, and still affects—and is affected by—the country's social-economic situation.

Ethiopian Jews immigrated to Israel in two principal waves:

• Of the 17,000 who moved to Israel during the 1980s, 6,700 came as part of Operation Moses (November 1984–January 1985).
  
• Another 45,000 immigrants came to Israel in the 1990s, 14,000 of them in Operation Solomon (May 1991).

Like the newcomers of the 1950s, Ethiopian immigrants also faced numerous problems since the community's social and economic characteristics hampered its integration:

• Human capital: A large percentage of Ethiopian immigrants were uneducated. Many were farmers, and had limited familiarity with the educational frameworks and workplaces of a modern society. These factors, together with their di