

Sammy Smootha

Still Playing by the Rules

Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2015



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סמי סמוחה

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The 2015 Index book is based on the text and data-analysis of the 2013 Index, with the required changes and updating.

The book does not reflect the opinions of the funding foundations or the University of Haifa, under whose auspices this research was conducted. I bear sole and full responsibility for its contents.

Sammy Smooha

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CHAPTER 1

About the Index

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel draws on Arab and Jewish public opinion surveys, measuring the attitudes of Arab and Jewish citizens toward one another and toward the state, and monitoring trends of change in these attitudes over the years.

The Arab survey is based on 700 face-to-face interviews conducted with a national representative sample of Arab citizens aged 18 and over (including Druze and Bedouin, but excluding Palestinians in East Jerusalem and Druze in the Golan Heights, who are by and large not Israeli citizens). The Jewish survey analyses 700 telephone interviews with a national representative sample of Jews aged 18 and over (including immigrants, ultra-Orthodox, settlers living in the West Bank, and Moshav and Kibbutz members). The Arabs were interviewed by Arab interviewers in Arabic and Jews were interviewed by Jews in Hebrew and Russian, and all were guaranteed full confidentiality. The interviews were conducted on the basis of fixed-choice questionnaires which in 2015 included 198 items for Arabs and 125 items for Jews. The sampling error in each survey is plus or minus 3.7%.

The surveys for the 2015 Index were conducted following the Knesset elections that were held on March 17, 2015, but before the wave of terrorism that erupted on October 1, 2015. The Arab survey was carried out in May-July 2015 and the Jewish survey in June 2015.

The Index data are weighted according to the returns of the 2015 Knesset elections, ensuring full correspondence between reports of voting in the interviews and the actual election returns. Since 2003 the Index surveys have been conducted according to the same design, allowing direct comparisons of the results from 2003 to 2015. However, there are no Indexes for 2005 and 2014

due to insufficient funding. The Index questionnaires include some questions which were posed in surveys of Arabs since 1976 and surveys of Jews since 1980. These questions were asked until 2015 and are used as benchmarks to measure long-term trends of change among Arab and Jewish attitudes.

The Index examines sixteen key issues on which Arabs and Jews are likely to differ. These are social and cultural separation; the image of the other; alienation; distrust of the other side and state and public institutions; deprivation; collective memory; perceived threats; legitimacy of coexistence (Arabs' granting or denying legitimacy to Israel as an independent, Jewish, and Zionist state; Jews' granting or denying legitimacy to Arabs' civil, ethnic, and national rights); regional disputes (the conflicts between Israel on the one hand and the Palestinians and the Arab world on the other); regional integration (should Israel strive for integration into the West or the region); identity; minority leadership (role and trust); cultural autonomy; means of struggle; options for change (desirable change in Israel's policy and regime); and overall evaluation of the state of Arab-Jewish relations. In addition to these constant issues, every year the Index focuses on a specific issue, either one of the constant issues or another important topical issue that may shed light on the three way relations between Arab citizens, Jews, and the state. In the 2015 Index new questions were asked concerning the Joint List (the united list of the three Arab political parties and the Arab-Jewish party Hadash), statements made by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Moshe Kahlon during the 2015 Knesset campaign concerning the Arab minority, Operation Protective Edge (the 2014 Gaza Conflict), and concerning regional developments.

In addition to analyzing the findings regarding each issue, the cumulative Index data allows us to examine short-term trends of change for the Index years since 2003, and long-term trends of change in Arab attitudes since 1976 and Jewish attitudes since 1980. In addition, it explores drivers for coexistence (namely, background and other characteristics associated with attitudes toward Arab-Jewish coexistence).

Like other Israeli indexes, principally the Israeli Democracy Index by the Israel Democracy Institute, the Peace Index by Tel Aviv University and the Israel Democracy Institute, and the National Resilience Index by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel has several advantages over incidental public opinion polls. It is a scientific tool for investigating a certain issue, comprehensively and annually, based on national representative surveys of the adult population; it enables cross-temporal comparisons in order to examine trends of change beyond random fluctuations; and constitutes a database offering valuable information to researchers, policy makers, and any other interested party.

This brief publication in English presents the goals and methodology of the Index, the findings of all sixteen issues covered by the study, general conclusions concerning Arab-Jewish relations, and the topline of the Arab and Jewish surveys (the answers in percentages to all questions asked). A full report appears in the separate book in Hebrew on the 2015 Index published by Pardes Publishing House.

CHAPTER 2

Main Findings

Israeli society is deeply divided due to the schisms between Arabs and Jews and between the religious and secular. Cultural differences between Palestinian-Arab and Jewish citizens, as well as the separation of institutions and communities, are permanent and clearly discernible. The two groups fundamentally disagree on principal issues concerning the character of the state, Arab national rights, the conflict with the Arab world, and integration into the region.

The general public, media figures, policy makers, and academic researchers for the most part believe that Arab-Jewish relations in Israel since the state's establishment have been characterized by increasing radicalization on all sides, leading eventually to confrontation and the collapse of mutual relations. This is viewed as part of broader processes that are underway: empowerment, Palestinization, and growing religiosity and Islamization of the Arab minority; the Jewish's majority's shift to the right and towards religion; and the entrenchment of the State of Israel in the occupied territories and in its Jewish-Zionist character. Furthermore, the ruling political right is in the process of recasting the State of Israel and Israeli society, molding the country into a growingly ethno-national and illiberal entity. Accordingly, neither side acts meaningfully to promote coexistence and integration between Arab and Jewish citizens. By providing an up-to-date and detailed picture of Arab and Jewish attitudes, the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel can test the dominant thesis of mutual radicalization and alienation.

We present below the key findings of the 2015 Index with full comparison to the findings from 2003, 2012, and 2013, in

addition to some results from earlier surveys. These comparisons shed light on the reliability of the 2015 findings and the extent to which they are representative, as well as helping to identify trends of change over time.

Many factors have contributed to the deterioration of Arab-Jewish relations since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. These include the shattering of the high hopes which the Rabin government instilled in the Arabs; the failure of the Oslo Accords; the Arab unrest of October 2000; the repression of the second Intifada; the belligerent acts committed by the Palestinians, Hezbollah, and Israel throughout the 2000s; the legislative steps and restrictions imposed in order to contain the national struggle of the Arab public and leadership; and the lack of a grand state program for achieving socio-economic equality. Despite the exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and some worsening of Arab-Jewish relations, Israel proper has maintained tranquility and stability, but fears concerning the breakdown of coexistence and violent outbursts are on the rise.

This trend of exacerbation continued until the fall of 2012, as is demonstrated clearly by the 2012 Index. Yet the exacerbation evidently came to an end in 2013, when the forces drawing Arabs and Jews together overwhelmed those dividing them. The year 2013 began with elections for the 19th Knesset, which led to the formation of a right-wing-center government, replacing the prior right-wing government. The new government negotiated a permanent settlement with the Palestinians and released Palestinian prisoners. Nonetheless, the government demanded that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish people's homeland, a demand which the Palestinians utterly rejected, under pressure from and with the blessing of Israel's Arab citizens. Yisrael Beitenu's idea of ceding the Triangle (a concentration of Arab towns and villages in Israel's central region, alongside the Green Line, in which one fifth of the Israeli Arab population resides) to a future Palestinian state remained on the national agenda in 2013, forcing the Arabs to consider seriously the meaning of their citizenship and paradoxically pushing them to appreciate their life

in Israel. Arab feelings towards Israel also became more positive in the wake of their bitter disenchantment with the Arab Spring; the continued bloodshed in Syria, the use of military force to oust the Muslim Brothers' government in Egypt, and the rise of Islamic regimes to power in Gaza, Libya, and Tunisia.

In 2013, the Israeli government submitted to the Knesset a bill for the settlement of unsettled Negev Bedouin, but retracted it due to internal disagreement within the government coalition. The new government also wisely avoided crossing the red line of imposing obligatory civil service on Arabs. An impressive rise in the number of Arab volunteers to civil service was apparent despite the boycott campaign by Arab leaders. In addition, it appears that various initiatives for economic integration of the Arab population, mainly the Arab middle class, began bearing fruit in this year.

The 2013 Index revealed that the harshening of Arab attitudes, a trend underway since 1996, had stopped. Attitudes toward Jews and the state ceased to radicalize among all Arab population groups and in some cases even became more moderate. Among Jews, the historical trend of stabilization-moderation of attitudes continued. Contrary to the dominant view, Jewish public opinion regarding the Arab minority has not become increasingly critical and negative. Despite their drift to the right, the majority of Jews has learned over the years to distinguish Israeli Palestinian citizens from non-citizen Palestinians, accepting them and respecting their rights. It seems that the emergence and incitement of the radical right are responsible for the widespread stereotyping of the silent Jewish public as progressively more anti-Arab.

The 2015 Index can shed light on the intriguing questions of whether the halt in the harshening of Arab attitudes in 2013 was a fleeting change or a real turning point and whether the stability in Jewish attitudes continues. The counterbalancing forces on Arabs and Jews remained potent during the year and a half which passed between the 2013 Index and the 2015 Index. On the one hand, Operation Protective Edge and the 2015 elections for the 20th Knesset strongly alienated Arabs and Jews: the two sides sharply disagreed on Israel's instigation of hostilities and the great damage

this caused to the Palestinians in Gaza. The anti-Arab campaign during the Knesset elections further distanced Arabs and Jews from each other. On the other hand, the alienation of Arab citizens was softened by their deep disaffection with the continued deterioration of the Arab Spring and their realization that they do not have a better alternative to life as a minority in Israel. The silent Jewish majority continues to reject the far right's slogans against the Arabs, realizing that Arab citizens differ from Palestinian non-citizens, that they are a permanent entity in the country, and that both Jews and the state must come to terms with them.

For the sake of brevity, the following presentation of the main findings for each of the sixteen key issues examined in the Index does not include the internal differences within the Arab and Jewish groups. These differences are similar and consistent across all the issues. Arabs with more critical and radical positions are disproportionately non-Druze, religious, identify themselves as Palestinian-Arab without an Israeli component, have suffered more from Jews or state institutions (displacement during the 1948 war, land expropriations, enduring state discrimination, experiencing threats, humiliations and blows from Jews), have had fewer positive experiences with Jews (friendship, spending time together, receiving help, residing in a separate Arab village or town), and identify with Arab national political parties (feeling closer to or voting for them) as well as the Northern faction of the Islamic Movement.

Jews who are more critical or opposed to Arab citizens tend to be orthodox or ultra-orthodox, identify themselves more as Jewish than Israeli, are generally less educated, poorer, have suffered more from threats, humiliations, and blows by Arab citizens, have experienced fewer positive contacts with Arabs (friendship, spending time together, receiving help, they residing in an exclusively Jewish community), are hawkish in their approach to national security and concessions to the Palestinians, and most importantly are supporters of right-wing, orthodox or ultra-orthodox Jewish political parties.

We will discuss below the differences in attitudes within each community in the section "Internal Differences and Predictors".

1. Separation

Contrary to the stereotypical perception that Jews reject Arabs, the Index surveys have detected a high level of openness to integration among Jews. In 2015, 51.8% of Arabs (a decrease from 66.4% in 2003, 55.3% in 2012, and 62.8% in 2013) and 52.7% of Jews (a rise from 34.5% in 2003 and 45.7% in 2012) support the idea of Arabs living in Jewish neighborhoods (Table 1). In the field of education, 46.5% of Arabs in 2015 (a decrease from 70.5%, 45.1%, 54.1%) and 60.4% of Jews (a rise from 51.5% in 2003 and 54.9% in 2012) agree to have Arab students attending Jewish high schools. Neighborhoods and schools constitute intimate frameworks and thus integration within them could break down the enormous segregation between Arabs and Jews in Israel.

Table 1 Collective Social Integration, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews		
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2015
Friendly relations between Arabs and Jews	89.4	79.6**	*	*	77.9	69.2**	*
Arabs live in Jewish neighborhoods	66.4	55.3	62.8	51.8	34.5	45.7	52.7
Arabs study in Jewish high schools	70.5	45.1	54.1	46.5	51.5	54.9	60.4
Planned encounters between Arab and Jewish youth	86.2	*	*	*	75.6	*	*
Arabs spend time at Jewish leisure places	*	*	76.5	72.7	*	*	*
Arabs visit parks and swimming pools in the Jewish sector	78.1	*	*	*	57.4	*	*
Joint organizations for Arabs and Jews	87.2	68.8	75.8	77.1	70.5	69.4	*
Arab political parties participate in government coalitions	80.7	72.8	79.8	72.4	47.4	52.8	51.5

*Question not asked

**In 2010

A no less important finding is that 72.4% of Arabs in 2015 (a decline from 80.7% in 2003, 72.8% in 2012, and 79.8% in 2013) and 51.5% of Jews (No change from 47.4% in 2003 and 52.8% in 2013) support the participation of Arab political parties in government coalitions. In 2015, this implied endorsement of the potential entry of the Joint List into a left-center coalition. The degree of support among Arabs and Jews for the inclusion of Arab parties in the coalition is particularly high against the backdrop of opposition to such a possibility amidst both Arab and Jewish political parties. While in 2003 the level of support for social integration was consistently lower among Jews than among Arabs, this gap has since narrowed.

Moreover, the Arab desire to integrate, and the willingness of Jews to facilitate this integration, is evident not only on the general and abstract level, but also in more personal and concrete contexts. For example, 39.4% of Arabs in 2015 (a decrease from 48.6% in 2013) state explicitly that they are personally interested in living in Jewish neighborhoods, while 43.7% of Jews (a rise from 49.2%) agree to the possibility of Arabs living in their own neighborhood. These figures reveal a strong support for integration among both Arabs and Jews, particularly given the immense segregation currently existing between the two communities in terms of families, localities, housing (it is extremely rare for Arabs and Jews to be door-to-door neighbors), education, religion, civil society, political parties, and the security forces.

Majorities of 67.7% in 2015 (compared to 60.4% in 2003, 63.9% in 2012, and 67.2% in 2013) of the Arabs and 58.6% of the Jews (compared to 57.6%, 54.0%, and 51.9%) think that Arab and Jewish citizens should create common values and customs in addition to their own existing ones (Table 2). From the Arab perspective, social and cultural integration would increase their access to resources and to a less traditional way of life, without forcing them to assimilate into the Jewish population. The Jewish public accepts the idea of integration without Arab assimilation and does not fear that the participation of Arabs in the development of the Israeli-Hebrew culture will downgrade it.

Table 2 Collective Cultural Integration, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
Jews/Arabs have many good and important values and customs that Arabs/Jews should adopt	65.8	52.3	60.7	63.3	43.2*	41.8	36.1	45.7
Arab citizens and Jews should create new common values and practices in addition to their own existing ones	60.4	63.9	67.2	67.7	57.6	54.0	51.9	58.6

*In 2004

These findings clearly demonstrate that the trend of the end of mounting separation which was evident in 2013-2015 continued and indicate an increased desire for integration among both Arabs and Jews.

2. Image of the Other

There is an evident regression in the Arab images of Jews from 2013 to 2015. The image of Jews as violent rose from 30.5% in 2013 to 42.6% in 2015 (compared to 42.4% in 2003 and 50.7% in 2012) as a result of the excessive force which the IDF applied in the 2014 Gaza War (Table 3). In consequence, the Arab perception of Jews as swindlers also rose from 35.6% in 2013 to 45.8% in 2015 (compared to 52.5% in 2009 and 35.6% in 2012). Likewise there was also an increase in the attribution of racism to Jews during these years from 51.4% in 2013 to 55.1% in 2015 (55.7% in 2003 and 60.5% in 2012).

Table 3 Image of Jews among Arabs, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Most Jews in Israel are disposed to violent behavior	42.4	50.7	30.5	42.6
Most Jews in Israel are racist	55.7	69.5	51.4	55.1
Most Jews in Israel are swindlers	52.5*	56.1	35.6	45.8

*In 2009

By contrast, there are less stereotyping and more stability in Jewish perceptions of Arab citizens. A third (33.6%) of the Jews in 2015, as compared to 35.8% in 2013 (a decrease from 39.9% in 2003 and 35.8% in 2012), view Arabs as violent, while 31.7% in 2015 and 34.4% in 2013 (33.5% in 2003 and 31.8% in 2012) regard them as non law-abiding citizens. In the same vein, 30.4% in 2015, as compared to 31.4% in 2013 (33.0% and 31.3%), think that the majority of Arab citizens could never reach the same level of cultural development as Jews (Table 4).

Table 4 Image of Arabs among Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Most Arab citizens are disposed to violent behavior	39.9	35.8	35.8	33.6
Most Arab citizens are non law-abiding	33.5	31.8	34.4	31.7
Most Arab citizens could never achieve the same cultural level as Jews	33.0	31.3	31.4	30.4

3. Alienation

The sense of unease regarding casual encounters between Arabs and Jews in the public domain reflects considerable alienation. In 2015, 26.6% of the Arabs feel uncomfortable working with Jewish co-workers; 33.6% (a rise from 25.2% in 2011) feel uncomfortable visiting a shopping mall where Jews are also present; and 31.1% (a rise from 24.5% in 2011) feel uncomfortable receiving service

at a government office alongside Jews (Table 5). In 2011, the analogous levels of discomfort among Jews encountering Arabs were 20.7% in workplaces, 33.1% in shopping malls, and 20.6% in government offices. It can be assumed that respondents underreport the sense of discomfort for reasons of political correctness. Although only a minority of Arabs and Jews report a sense of discomfort at encounters in the common public space, these findings manifest a significant amount of mutual alienation between the two populations.

Table 5 Feelings of Unease When Arabs and Jews Happen to Be in the Same Area at the Same Time, Arabs and Jews, 2011, 2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs		Jews
	2011	2015	2011
In a shopping mall	25.2	33.6	33.1
Using public transportation (bus, cab, train)	25.9	*	36.3
In a medical institution (a clinic, a hospital)	20.1	*	23.6
In a government office	24.5	31.1	20.6
In a public park	24.0	*	29.4
In the workplace	22.7	26.6	20.7

*Question not asked

The sense of estrangement is more severe than the feeling of uneasiness. About two fifths (41.2%) of Arabs feel estranged and rejected by Jews, while close to half (48.3%) do not feel proud of Israel’s achievements (Table 6). 41.2% of Arabs (a decline from 50.0% in 2003) and 57.9% of Jews (a decrease from 69.5% in 2003) feel distanced from each other. In addition, 55.7% of the Arabs (a rise from 34.8% in 2003), as compared to 11.2% of Jews (a decline from 21.1% in 2003), feel dissatisfied with their life as citizens in Israel.

Table 6 Feelings of Dissatisfaction with the State, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
I feel distant from Jews/Arabs in Israel	50.0	50.8	42.7	41.2	69.5	62.2	65.9	57.9
As an Israeli citizen I feel alien and rejected in Israel	54.3	55.5	43.7	48.0	*	*	*	*
Feelings of dissatisfaction with their lives as Israeli citizens	34.8	56.5	47.8	55.7	21.1	*	*	11.2
I feel proud of Israel's achievements in all areas, e.g., sports, science and economy	65.7	43.4	48.9	48.3	*	*	*	*
Israel is a good place to live	74.5**	58.5	70.7	64.0	85.9**	*	*	*

*Question not asked

**In 2007

Other important findings disclose serious but diminishing Jewish rejection of Arabs. Among Jews, 29.0% (a decrease from 40.3% in 2003) are not willing to work under an Arab superior, and 59.3% (73.1% in 2003) report refraining from entering Arab villages and towns in Israel, probably resulting from a mixture of alienation, fear, and boycott (Table 7).

In 2015, Arabs and Jews were asked to evaluate the ramifications of Operation Protective Edge and the elections for the 20th Knesset — two events that occurred shortly before the 2015 Index surveys were conducted. Among Arabs, who as a whole opposed Operation Protective Edge, 68.6% stated that it made them feel more distant from Jews; among Jews (of whom 85.4% supported the operation), 62.1% felt more distant from

Arabs (Table 8) as a result of the operation. The elections for the 20th Knesset led 58.4% of Arabs and 44.9% of Jews to feel more distant from the other side.

Table 7 Rejection of the Other Side, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
I am not prepared to have a Jewish/ Arab friend	15.7	27.8	20.7	24.3	31.3	*	37.7	*
I am not prepared to have a Jewish/ Arab neighbor	27.2	37.6	29.7	39.2	47.4	46.9	45.7	41.0
I am not prepared to work under an Arab superior in my job					40.3	38.0	38.2	29.0
I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel	*	*	*	*	73.1	57.6	58.0	59.3

*Question not asked

During the first two years of the Arab Spring, the Arabs in Israel identified with it because it propelled Arab awakening and the democratization of Arab political regimes. This identification distanced them from Jews, who rejected and feared the Arab Spring. Yet after 2013 Israeli Arabs became disillusioned with the deteriorating Arab Spring, finding themselves increasingly in agreement with Jews. This change is missing, however, in the ratio of 34.9% to 22.9% of Arabs that report feeling more rather than less alienated from Jews in 2015 as a result of the Arab Spring. It is difficult for Arabs to disclose positive feelings toward Jews when evaluating the impact of controversial historical events.

Table 8 Feelings of Alienation from the Other Side in the Aftermath of Recent Events, Arabs and Jews, 2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs 2015	Jews 2015
Feelings of alienation from Jews/Arabs in the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge, 2014	68.6	62.1
Feelings of alienation from Jews/Arabs in the aftermath of the elections for the 20th Knesset, 2015	58.4	44.9
Feelings toward Jews in the aftermath of the failure of the Arab Spring:		
Alienation	34.9	
Closer	22.9	
No change	40.9	
No answer	1.3	

4. Distrust

Mutual distrust is one of the gravest problems in deeply divided societies. Distrust is evidently widespread in Israel: 54.2% of Arabs (no change from 55.6% in 2003) and 41.8% of Jews (a decrease from 52.1% in 2003) do not trust most people in the other group. Intergroup distrust is not on the rise in either group (Table 9).

A lack of confidence in professional institutions is far less significant than feelings of mistrust towards political institutions among both Arabs and Jews. In 2015, only 15.6% of Arabs and 23.1% of Jews do not have confidence in health services, in addition to 37.9% and 38.1%, respectively, in the courts. In contrast, 63.7% of Arabs and 54.7% of Jews do not have faith in the Knesset. The rate of non-confidence in Israel's right-wing government among average Arabs (67.8%) is greater than that among average Jews (55.7%), but far below that of average Jews on the moderate left (78.1%) and left (90.5%).

Table 9 Distrust of the Other Side and State and Public Institutions, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
It is impossible to trust most Jews/ Arab citizens	55.6	62.4	55.3	54.2	52.1	48.3	45.8	41.8
Lack of trust in health services	6.7	10.7**	18.7	15.6	15.6	16.2**	18.1	23.0
Lack of trust in Higher Education institutions	*	25.8	*	20.8	*	12.1	*	21.1
Lack of trust in the courts	27.5	34.6**	38.7	37.9	29.9	41.1**	35.9	38.1
Lack of trust in National Insurance Institute	*	46.1	*	*	*	41.1	*	*
Lack of trust in local government	*	63.2	*	*	*	29.8	*	*
Lack of trust in the police	*	64.7	*	64.2	*	36.0	*	51.9
Lack of trust in the Knesset	58.3	64.6	66.3	63.7	64.2	64.4	51.8	54.7
Lack of trust in the government	71.7	70.4	73.1	67.8	57.2	50.4	51.8	55.7

*Question not asked

**In 2007

5. Deprivation

Arabs feel deprived and many attribute their predicament to government policy. A majority of 67.0% of Arabs in 2015 believe that the government treats them as second-rate citizens or as hostile citizens who do not deserve equality, compared to a majority of 63.9% of Jews who view government policy as based on equality or only minor discrimination (Table 10). Jews perceive manifestations of institutional discrimination and differential

treatment of Arabs as something which Arabs “deserve” for their wrongdoing and failure to identify with the state.

Table 10 Evaluation of Government Policy toward Arab Citizens, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
The government treats Arabs in Israel:								
As equal citizens	7.4	6.6	6.9	7.5	20.7	25.9	29.2	28.9
As equal citizens with discrimination in certain areas	29.9	21.4	25.2	24.1	36.6	38.0	33.9	35.0
As second class citizens	44.0	42.8	44.0	40.2	29.4	24.2	24.5	19.8
As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	18.3	27.7	22.7	26.8	8.5	6.8	5.9	8.9
No answer	0.4	1.5	1.2	1.4	4.8	5.2	6.5	7.4

The Arabs’ negative assessment of government policy toward them is nurtured by the government foreign and security policies, as well as its special legislative measures to restrict their freedom of action. Most Arabs respond harshly to new laws disallowing family unification if one spouse originates from an enemy area, imposing fines for public commemoration of the Nakba, authorizing admission committees of communal villages to reject candidates as “unfit”, punishing anyone who calls for a boycott of persons or institutions associated with Israel (including Jewish settlements in the West Bank), and other motions to restrict freedom and rights. In 2011, as many as 76.2% of Arabs felt that these laws weakened their confidence in coexistence with Jews, with 75.6% reporting that they diminished their belief in Israel’s right to exist.

In addition to land confiscations and displacement in the past, in 2015 Arabs report the following negative experiences: 26.7% have suffered from threats, humiliation, or blows perpetrated by Jews, 48.9% report discrimination by Jews or the state, 12.0% have been harassed by state authorities, and 11.5% have

suffered damage due to protest activities. These rates have risen in comparison to those of 2003, but not in comparison to 2013.

In contrast to harm endured by Arabs, in 2015 20.5% of Jews (a rise from 18.7% in 2013 and 14.9% in 2003) report suffering from threats, humiliation, or blows committed by Arab citizens (Table 11). Since Jews outnumber Arabs in a ratio of 5 to 1, the number of Jews harmed by Arabs is several times greater than the number of Arabs hurt by Jews. This attests to the strong and assertive character of the Arab minority.

The negative experiences of Arabs and Jews are counterbalanced by positive experiences: in 2015 58.3% of the Arabs (no change from 62.2% in 2013) report receiving help from Jews and 72.6% (a decrease from 79.3% in 2013) spend leisure time with Jews. In comparison, in 2015 18.8% of Jews (a rise from 12.3% in 2013) report receiving help from Arabs and 26.8% (26.6% in 2013) spend time with Arabs.

Table 11 Personal Experiences, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
Have personally encountered threats, insults, or blows perpetrated by Jews/Arab citizens	19.4	26.4	22.7	26.7	14.9	18.8	18.7	20.5
Have personally, as Arabs, encountered discrimination by Jews or state institutions	44.9	52.5	52.9	48.9				
During the past three years have been harassed by the authorities for their participation in protest actions	3.7	8.5	10.3	12.0				
During the past three years their livelihood has been hurt by their participation in protest actions	3.5	6.1	9.1	11.5				
Have received help from Jews/ Arab citizens	46.2	48.5	62.2	58.3	16.4	20.1	12.3	18.8
Have spent leisure time with Jews/Arab citizens	44.2	68.7	79.3	72.6	22.2	29.7	26.6	26.8

During the Knesset election campaign in 2015, Jewish leaders made statements about Arab citizens that could be viewed as racist. A majority of 82.6% of Arabs compared to a minority of 38.7% of Jews labeled as racist Kahlon's statement that he was not willing to join a left-center coalition based on the Arab Joint List. More significant was Netanyahu's call to his supporters, on Election Day, to ensure they voted because the Arabs were voting en masse. This was viewed as racist by 85.8% of Arabs and 42.2% of Jews (Table 12). The Jewish attitude to this issue was affected by political orientation. As few as 22.2% of Jews on the right, in contrast to as many as 57.7% on the center and 90.5% on the left, condemned Netanyahu's call as racist. This reveals the ever deepening chasm between the Israeli political right and left and the right's diminishing commitment to liberalism, democracy, human rights, and tolerance of the other.

Table 12 Designation of Statements Made during the 2015 Election Campaign as Racist, Arabs and Jews, 2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs	Jews
	2015	2015
The statement by Kahlon, head of Kulanu Party, that he will not join a coalition based on Arab votes	82.6	38.7
Prime Minister Netanyahu's call to his supporters to ensure they vote because the Arabs were voting en masse	85.8	42.2

6. Threats

Both sides reveal a very strong sense of feeling threatened by the other, though this fear has not risen since 2003. In 2015, 67.9% of Arabs (81.1% in 2003, 77.8% in 2012, and 70.7% in 2013) fear grave violation of their basic rights; 67.1% (71.1%, 75.9%, and 67.0%) fear state violence; and 53.5% (50.6%, 66.5%, and 53.6%) fear annexation of the "Triangle" region to a future Palestinian state (Table 13).

**Table 13 Fear of Collective Threats, Arabs,
2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)**

	Arabs			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Severe infringement of Arab citizens' rights	81.1	77.8	70.7	67.9
Mass confiscations of Arab lands	79.2	79.5	78.2	69.6
Annexation of the Triangle to a future Palestinian state against the will of its Arab residents	50.6	66.5	53.6	53.5
A population transfer (mass expulsion) of some Arab citizens	55.4	68.0	58.4	54.5
State violence against Arabs	71.1	75.9	67.0	67.1
Violence against Arabs by the Jewish extreme right	*	80.0**	*	*

*Question not asked

**In 2011

Among Jews, too, fear of Arab citizens is high, although it has not increased. In 2015, 61.2% of Jews (71.8% in 2003, 64.9% in 2012, and 59.4% in 2013) fear an Arab struggle to change the Jewish character of Israel; 63.4% (73.8%, 63.8%, and 60.6%) fear a popular Arab revolt; and 73.5% (83.1%, 76.0%, and 67.5%) fear Arab support for Palestinian resistance (Table 14).

**Table 14 Fear of Collective Threats, Jews,
2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)**

	Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Arab citizens endanger the state due to their high birthrate	70.1	51.5	*	*
Arab citizens endanger the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character	71.8	64.9	59.4	61.2
Arab citizens endanger the state by starting a popular revolt	73.8	63.8	60.6	63.4
Arab citizens endanger the state by their support of the Palestinian people's struggle	83.1	76.0	67.5	73.5

*Question not asked

Although the threats felt by both sides are not realistic, the strong mutual sense of threat among Arabs and Jews in Israel confirms the existence of considerable mistrust between the two communities and constitutes a severe barrier to integration and equality.

7. Collective Memory

A profound rift between Arabs and Jews prevails in historical memory. Arab citizens adhere to the Palestinian narrative: 77.1% of the Arabs in 2015, 75.5% in 2013 (a decrease from 85.3% in 2012), perceive Zionism as a colonial and racist movement, and 54.7% of them in 2015 (62.5% in 2011, 57.0% in 2012, and 47.3% in 2013) maintain the latter-day Crusader image of Israeli Jews as “foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, are doomed to leave and the country will revert to the Palestinians” (Table 15). Conversely, Jews cherish the Zionist narrative: 62.0% in 2015 (65.5% in 2011, 64.2% in 2012, and 58.7% in 2013) believe that “the Palestinians are Arabs who settled in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people,” while 61.8% (61.7%, 60.5%, and 61.1%) think that the Palestinians do not have national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants.

Among Arabs, 68.2% in 2015 (72.3% in 2011, 77.2% in 2012, and 64.8% in 2013) blame the Jews for the conflict with the Palestinians, while 72.2% of Jews (61.7%, 68.6%, and 59.6%) blame the Palestinians for the conflict with the Jews.

A more critical finding is that 31.0% of Arabs in 2015 (34.5% in 2013) do not believe that a Holocaust occurred in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis, while 54.3% of Jews (54.5% in 2013) do not believe that in 1948 the Palestinians experienced a Nakba (disaster), suffering defeat in the war against the Jews, becoming refugees, facing the destruction of villages and towns, and failing to establish a state of their own. Thus each side perceives itself as the victim and the other side as the aggressor.

Table 15 Narratives, Arabs and Jews, 2011-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2011	2012	2013	2015
Zionism is a colonial and racist movement	85.3	85.3	75.5	77.1				
The Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, are doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians	62.5	57.0	47.3	54.7				
The Palestinians are Arabs who settled in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people					65.5	64.2	58.7	62.0
The Palestinians do not have national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants					61.7	60.5	61.1	61.8
The Jews/Palestinians are principally responsible for the protracted conflict between the Palestinians and Jews	72.3	77.2	64.8	68.2	61.7	68.6	59.6	72.2
Do not believe that a Holocaust, in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis, occurred	23.8	31.0	34.5	31.0				
Do not believe that in 1948 the Palestinian Arabs experienced a disaster (Nakba): they lost the war against the Jews, became refugees, their localities were destroyed, and they did not establish a state of their own					57.7	52.6	54.5	54.3

8. Legitimacy of Coexistence

The 2015 Index clearly shows that Arabs and Jews continue to accept all the components of the basic framework of their coexistence. The range of consensus among Arabs concerning the foundations of coexistence was 62.8%-81.3% in 2015 (compared to 64.0%-81.7% in 2008), while the range among Jews was 58.9%-88.9% (compared to 60.0%-88.9% in 2008) (Table 16).

These very high statistics reflect a strong basic commitment to coexistence among both Arabs and Jews. Questions concerning coexistence were first asked in 2008 and the degree of the other side's acceptance has remained stable among both parties. For instance, 66.0% of Arabs and 58.9% of Jews in 2015 (66.4% and 55.8% respectively, in 2013) agreed that "it is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel".

**Table 16 Acceptance of Coexistence, Arabs and Jews,
2008, 2012-2015 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				Jews			
	2008	2012	2013	2015	2008	2012	2013	2015
Israel as a state has a right to exist	63.3	60.0	65.7	65.8				
Two states for two peoples					70.6	66.7	61.5	60.0
It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel	63.3	62.7	66.4	66.0	*	57.2	55.8	58.9
Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state	62.8	59.0	69.2	64.0	57.2	81.1	79.2	84.7
Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act to change their relations using only legal and democratic means	63.0	58.3	77.4	77.8	83.7	91.8	83.7	88.9
Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations, such as personal friendships and involvement in joint organizations	78.7	80.5	84.0	81.3	93.7	82.8	76.7	82.0
Do not avoid as much as possible any personal contact with Jews/ Arabs	81.7	73.9	82.4	73.6	86.6	69.0	66.1	69.0

*Question not asked

This consent softens the serious disagreements that divide Arabs and Jews concerning specific and concrete key issues. Arab and Jewish respondents gave strong positive responses to all the coexistence questions posed, reflecting a consensus on a Palestinian state alongside Israel; democracy as the obligatory method for managing

their mutual relations; a duty of loyalty to the state; the perception of coexistence as an asset; and recognition of the importance of voluntary relations between the two sides beyond necessary contact. Arabs legitimize the existence of Israel as a state, while Jews consent to the overall solution of two states for two peoples and to the right of an Arab minority to live in Israel and enjoy full civil rights. However, this model of coexistence does not require Arabs to accept Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state or to be patriotic, and does not oblige Jews to acknowledge the Arabs' national rights or to embrace binationalism, be it in one or two states.

A majority of 60.3% of Arabs in 2015 (a rise from 57.7% in 2011, 55.9% in 2012, and 52.1% in 2013) reconcile themselves with the present reality of a Jewish majority in the State of Israel, 63.4% (a rise from 56.6%, 55.9%, and 52.1%) are reconciled to Hebrew as the language in which the state is run, 56.2% (53.2% and 52.1%) accept a state in which the existing dominant culture is Hebrew-Israeli, and 60.7% (51.1%, 60.2%, and 55.9%) are reconciled to Saturday as the official day of rest (Table 17). Furthermore, 51.7% of the Jews in 2015 (70.9% in 2006, 48.2% in 2012, and 53.2% in 2013) would vote yes in a referendum defining Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and ensuring full civil rights to the Arabs. As indicated above (Table 6), on a more general level 64.7% of Arabs in 2015 (74.5% in 2007, 58.5% in 2012, and 70.7% in 2013) feel that Israel is a good place to live.

Table 17 Reconciliation with Israel as a Jewish State, Arabs, 2011-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs			
	2011	2012	2013	2015
Reconciled to Israel as a state with a Jewish majority	57.7	55.9	52.1	60.3
Reconciled to a state whose dominant language is Hebrew	56.6	60.6	52.3	63.4
Reconciled to a state with the existing dominant culture	51.1	53.2	52.1	56.2
Reconciled to Saturday as the official day of rest	57.9	60.2	55.9	60.7
It is justified that state symbols should be Jewish, but the state should also have symbols with which Arabs can identify	75.4	67.2	64.3	70.9

A central aspect of the issue of legitimacy is Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist. The Index surveys show that in 2015, 56.4% of Arabs (compared to 81.0% in 2003, 58.0% in 2012, and 55.6% in 2013) recognize Israel's right to exist as a state; 51.7% (65.6%, 47.4%, and 52.8%) recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state; and 42.7% (29.6% in 2012 and 43.1% in 2013) recognize its right to retain a Jewish majority (i.e. to be a Zionist state) (Table 18). A majority of 57.5% of Arabs regard Zionist Israel as a racist state.

Table 18 Israel's Right to Exist as a Jewish and Zionist State, Arabs, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Israel according to the pre-1967 borders has the right to exist as a state that retains a Jewish majority	*	29.6	43.1	42.7
Israel according to the pre-1967 borders has the right to exist as a state under Jewish control	*	29.3	34.5	45.7
Israel according to the pre-1967 borders has the right to exist as a state that serves the needs of Jews in Israel and all over the world	*	26.4	34.3	40.5
Israel as a Zionist state in which Arabs and Jews live together is racist	66.8	67.2	56.1	57.5
Israel according to the pre-1967 borders has the right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state:				
Yes	12.2	11.9	11.0	19.8
Yes with reservation	24.8	24.5	26.9	22.8
No	59.6	54.0	54.2	53.9
No answer	3.4	9.5	7.9	3.6

*Question not asked

These figures demonstrate that a large number of Palestinian-Arab citizens recognize Israel and are reconciled with the existence of the state as declaredly owned by the Jewish people and maintaining hostile relations with the Palestinian people, to which this minority belongs. The impressive degree of public Arab acceptance is striking considering the Israeli Arab leadership categorically and overtly

rejects Israel's Jewish and Zionist character. Yet the Arabs' resignation to Israel's Jewish identity is neither moral justification of Israel's existence and national character nor an entity they desire or identify with because it is clear they wish Israel to be a binational state as much as possible. It reflects a large dose of realism and pragmatism on the part of the common Arab. The pragmatic acceptance of Israel's Jewish nature runs counter to the declining legitimacy Arabs have given to Israel as an independent state, a Jewish and democratic state, and a Zionist state (defined as a state that takes legal and other steps to preserve its character as a Jewish state indefinitely).

Among Jews, 79.7% in 2015 (72.6% in 2003, 75.0% in 2012, and 73.7% in 2013) recognize the right of the Arabs to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights; and 69.5% (63.1% in 2003, 67.0% in 2012, and 66.7% in 2013) accept Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society (Table 19). In addition to the legitimacy of full individual rights, a majority of Jews accept the extension of cultural collective rights to Arabs in the areas of religion, language, education and culture. For instance, 67.4% in 2012 (66.7% in 2010 and 67.2% in 2011) justify the collective Arab right to a separate educational system in Arabic. Yet at the same time, most Jews deny Arabs national rights: in 2015 only 36.5% (41.9% in 2012 and 41.2% in 2013) agree that the Arabs, like the Jews, have historical and national rights to the country.

Table 19 Arabs' Right to Live in Israel as a Minority with Equal Individual Rights, Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Arab citizens have the right to live in Israel as a minority with full citizenship rights	72.6	75.0	73.7	79.7
The national Arab minority has a right to exist in Israel with full citizenship rights (yes, yes with reservation)	79.5	76.3	76.0	82.4
Reconciled today with the existence of Arab minority in the State of Israel	82.1	83.2	83.7	83.0
Arab citizens will have a minority status with full citizenship rights in a Jewish and democratic state and reconcile themselves with it	76.9	70.9	64.9	74.9

→

	Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
There should be equality between Arab and Jewish citizens in individual rights, in state budgets, and in opportunities for education and employment	68.8	67.9	72.8	74.2
Acceptance of Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society	63.1	67.0	66.7	69.5

These figures reveal that a large majority of Jews accepts Arabs as a minority with equal individual rights and recognizes the reality in which ethnic-cultural collective rights are accorded to the Arabs. Yet only a small minority of Jews is willing to grant Arabs national collective rights, such as Palestinian identity and the power of veto in matters of vital interest to the minority. These positions have not declined over the years. However, around a quarter of Jews consistently reject Arab-Jewish coexistence and would deny basic rights to Arabs: 21.1% in 2015 (33.7% in 2003, 27.9% in 2012, and 30.5% in 2013) believe that Arabs should not be entitled to vote in Knesset elections; 44.9% in 2013 (52.0% in 2003 and 44.6% in 2012) support outlawing the long-time, Arab-Jewish Hadash Party (the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) (Table 20); and 29.5% in 2015 favor outlawing the new Arab Joint List (Table 35). These figures demonstrate that a majority of Jews accepts Arabs as part of Israeli society and its attitudes have remained unchanged or even moderated over time. Yet a minority of one-fifth or more rejects coexistence and would deny basic rights to the Arab minority within a Jewish state.

Table 20 Restrictions of Arabs’ Citizenship Rights, Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Arabs should not be allowed to vote in Knesset elections	33.7	27.9	30.5	21.1
Arabs should not be allowed to buy land in any area they desire	67.6	41.0	56.8	55.8
The state should expropriate Arab lands for development by Jews	32.3	36.1**	*	*
The state should give some preference to Jews over Arab citizens	53.8	52.7	48.3	46.8
Support the outlawing of Hadash	52.0	44.6	44.9	*

*Question not asked **In 2011

Most Jews are committed to Israel’s Jewish identity more than to democracy. In 2015, a majority of 65.3% of Jews (69.7% in 2003, 64.5% in 2012, and 61.7% in 2013) would choose the Jewish character of the state over democracy if they stand in contradiction (Table 21). Regarding the proposed “Nation-State” law, 68.6% of Jews in 2015 (66.9% in 2013) agreed that “Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state and only then a democratic state,” while 67.3% (64.2%) agreed that “there is a need for a law to establish that democracy will only be observed in Israel if it does not harm a Jewish state”. Support for the enactment of a law stating that Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state was expressed by 88.5% of the respondents who define themselves as right-wingers, 84.6% of moderate right-wingers, 61.4% of centrists, 34.7% of moderate left-wingers, and 14.3% of left-wingers; and by 96.5% of ultra-orthodox respondents, 78.7% of national-religious Jews, 75.7% of traditional Jews, and 60.2% of secular Jews. It is clear, therefore, that a decided majority of the Jewish public, with the exception of a small left-wing minority, supports the introduction of a “Jewish State” law subordinating democracy to the Jewish nature of the state.

Table 21 A Jewish State versus Democracy, Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
In the case of a contradiction between the democratic and Jewish character of the state, I prefer the Jewish character	69.7	64.5	61.7	65.3
Decisions on the character and borders of the state should be made with a majority agreement among Jews; a majority from the population at large is not sufficient	81.9	69.2	65.3	69.4
In my eyes Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state and only then a democratic state	*	*	66.9	68.6
A law is required stating that democracy should prevail in Israel on the condition that it does not harm the Jewish state	*	*	64.2	67.3

*Question not asked

9. Regional Disputes

The Oslo Accords cleared the way for the two-state solution, a principle that gained the backing of the international community, a majority of Jews (60.0% in 2015), and a majority of Arab citizens (71.3% in 2015) (Table 22). According to a poll conducted in June 2015 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), half (51%) of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip support the two-state solution. The support of Israeli Jews, Arab citizens and non-citizen Palestinians for a separate Palestinian state has steadily been on the decline since 2014.

While Arabs and Jews accept the two-state solution, they are divided regarding methods of implementation. 60.6% of Arabs and only 40.3% of Jews endorse the pre-1967 borders with land swaps because the opponents on each side want more territory or reject the two-state solution, 38.2% and 20.2% respectively agree on the division of Jerusalem into two separate cities, 53.3% and 43.8% accept the idea of compensation for the Palestinian refugees and allowing their return only to the Palestinian state, while 24.6% and 40.5% consent to annexing part of the Triangle to a Palestinian state. While only 36.5% of Jews are willing to dismantle the Jewish settlements outside the settlement blocs across the Green Line, and only 18.1% agree that Palestinian recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people should not be a condition for a settlement of the Palestinian conflict, 56.6% believe that Israel should take risks in order to reach a peace settlement with the Palestinians. The fact that 85.4% of Jews, compared to only 27.4% of Arabs, supported Israel in Operation Protective Edge, 2014, uncovers the profound Arab-Jewish divide on the Palestinian issue.

Table 22 Solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
There should be two states for two peoples	88.8	68.7	63.7	71.3	71.3	66.7	61.5	60.0
The pre-1967 boundaries will be the boundaries between the two states, with an option of land swaps	82.0	62.7	51.2	60.6	44.2	43.2	40.3	40.3
Jewish settlements outside settlement blocs over the Green Line will be dismantled	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	36.5
Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	61.0**	48.8	43.2	38.2	23.3**	21.4	22.6	20.2
The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return only to the Palestinian state	72.2	46.8	47.5	53.3	62.6	47.1	48.2	43.8
Some of the Arab localities in the Triangle will be annexed to a Palestinian state	16.7	22.8	26.6	24.6	45.3	39.4***	40.4	40.5
The borders between Israel and the Palestinian state will be open	76.2	73.1***	*	*	30.6	*	*	*
After the full implementation of these principles, neither side will have any further claims against the other and the conflict between them will be over	80.5	58.6	51.0	57.3	64.8	44.4	46.1	48.5

*Question not asked

**In 2004

***In 2011

The Arabs expect that the final-status settlement with the Palestinians will also meet their particular demands as a minority. For instance, only a minority of 47.1% of Arabs in 2015 would embrace a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians if this does not include a solution to the question of lands expropriated from Arab citizens

or a solution for the problem of the internal refugees, who account for over one fifth of all Arabs in Israel (Table 23). This finding reveals that the Arab minority in Israel is a party to the conflict with its own distinct demands for the settlement and thus its support of a peace treaty in an Israeli referendum cannot be taken for granted.

Table 23 A Peace Agreement with the Palestinians that Disregards Arabs in Israel, Arabs, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs		
	2012	2013	2015
Support a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even though it includes the recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state but ensures full civil equality to Arabs	52.6	58.4	58.4
Support a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even though it does not include a solution to the problem of lands confiscated from Arab citizens in Israel and a solution to the problem of the internal refugees	34.8	42.3	47.1

The two sides are quite pessimistic regarding the possibility of reaching a stable peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. In 2015, half (50.8%) of Arabs and less than three fifths (58.1%) of Jews do not believe that negotiations can lead to a peace settlement in the coming years (Table 24), while 42.6% and 45.5% do not believe that a peace agreement will settle all demands of the parties involved in the conflict (Table 23). The Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza are even more pessimistic. According to the poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 72% believe that the chances of establishing a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the coming five years are slim to non-existent.

Turning from the Palestinian issue to that of the region in general, 49.6% of the Arabs endorse the statement that “as long as there is no peace between Israel and the Arab world, there is a need for a strong Arab or Muslim force that can confront Israel and harm it significantly, if necessary” (Table 25). Among Arab respondents, 62.8% favor a nuclear agreement with Iran; while 58.1% oppose actions by Israel to prevent Iran from replacing it as the strongest regional power.

Table 24. Belief that Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians Will Lead to a Permanent Settlement, Arabs and Jews, 2013, 2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs		Jews	
	2013	2015	2013	2015
Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent settlement in the coming years				
Agree, tend to agree		49.2		37.8
Disagree, tend to disagree		50.8		58.1
No answer		0.0		4.0
The negotiations underway between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent settlement				
Definitely believe, believe	25.9		15.6	
Do not believe, definitely do not believe	57.0		81.8	
No answer	17.2		2.7	

Table 25 Regional Developments, Arabs, 2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs
	2015
As long as there is no peace between Israel and the Arab world, there should be a strong power, Arab or Muslim, that can confront Israel and harm it significantly if necessary	49.6
Disagree that Israel should act to prevent Iran from replacing it as the strongest regional state	58.1
I welcome the nuclear agreement between the superpowers and Iran	62.8
When I see the evident unrest and instability in the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, I feel it is good to live in Israel	64.2

An overwhelming majority of 82.4% agrees that “the Islamic State is an extremist terrorist organization and as an Arab I feel ashamed of it” (Table 26). However, it is hard to disregard the finding that 16.9% of Arabs do not view the Islamic State as an extreme terrorist organization and as Arabs do not feel ashamed of it. This finding is astonishing not only in light of the terrorist, fundamentalist, and murderous character of this organization but also considering the wall-to-wall opposition to the Islamic

State shared by the Arab leadership and community, including the northern branch of the Islamic Movement. Arabs professing this exceptional stance of not opposing the Islamic State constitute 18.2% of Muslims; 19.8% of Muslims with higher education; 25.7% of Muslims who deny Israel's right to exist; 27.3% of Muslims whose identity is Palestinian-Arab without any Israeli component; 28.1% of Muslims who of all political parties and movements identify most with the northern branch of the Islamic Movement; 29.2% of Muslims who did not participate in the 2015 Knesset elections; 29.8% of Muslims who are prepared to move to a future Palestinian state; and 38.2% of Muslims who disagree that the chaos in the Arab world makes them feel that it is good to live in Israel. The outlook of these Arabs is apparently rejectionist, they object to coexistence, and by not opposing the Islamic State register their protest against the discrimination and exclusion of Arabs by the Jewish state. They have fostered an atmosphere which has led dozens of young Arabs from Israel to depart for Syria to fight alongside the Islamic State and other Islamist organizations.

Table 26 Da'ash (Islamic State), Arabs, 2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs
	2015
Da'ash [ISIS] is an extreme terrorist organization and as an Arab I feel ashamed of it:	
Agree	57.3
Tend to agree	25.1
Tend to disagree	11.3
Disagree	5.6
No answer	0.8

10. Regional Integration

These attitudes to the region reveal that the Arab public's approach to Israel is complex and ambivalent, although the overall tendency is positive. The breakup of Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Yemen,

together with the continued spread of turmoil in the region, caused 64.2% of Arabs to declare that “when I see the disruption and instability of the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, I am glad that I live in Israel” (Table 25, above).

However, Arabs are divided regarding the balance between integration in the region compared to integration in the Western world. In 2015, 52.9% of Arabs (46.8% in 2012 and 48.2% in 2013) and 60.6% of Jews (63.4% in 2012 and 60.1% in 2013) believe that “Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries,” while 62.0% (55.1% and 49.7%) and 58.9% (65.0% and 59.3%) agree that “in the cultural arena, Israel should integrate into Europe-America more than into the Middle East” (Table 27).

Similarly to other attitudes relating to regional integration, it is evident that the Arab public is divided on this issue, with a predisposition toward the West (a stance that draws it closer to the Jews), in contrast to the position of the Arab leadership, which unreservedly advocates Israel’s integration into the Arab region.

Table 27 Israel’s Regional Integration, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries	*	46.8	48.2	52.9	*	63.4	60.1	60.6
Israel should integrate into the Western world more than into the Arab and Muslem states in the region	47.0	49.7	45.2	59.6	76.3	*	*	*
In the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East	53.1	55.1	49.7	62.0	66.4	65.0	59.3	58.9
Israel has much to learn from the West and only little to learn from Arab countries	*	48.4	54.7	*	*	55.1	*	*

*Question not asked

11. Identity

We investigated four components of the Arab collective identity in Israel: Arab, Palestinian, Israeli, and Nakba. When asked which of the first three they feel to be the most important component of their identity, 39.5% of Arabs choose the Palestinian people over religion and citizenship (Table 28). The Palestinian-Arab component in Arab identity has risen in significance from being emphasized by 18.8% in 2003 to 39.5% in 2015.

Table 28 Most Important Component of Personal Identity, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
Most significant affiliation:								
Israeli citizenship	29.6	12.2	18.7	13.4	29.6	42.2	41.0	35.1
Religion	48.2	45.2	45.2	46.5	18.9	15.0	15.4	15.6
Nationality (Palestinian/Jewish people)	18.8	41.3	33.9	39.5	43.6	40.6	40.6	45.6
No answer	3.4	1.3	2.2	0.6	7.9	2.1	3.1	3.8

In 2015, 36.2% of Arabs (53.0% in 2003, 32.6% in 2012, and 42.5% in 2013) choose to define their identity without any reference to the Palestinian component (Arab, Israeli, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel); 37.1% (41.4%, 45.0%, 39.0%) combine Palestinian and Israeli components in their identity (Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian-Arab in Israel, Israeli Palestinian); and 25.8% (5.5%, 21.5%, 17.6%) define themselves in Palestinian terms without any Israeli component (Palestinian, Palestinian-Arab) (Table 29).

Table 29. Personal National Identity, Arabs, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Choice of personal identity, of nine identities offered:				
Arab	9.1	8.5	6.2	11.5
Israeli Arab	29.7	11.9	17.0	12.3
Arab in Israel	9.5	9.8	16.1	6.5
Israeli	4.8	2.4	3.2	5.9
Palestinian Arab	3.7	18.0	15.0	20.3
Israeli Palestinian	2.7	3.2	3.2	3.7
Palestinian in Israel	3.7	7.4	5.8	6.6
Palestinian Arab in Israel	33.7	34.4	30.0	26.8
Palestinian	1.9	3.5	2.6	5.5
No answer	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.0
Collapsing the above 9 self-identities into 3 categories:				
Arab, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel, Israeli	53.0	32.6	42.5	36.2
Israeli Palestinian, Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian Arab in Israel	41.4	45.0	39.0	37.1
Palestinian, Palestinian Arab	5.5	21.5	17.6	25.8
No answer	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.0

The Arabs' identity includes strong Palestinian and Israeli components. The strength of the Israeli component is evident: 73.3% of Arabs in 2015 incorporate an Israeli component into their identity despite the increase of the Palestinian component over the years (Table 29); 58.1% feel they share more in common with Jews than with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; and 72.2% are not prepared to move to a future Palestinian state (Table 30). Yet the strength of the Palestinian component in Arabs' identity is similarly apparent. In 2015, only 15.8% (16.7% in 2013) consider themselves "Palestinian-Arabs and Israeli-Arabs equally" (Table 31), while 56.6% (51.8% in 2013) feel that the memory of the Nakba is a central component of their life.

Table 30 Affinity of Arabs in Israel with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews		
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013
Arab citizens are more similar in their way of life and behavior to the Jews in Israel than to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	71.5	54.4	59.5	58.1	41.7	48.5	46.5
Most Arab citizens would be more loyal to a Palestinian state in which they do not live than to Israel	39.2	50.2	47.0	46.6	68.6	64.6	59.1
Arab citizens have a right to support an armed struggle by the Palestinians even within the Green Line	17.8	39.5**	*	*	*	*	*
Feel closer to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza than to Jews in Israel	51.1	55.7	41.8	43.7	*	*	*
Are prepared to move to a Palestinian state	13.8	24.1	20.9	27.5	*	*	*

*Question not asked

**In 2011

Table 31 Personal Identity as Palestinian-Arab versus Israeli-Arab, Arabs, 2013-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs	
	2013	2015
View themselves as:		
Only Palestinian-Arab and not Israeli-Arab in any way	24.4	31.0
Mainly Palestinian-Arab but to some extent also Israeli-Arab	33.8	32.0
Equally Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Arab	16.7	15.8
Mainly Israeli-Arab but to some extent also Palestinian-Arab	14.6	11.6
Only Israeli-Arab and not Palestinian-Arab in any way	7.5	8.5
No answer	2.8	1.0

We also explored four components in Jews' collective identity: Jewish, Israeli, Zionist, and Shoah (Holocaust). In 2015, 61.1% of Jews (63.5% in 2013) describe their identity as equally Jewish and Israeli (Table 32), 35.1% (41.0%) choose Israeli citizenship and 45.6% (40.6%) choose the Jewish people as their most important

affiliation (Table 28), while 81.2% (83.3%) define themselves as Zionist, and 94.8% in 2013 feel the Shoah is central to their lives.

Table 32 Personal Identity as Israeli versus Jewish, Jews, 2013-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews	
	2013	2015
See themselves as:		
Only Jewish and not Israeli in any way	3.1	6.8
Mainly Jewish but to some extent also Israeli	15.2	13.9
Equally Jewish and Israeli	63.5	61.1
Mainly Israeli but to some extent also Jewish	13.0	12.6
Only Israeli and not Jewish in any way	3.5	3.3
No answer	1.7	2.3

It is easier for Jews to combine Israeli and Jewish components of their identity (63.5% say they are equally Jewish and Israeli) than it is for Arabs to combine Israeli and Palestinian components (only 15.8% say they are equally Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Arab) because Israel is a Jewish state and Palestinian identity is considered hostile by Jews. This reality is highlighted by the finding that 66.5% of Jews in 2015 (75.6% in 2003, 69.4% in 2012, and 68.1% in 2013) think that “an Arab who defines himself as a ‘Palestinian Arab in Israel’ cannot be loyal to the state and its laws”. Political affiliation shapes Jews’ rejection of the identity of a “Palestinian Arab in Israel”: an overwhelming majority of 86.1% of right-wingers finds this identity unacceptable, as do 73.7% of moderate right-wingers, 66.3% of centrists, 43.7% of moderate left-wingers, but just 27.5% of left-wingers.

The identities of Arabs and Jews separate the two groups because the shared Israeli component is weak as a common denominator and neither side respects the other party’s identity. As was mentioned above, in 2015 66.5% of Jews think that an identity as “a Palestinian-Arab in Israel” is incompatible with loyalty to the state and law-abidance, while 54.2% deny the

occurrence of the Nakba. Similarly, 77.1% of Arabs in 2015 condemn Zionism as a colonial and racist movement and most of them do not feel at ease with the Shoah, believing it to be harnessed to legitimizing the Jewish state's right to exist, and 31.0% deny its very existence. Hence, the Jews do not honor the Palestinian and Nakba components of Arab identity, whereas the Arabs do not honor the Zionist and Shoah components of Jewish identity.

12. Minority Leadership

Arabs and Jews are divided on the question of whether Arab leadership bodies faithfully represent the Arab public but they agree that Arab leaders do not truly represent the Arab population. The Arabs do distinguish between leadership bodies that are needed to serve them and the leaders themselves who head these positions, whereas the Jews do not make this distinction. The Arabs do not judge leadership roles by the leaders who perform them, while the Jews do. 59.6% of Arabs in 2015 (58.9% in 2003, 62.7% in 2012, and 59.5% in 2013) believe that the Higher Follow-Up Committee is representative; 57.0% (51.8%, 61.8%, 56.8%) consider the Islamic Movement representative; and 60.9% (55.0% in 2012 and 60.7% in 2013) regard the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities to be representative (Table 33). The Arab political parties were also perceived as representative by 59.1% of Arabs in 2013 (53.1% in 2003 and 61.9% in 2012).

By contrast, a majority of the Jewish public — whose acquaintance with Arab leadership bodies is limited and based mainly on unsympathetic media coverage — does not trust these bodies. Only 34.4% of Jews in 2015 (36.0% in 2012 and 39.6% in 2013) think that the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities is representative and 36.6% in 2013 (53.1% in 2003 and 35.4% in 2012) believe that the Arab political parties truly represent the Arab population.

Table 33 Confidence in Arab Leadership Institutions in Israel, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
The Arab parties truly represent Arab citizens	53.1	61.9	59.1	*	53.1	35.4	36.6	*
The Committee of Arab Local Authorities truly represents Arab citizens	*	55.0	60.7	60.9	*	36.0	39.6	34.4
The Higher Follow-Up Committee truly represents Arab citizens	58.9	62.7	59.5	59.6	*	*	*	*
The Islamic Movement truly represents Arab citizens	51.8	61.8	56.8	57.0	*	*	*	*

*Question not asked

However, both Arabs and Jews mistrust Arab leaders in Israel. In 2015, 59.8% of Arabs (63.3% in 2013) and 80.0% of Jews (84.8%) do not trust Israeli Arab leaders (Table 34). Two thirds (67.5%) of Arabs in 2015 (66.5% in 2013) and 62.4% of Jews in 2013 believe that Arab leaders in Israel do not really serve the Arab population because they do not advance practical solutions to its problems. In 2015, 59.6% of Arabs (62.4% in 2012 and 61.3% in 2013) would prefer their leaders to fight for civil and socioeconomic equality rather than for peace and a change of Israel's character. The Arab public clearly supports the same approach taken by MK Ayman Odeh, head of the Joint List.

Table 34 Distrust of Arab Leadership in Israel, Arabs and Jews, 2011-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2011	2012	2013	2015	2011	2012	2013	2015
Do not trust Arab leaders in Israel	59.6	58.2	63.3	59.8	82.5	83.2	84.8	80.0
Arab leaders in Israel do not serve the Arab population by advancing practical solutions to its problems	62.4	63.2	66.5	67.5	61.3	65.9	62.4	*
Arab leaders in Israel do not serve the Arab population by voicing protest against the state and its policy	59.3	61.1	62.2	*	34.3	*	*	*
Arab leaders in Israel should deal with solving daily problems faced by the Arabs rather than the conflict with the Palestinians	84.1	76.0	80.3	*	85.6	86.4	*	*
The impact of Arab leadership in Israel on relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel								
Positive Contribution	69.3	69.5	57.9	*	18.4	17.3	*	*
Damaging	25.8	26.0	35.2	*	70.9	73.4	*	*
No answer	5.1	4.5	6.6	*	10.7	9.3	*	*

*Question not asked

The 2015 Index shows strong support for the Joint List among Arabs. The survey found that 55.9% of Arabs believe the Joint List to be truly representative of Arabs in Israel (Table 35). Regarding the preferred aim of the Joint List, 79.2% of Arabs insist that the List should concentrate on solving the Arab population's everyday concerns; 75.7% feel that the List should engage in dialogue with the authorities and Jewish political parties in order to advance the interests of the Arab population; and 57.6% even agree that it should join a center-left government coalition in the event of such a coalition being formed. The Arab public regards the Joint List as a vehicle for realizing aspirations not met by the existing Arab leadership.

Table 35 Joint List, Arabs and Jews, 2015 (Percentages)

	Jews	
	2013	2015
The Joint List of Arab political parties truly represents the Arabs in Israel	55.9	39.0
It is important to me that the Joint List continue to exist as one body and not break up	67.9	*
The Joint List should concentrate on solving the Arab population's daily problems	79.2	*
The Joint List should cooperate with the authorities and Jewish political parties in order to advance the interests of the Arab population	75.7	*
If an opportunity arises for the left-center bloc to form a government, the Joint List should be ready to join this coalition and assume common responsibility for all government decisions and actions	57.6	*
Jewish political parties should accept the Joint List as a legitimate candidate for membership in a coalition government, like any other party	*	46.7
Expect the Joint List to improve the conditions of the Arab population in Israel	52.5	*
Fear the Joint List will intensify the separation between Arabs and Jews in Israel	45.0	*
The Joint List should be outlawed	*	29.5

*Question not asked

In contrast to the strong Arab support for the Joint List, Jews express reservations or opposition to it: only 39.0% view the List as truly representative of the Arab population and 29.5% even believe it should be outlawed. It is interesting to note that 46.7% of Jews accept the Joint List as a legitimate candidate for joining coalition governments. The degree of acceptance of the Joint List as a coalition member among Jews varies considerably according to political orientation: 23.6% among Jews on the right, 48.8% on the moderate right, 60.1% on the center, 78.3% on the moderate left, and 88.6% on the left. Jews on the left-center of the political spectrum are more receptive, not only because of their stronger commitment to democracy but also because their ascendance to power is highly dependent on the Arab representation in the Knesset.

13. *Autonomy*

The Arab public supports cultural autonomy for Arabs. A large majority of 77.6% in 2015 (90.9% in 2003, 86.5% in 2012, and 80.4% in 2013) agrees that “the state should grant Arab citizens powers to manage their religious, educational, and cultural institutions” (Table 36).

**Table 36 Autonomy for Arabs, Arabs and Jews,
2003, 2008, 2012-2015 (Percentages)**

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2008	2013	2015
The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational, and cultural institutions	90.9	86.5	80.4	77.6	61.7	62.7**	52.6	59.0
Arab citizens should enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of budgets, and administer their own religious, educational, and cultural institutions	66.4	60.4	65.8	54.1	62.0	*	*	*
The state should recognize a superior body that Arab citizens will choose to represent them	89.6	84.2	74.1	81.5	53.2	40.2	*	*
The state should recognize the Higher Fellow-Up Committee as a body representative of Arab citizens	*	76.1	72.8	72.1	*	*	*	*
The state should recognize and support an Arab university on a par with the Israeli universities	*	*	*	*	59.2	52.6	*	*

*Question not asked

**In 2009

A majority of 54.1% (66.4%, 60.4%, and 65.8%) believes that “Arab citizens should enjoy democratic rights, receive their proportional share of budgets, and manage their own religious,

educational, and cultural institutions”. A majority of 72.1% of Arabs also believes that the state should recognize the Higher Follow-Up Committee and 82.1% would like to have the Arab public elect the members of the committee, enhancing its legitimacy and representativeness.

Surprisingly, a majority of 59.0% of Jews in 2015 (58.3% in 2012 and 52.6% in 2013) is willing to grant religious, educational, and cultural autonomy to Arabs. In 2008, 52.6% of Jews even agreed to the establishment of an Arab university and 40.2% supported the idea of an elected supreme body to represent Arabs in official contact with the state. It would seem that many Jewish respondents confuse the existing institutional separation with the state’s extension of self-rule and are unaware that the Israeli authorities vehemently oppose Arab autonomy. Thus the Jewish public is more willing than its political leaders to grant cultural autonomy to the Arabs.

14. Means of Struggle

Arabs demonstrate a commitment to pursuing their struggle for equality and peace through democratic means. In 2015, 56.2% of Arabs (63.1% in 2003 and 54.0% in 2013) believe that “despite its shortcomings, the Israeli regime is also a democracy for Arab citizens” (Table 37), while 77.7% (63.0% in 2008 and 77.4% in 2013) agree that “Arab and Jewish citizens may act to change their mutual relations using only legal and democratic means” (Table 16 above). Arabs support an active and vigorous struggle, as evidenced by the finding that 70.5% (62.6% and 70.3%) support general strikes and 58.9% (49.9% and 49.0%) are in favor of protest abroad.

Yet support of non-democratic means is no less significant — in 2015 29.3% of Arabs (9.9% in 2003 and 19.0% in 2013) also support illegal demonstrations, 32.5% (32.8% and 29.7%) favor a boycott of Knesset elections, and 18.5% (5.4% and 16.0%) support the use of any means, including violence. The level of

support for boycotting the elections, despite the formation of the popular Joint List, and in favor of using violence implies serious erosion of the commitment to democracy among Arab citizens. Moreover, 54.0% of Arabs in 2015 (51.7% in 2013) justify launching their own Intifada if their situation does not improve substantially, while 55.8% in 2013 justify the launch of a Bedouin Intifada in the Negev if the government plan to resolve the Bedouin dispute over lands and unrecognized villages is approved by law and implemented.

***Table 37 Means of Struggle, Arabs and Jews,
2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)***

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is also a democracy for Arab citizens	63.1	54.2	54.0	56.2	76.6	79.9	78.4	77.2
Arab citizens can improve their situation using persuasion, political pressure, and voting	81.4	65.6	67.5	57.7	68.1	*	*	*
Favor a boycott of Knesset elections	32.8	41.3	29.7	32.5	*	*	*	*
Favor the use of General strikes	62.6	81.0	70.3	70.5	46.1	29.3	30.5	34.0
Favor protests abroad	49.9	70.9	49.0	58.9	40.8	23.5	30.3	20.7
Favor illegal demonstrations	9.9	25.8	19.0	29.3	*	*	*	*
Favor the use of any means, including violence	5.4	16.6	16.0	18.5	*	*	*	*
Believe that it is justified for Arab citizens in Israel to launch an Intifada of their own if their condition does not improve appreciably	*	58.2	51.7	54.0	*	*	*	*

*Question not asked

These protest attitudes are backed by actual protest activities. In the year 2015 alone, as many as 40.7% of Arabs participated in the annual commemoration of Land Day on March 31, 2015,

while 32.1% participated in the annual commemoration of Nakba Day usually held on Independence Day (in 2015 this occurred on April 23, 2015) (Table 38).

Table 38 Participation in Protest Actions and Commemoration Events, Arabs, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs			
	2003	2012	2013	2015
Participated in Land Day commemoration, March 2015				40.7
Participated in Nakba Day commemoration, April 2015				32.1
Have ever participated in legal demonstrations and processions	28.7	50.8	52.4	51.3
Have ever participated in illegal demonstrations and violent processions	5.6	20.9	21.1	30.1
Have ever participated in Land Day commemoration	17.9	50.1	54.6	50.7
Have ever participated in Nakba Day commemoration	12.9	47.9	49.4	47.3

These figures are expectably higher when Arabs are asked if they have ever participated in protest actions and commemoration events. A clear trend of increase is noticeable over the years because more and more Arabs took part in them: participation rates rose from 28.7% in 2003 to 51.3% in 2015 in legal demonstrations and processions; from 5.6% to 30.1% in illegal demonstrations and violent processions; from 17.9% to 50.7% in Land Day commemorations; and from 12.9% to 47.3% in Nakba Day commemorations (Table 38).

Most Jews believe that Arabs citizens can employ the parliamentary democratic means available to them and hence object to the use of non-parliamentary democratic steps. A decided majority (77.2% in 2015) of Jews (76.6% in 2003 and 78.4% in 2013) believes that despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is also a democracy for Arab citizens. Only 34.0% (46.1% and 30.5%) of Jews view Arab general strikes and only 20.7% (40.8% and 30.3%) regard protest abroad as acceptable means of struggle (Table 37).

15. Options for Change

Arabs and Jews possess contrasting visions and desires concerning the possibility of radical regime change. As many as 45.7% of Arabs in 2015 (18.9% in 2003 and 41.7% in 2013) approve of the formation of a Palestinian state instead of Israel, while 17.8% of Jews in 2013 (21.4% in 2003 and 20.2% in 2013) advocate Jewish rule, denying democratic rights to Arabs.

Arabs and Jews were asked what steps they are prepared to take in order to improve their mutual relations. Arab respondents were presented with a list of 16 possible steps “so that the state and the Jews will treat them with equality, respect, and trust”. These steps range from restricting the use of various means of struggle and refraining from fighting to basically altering the character of the state. No step won the support of a majority of Arab respondents. Agreement ranged from 19.1% to 46.9% in 2009, 16.7%-35.9% in 2012, 19.8%-45.0% in 2013, and 27.7%-46.7% in 2015 (Table 39). The range of agreement was from 40% to 47% among Arabs regarding four steps in 2013 and seven in 2015. The trend of decline in agreement between 2009 and 2012 was reversed in 2013 and 2015.

The level of agreement varied from step to step. On the one hand, 27.7% of Arabs in 2015 agree that Arab citizens should not demand recognition as a Palestinian national minority, 27.5% are willing to forego the right of return to the State of Israel for Palestinian refugees, and 31.9% concur that Arabs will not commemorate the Nakba in public (Table 39). On the other hand, 42.9% agree to accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, 46.7% agree to recognize the right of Jews to determine the language, culture, symbols, and policies of the state on condition that the state recognizes the needs of Arab citizens, and 39.5% agree that Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of some kind to the state.

Table 39 Steps Arabs Are Ready to Take in Order for the State and Jews to Treat Them with Equality, Respect and Trust, Arabs, 2009-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015
Peace and the Palestinian Question						
Arab citizens will not identify publicly with the Arab side in the case of a verbal or physical attack on Israel	32.0	27.0	33.2	23.2	28.7	35.6
Arab leaders will unequivocally condemn violent actions by Arabs against Jews in Israel	46.9	33.2	46.5	35.7	44.3	40.6
Arabs will view Israel as their state and support it in the case of a dispute with the Palestinian state	32.3	25.6	25.1	20.3	19.8	28.7
Transitional Justice						
Arab citizens will not publicly observe Nakba Day, i.e., the disaster that occurred to the Palestinians in the 1948 war	23.8	30.8	19.2	17.5	23.7	31.9
Arab citizens will not demand that the displaced (internal refugees) will be allowed to reconstruct their villages which were destroyed in 1948	22.1	25.2	20.2	18.8	24.8	34.8
Arab citizens will not regard the Jews as alien settlers who stole the country's lands from the Arabs	34.2	30.3	28.3	29.0	39.1	43.4
Equal Duties						
Arab citizens should fulfill a duty of some kind to the state	43.0	34.2	47.0	34.4	41.5	39.5
Means of Struggle						
Arab citizens will avoid protest abroad against the state	33.9	28.3	27.9	31.0	39.2	41.2
Arab leaders will avoid severe pronouncements against the state	44.4	36.2	42.0	33.6	45.0	44.3
Identity						
As long as there are no peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab citizens will not define their identity as "Palestinian-Arabs in Israel"	27.3	30.9	30.4	26.3	36.5	40.0
Arab citizens will not demand to be recognized as a Palestinian national minority	21.6	23.2	23.7	19.3	27.4	27.7

→

	Arabs						←
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015	
Israel's Legitimacy							
Arab citizens will accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state	40.3	34.8	38.8	35.3	42.9	42.9	
Arab citizens will accept Israel as the state of all Jews in the world, and not just of the Jews in Israel	25.7	27.1	24.6	22.8	29.4	34.9	
Arab citizens will avoid any struggle to change the Jewish-Zionist character of the state	25.2	20.9	26.3	27.8	28.4	39.0	
Arab citizens will renounce the Palestinian refugees' right to return to the State of Israel	19.1	20.4	16.5	16.7	21.4	27.5	
Arab citizens will recognize the Jews' right to determine the language, culture, symbols, and policy of the state, while recognizing the needs of the Arab citizens	41.5	38.0	41.1	35.9	36.2	46.7	

Similarly, Jewish respondents were presented with 17 steps and asked whether they are prepared to accept them “so that Arab citizens can feel that Israel is their state and they are citizens of it with equal rights”. Jewish agreement ranged from 15.5% to 80.1% in 2009, 12.7%-65.8% in 2012, 12.5%-57.6% in 2013, and 11.6%-65.8% in 2015 (Table 40). Agreement was particularly high in 2009, with a marked rise also between 2013 and 2015. There was agreement of 40% or more regarding 12 of the 17 steps in both 2013 and 2015. Agreement among Jews is significantly higher than among Arabs. In 2015, 55.8% of Jews were willing to grant Arabs religious, educational, and cultural autonomy; 59.2% agreed that the state should enact a law guaranteeing Arab citizens a proportional share of the state budget; and 55.0% favored the introduction of an emergency state plan to reduce the discrepancies between Arab and Jewish citizens.

Jews are open to change as long as it is not perceived as endangering state security, blurring Israel's Jewish character, or granting Arabs affirmative action. These objections are reflected in a lesser endorsement of the following steps: Only 26.4% of Jews agree that there should not be any distinction between Arabs and Jews during security checks at border crossings; only 28.1%

agree that Israel should grant appropriate expression to Arabs in its symbols, flag, and anthem; and just 31.3% believe that Arab citizens should enjoy affirmative action in acceptance for employment in official institutions and admission to universities and colleges.

Table 40 Steps Jews Are Ready to Take in Order for Arab Citizens to Feel That Israel Is Their State and They Are Citizens of It with Equal Rights, Jews, 2009-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015
Peace and National Security						
The Jews and Palestinians will make painful concessions and a Palestinian state will be established in the pre-1967 borders, with a land swap option	42.0	43.5	43.5	42.3	42.7	43.7
There will be no differences between Arabs and Jews in security checks at border crossings	33.2	25.8	27.2	26.9	27.7	26.4
Transitional Justice						
In the framework of peace with the Palestinians, the state will compensate Arab citizens with land or money for the lands it expropriated from them	49.6	44.1	49.8	44.0	48.4	47.0
The state should recognize its responsibility for the Nakba, i.e., the disaster that happened to the Palestinians during the 1948 war	15.5	14.4	15.6	12.7	12.5	11.6
Civil Rights						
The state will guarantee that Arab citizens may live in any locality they desire	42.0	37.6	37.2	42.8	43.0	47.2
Resources						
The state should grant official status to the currently unrecognized Arab localities and provide them with resources such as connection to the water and electricity grids, as are accorded to recognized localities	65.1	55.1	55.2	51.9	49.5	56.2
The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive proper representation in all state institutions and public bodies	66.3	52.4	56.3	54.9	51.2	55.1
The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive a proportional share of the state budget	69.0	54.9	51.0	55.9	53.6	59.2

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	Jews					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2015
Arab political parties should be invited to participate in government coalitions just as Jewish political parties	54.6	48.1	44.0	49.9	48.9	48.0
The state should launch an emergency program to bridge the gaps between Arab and Jewish citizens	61.6	51.3	49.6	51.0	44.1	55.0
Affirmative Action						
Arab citizens should be granted corrective preference in admission to state institutions, universities, and colleges	34.9	29.0	27.2	29.9	24.7	31.3
National Minority Status						
The Arabic language should be used in state institutions just as the Hebrew language and its study should be obligatory in Jewish schools	51.2	49.5	47.7	48.5	42.2	49.9
The state should recognize Arab citizens as Palestinians and guarantee their right to maintain relations with the Palestinian people and Arab nation	35.0	30.9	27.5	28.2	28.2	25.2
Autonomy						
The state should allow Arab citizens to conduct their own educational, religious, and cultural affairs	60.6	51.3	49.3	55.8	50.2	55.8
The state should recognize a superior body chosen by Arab citizens to represent them	55.7	43.8	43.3	47.5	41.2	47.1
The state should consult* leaders of Arab citizens concerning important decisions pertinent to them	80.1	65.0	60.7	65.8	57.6	65.8
State Character						
The state should give Arab citizens proper expression in its symbols, flag, and anthem	36.3	22.4	27.2	24.5	26.4	28.1

*The wording in 2009 was "The state will consult"

16. Evaluation of the State of Relations

The Arabs perceive the state of Arab-Jewish relations to be particularly dire. In 2015, 57.6% (58.3% in 2003 and 53.5% in 2013) evaluate the state of relations with Jews as not good, while 61.8% (43.0% and 52.3%) anticipated a worsening of Arab-Jewish relations in the future (Table 41). A majority of 70.2%

of Jews (85.8% and 63.6%) agree that Arab-Jewish relations are currently not good and 49.1% (54.2% and 40.5%) expect these relations to deteriorate in the future.

Table 41 Evaluation of the State of Arab-Jewish Relations, Arabs and Jews, 2003, 2012-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs				Jews			
	2003	2012	2013	2015	2003	2012	2013	2015
Relations today between Arab citizens and Jews are not good	58.3	61.4	53.5	57.6	85.8	69.3	63.6	70.2
Expect a worsening of the relations between Arab citizens and Jews in the course of the coming five years	43.0	66.2	52.3	61.8	54.2	49.6	40.5	49.1

Internal Differences and Predictors

In addition to the examination of the differences in attitudes between Arabs and Jews, the Index's research systematically scrutinizes the differences within each group. Significant differences are indeed to be found in almost every attitude among both Arabs and Jews.

Arabs who adopt critical and radical positions are more likely to be non-Druze, religious, to identify themselves as Palestinian-Arab without an Israeli component, to feel most closely affiliated to the northern branch of the Islamic Movement, to lack positive personal experiences with Jews (friends, home visits, help, leisure), and to have had negative personal experiences with Jews or state institutions including threats, humiliations, or blows; discrimination; harassment by the authorities; confiscation of land or becoming internal refugees in 1948 (Table 42). Age, gender, and educational level do not influence attitudes among Arabs.

A militancy scale is employed as a reliable summary measure to explore the internal differences among Arabs, constructed on the basis of 13 common key questions asked in 2012, 2013, and 2015. Some of the questions concern a feeling of alienation from Jews,

denial of Israel's right to exist, objection to imposing obligatory national service on Arabs, rejection of the two-state solution, and the view of Jews as foreign settlers that will eventually disappear, as did the Crusaders. Agreement with any item scores one point and thus the scale ranges from 0 to 13. The mean score in 2012 was 6.70, declining to 5.93 in 2013 and 6.02 in 2015, demonstrating moderation and stability since 2012 (Table 42).

Table 42 Internal Differences in Militancy Scale, Arabs, 2012-2015 (Means)

	Arabs		
	2012	2013	2015
Total	6.70	5.93	6.02
Community:			
Druze	2.34	2.00	1.44
Galilee Bedouin	7.21	3.87	4.39
Negev Bedouin	7.62	6.97	7.90
Non-Bedouin Muslim	6.00	6.79	5.71
Christian	5.84	5.00	5.68
Deprivation:			
Not from an internal refugee family	5.24	5.77	4.80
From an internal refugee family	7.45	7.25	7.12
Not from a family that suffered land expropriations	4.77	5.35	4.40
From a family that suffered land expropriations	6.50	7.22	6.76
Have never suffered discrimination by Jews or state institutions	4.68	5.28	4.19
Have suffered discrimination by Jews or state institutions	6.52	6.78	6.63
Have never encountered threats, humiliations, or blows perpetrated by Jews	5.19	5.34	4.70
Have encountered threats, humiliations, or blows from Jews	6.73	7.72	6.72
Contact with Jews:			
Have Jewish friends	4.88	5.33	4.56
Do not have Jewish friends	6.74	7.41	6.35
Have received help from Jews	4.86	5.42	4.59
Have never received any help from Jews	6.55	6.99	6.71
Have spent time with Jews	5.37	5.70	4.90

→

	Arabs			←
	2012	2013	2015	
Have never spent any time with Jews	6.35	7.43	6.55	
Residence:				
Live in Jewish towns	3.71	3.16	5.18	
Live in Arab villages and towns	5.81	6.31	5.31	
Identity:				
Israeli, Arab, Israeli Arab, Arab in Israel	3.00	4.21	3.33	
Palestinian in Israel, Palestinian-Arab in Israel, Israeli Palestinian	6.56	7.10	6.18	
Palestinian-Arab, Palestinian	7.54	8.42	7.53	
Vote in Knesset elections for:				
Jewish political parties	2.17	2.11	1.60	
Arab political parties	6.53	6.93	6.19	
Islamic Movement:				
Opponents	4.94	4.73	3.34	
Neutral (neither opponents nor sympathizers)	5.01	6.07	4.49	
Sympathizers	7.02	6.75	7.08	
Members or active members	7.12	7.26	6.20	
Gender:				
Male	5.56	5.98	4.85	
Female	5.68	6.14	5.78	
Age:				
18-24	5.59	7.13	5.99	
36-40	5.55	5.64	4.95	
51-55	5.56	4.38	5.21	
Education:				
Incomplete high school education	6.21	6.12	5.23	
Completed university/college education	5.95	5.70	5.43	
Family income:				
Above average	5.31	5.77	5.87	
Below average	5.92	6.41	5.15	
Religious observance:				
Religious or very religious	6.65	6.79	6.64	
Not religious	4.08	4.29	3.38	

The militancy scale reveals significant differences between Arab population groups. As an illustration, in 2015, Druze scored 1.44 as compared to 7.90 among Negev Bedouins; Arabs from families who had not suffered land expropriations scored 4.40, compared to Arabs who had suffered such expropriations, who scored 6.76; Arabs who had spent time with Jews scored 4.90, compared to 6.55 among Arabs who had not done so; and voters for Jewish parties scored 1.60, compared to voters for Arab parties, who scored 6.19. At the same time, differences according to gender, age, and education are not stable or consistent.

In order to discover the best predictors for Arabs and Jews, an identical coexistence scale was constructed for both groups. The scale is composed of six items listed in Table 16. Any response supporting coexistence, such as agreement with the statement “It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel,” or “Arab and Jewish citizens may act to change their relations using only legal and democratic means,” receives one point. The scale ranges from 0 to 6. The mean score in 2015 on the coexistence scale for Arabs (4.30) and Jews (4.43) was similarly high.

The five best predictors of the Arab score on the coexistence scale are as follows (in ascending order of their impact): hailing from a family that suffered land confiscations; voting in the last Knesset elections for Arab rather than Jewish parties; identification as Palestinian rather than Israeli Arab; suffering from threats, humiliations, or blows in personal encounters with Jews; and spending leisure time with Jews (the best predictor).

Regarding differences among Jews, those who maintain critical and negative opinions regarding Arab citizens are more likely to be ultra-orthodox and national-religious, aged 18-24, without a full academic education, their strongest affiliation is with the Jewish religion or the Jewish people (rather than Israeli citizenship), moderate right-wingers or right-wingers, lacking positive personal experiences with Arabs (friends, home visits, help, leisure), and who have encountered negative personal encounters with Arabs (experience of threats, humiliations, or blows by Arab citizens).

Using this set of factors, the five best predictors for the score of Jews on the coexistence scale are as follows (in ascending order of their impact): suffering from threats, humiliations, or blows in personal encounters with Arab citizens; having Arab friends and visiting their home; spending leisure time with Arabs; non-secular (ultra-orthodox, national-religious, traditional); and defining themselves as right or moderate right (not center, moderate left, or left).

Trends of Change

The surveys from 1976 to 2002 and the 2003-2015 Index surveys do not support the thesis of radicalization among Arabs and Jews. They reveal among Arabs a complex mix of exacerbated attitudes within democratic bounds and a certain shift toward radicalism. Among the Jews there is a trend of stability and some moderation in attitudes toward the Arab minority.

This trend of exacerbation, rather than radicalization, in the Arab public's position is evident in growing support for the struggle (including protest abroad) for equal rights to be conducted within the limits of democracy, as is demonstrated by Palestinization of identity without discarding the Israeli component, and a rise in the denial of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state. Yet, there is also an adoption of some extreme non-democratic stances such as support of violence, denial of Israel's right to exist, and unwillingness to create friendships with Jews. This mix of attitude change is not evidence of growing Arab radicalism and is not accompanied by violence and subversion.

The picture is far more unequivocal among the Jewish public: Over the period 1980-2015 most of the parameters have remained stable. A considerable number of attitudes have remained unchanged or even moderated; there are hardly any instances of exacerbation or radicalization.

A number of years since 1976 have been exceptional. In 1995, the positions among Arabs were noticeably more moderate than

usual as a result of the Rabin government's policy shift in favor of the Palestinian people and Arabs in Israel. The change in foreign policy is evident in Israel's recognition of the Palestinian people, acceptance of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, acknowledgement of the PLO as representative of the Palestinians, and approval of territorial partition as the solution to the Palestinian question. In the domestic sphere, the change is reflected in significant reduction of anti-Arab discrimination in certain areas, an increased budget for the Arab sector, and the Prime Minister's regular meetings with leaders of the Arab political parties who backed the ruling coalition from the outside. Since 1996, however, there has been an evident exacerbation in Arab attitudes. A trend towards moderation among Arabs was also witnessed in 2003, probably reflecting the deterring and chilling effect of the Arab uprising in October 2000. Since 2009, under the governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu, Arab citizens' stances have been more critical of Israel. However, this trend unexpectedly halted in 2013, in all probability due to the negotiations underway between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the release of Palestinian security prisoners, disillusionment with the Arab Spring, and the maturation of the historical process which enlarged the Arab middle class.

During the 18-month period between the 2013 Index and the 2015 Index a relatively large number of developments occurred which had a negative impact on the attitudes of both Arabs and Jews. These included the stalemate in the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Palestinians; the ongoing drive by the radical right against Arab citizens; the persistent campaign by the northern faction of the Islamic Movement under the slogan "Al-Aqsa Mosque Is in Danger"; the aggravation of the dispute between the government and the Negev Bedouins; Operation Protective Edge; and the campaign for the Knesset elections in March 2015. To these we should add the continued empowerment of the Arab minority, which has led to the public expression of more critical views by Arabs, and the counter-reaction among the Jewish public and leadership. Social media dramatically amplifies both Arab empowerment, with its adverse effects, and the Jewish

counter-reaction. These negative influences were moderated by the failure of the Arab Spring, uneasiness with the Islamic State, the ongoing civil war in Syria, and the collapse of several Arab states — regional developments that endow the life of Arab citizens in Israel with positive meaning and added value. Ongoing social mobility, initiatives to integrate Arabs into intermediate and senior slots in the economy, governmental investments to promote economic growth in the Arab sector, and a project to enhance young Arabs' access to institutions of higher education likewise had a restraining and moderating effect. Despite the negative forces at work between the 2013 Index and the 2015 Index, the halt in exacerbation of attitudes which was clear in 2013 continued, revealing a similar constellation throughout the entire 1976-2015 period under investigation.

The “*rapprochement thesis*” is an alternative interpretation to the “*radicalization thesis*,” positing that both sides share an interest in maintaining coexistence. According to this thesis, the Arabs have undergone a process of Israelization which includes the acquisition of bilingualism and biculturalism and access to a modern lifestyle. As citizens, they possess democratic tools for struggle and change. They also avail themselves of the resources and benefits provided by the welfare state, and remain subject to security control that serves as an effective deterrent. The exacerbation in positions among Arabs is the product of their politicization, which has raised awareness of their inferior status and the discrimination they face, as well as their greater familiarity with democratic means for affecting change. The Arab attitude change has also resulted from the wars between Israel and the Palestinians and the Arab world and the steps taken by the Israeli authorities to restrict Arab political activity. However, at the same time it reflects the fact that their growing empowerment has encouraged them to adopt verbal and behavioral positions which may be seen as violations of law and order, incitement, or disloyalty to the state. Conversely, moderation occurs when there is a *rapprochement* between Israel and the Palestinian people and when the government administers an egalitarian policy toward

Arab citizens, as under the 1992-1995 Rabin government. In any case, Arabs have learned to identify the red lines which they must not cross, such as refraining from terror and support of terror, avoiding damage to state security, and not disrupting everyday life.

In the surveys conducted since 1976 several questions have been asked consistently. They fall into two categories, according to their implications for coexistence: militant questions that do not shake the foundations of Arab-Jewish relations and rejectionist questions that undermine coexistence.

Table 43 presents Arabs' militant attitudes in the period 1976-2015. While these have experienced ups and downs they are, on the whole, stable. The attitudes in the late 1970s, indicating exacerbation in the aftermath of the first Land Day, are similar to those expressed in recent years. For example, support for general strikes ranges from 51% to 71%, with a mode of 60% and without consistent change over the years. Denial of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state also ranges from 35% to 62%, with a mode of about 60% and without consistent change.

Almost all the questions point towards moderation, or at least a lack of exacerbation, in Arab attitudes in 2013 compared to 2012. For instance, support for protest abroad decreased from 56.5% in 2012 to 38.5% in 2013, dissatisfaction with Israeli citizenship declined from 56.5% to 47.8%, and feeling closer to Palestinians than to Jews dropped from 55.7% to 41.8%. The transition from 2013 to 2015 is accompanied by conflicting and counterbalancing trends, resulting in stability, with a certain degree of exacerbation. To illustrate, the support for a Palestinian state alongside Israel rose from 63.7% in 2013 to 71.3% in 2015. However, at the same time dissatisfaction with the status of Arab citizens in Israel increased from 47.8% to 55.7%.

Table 43 Selected Militant Attitudes, Arabs, 1976-2015 (Percentages)

	Arabs*								
	1976	1980	1985	1995	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015
Deny Israel's right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state	*	56.1	61.1	34.6	59.6	62.0	54.0	54.2	53.9
Define themselves as anti-Zionist	*	*	*	24.3	19.6	35.4	43.6	42.5	36.0
The most important identity is membership of the Palestinian people	*	*	*	22.6	18.8	29.2	41.3	33.9	39.5
Support protest abroad	63.3	51.6	54.4	45.8	46.7	64.4	56.5	38.5	55.4
Support general strikes	62.4	54.0	60.3	56.1	58.2	71.2	65.2	50.6	63.7
Define themselves as Palestinian in Israel	*	28.6	38.4	36.0	40.1	43.3	45.0	39.0	37.1
Feel closer to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip than to Jews	*	*	*	49.2	53.1	49.9	55.7	41.8	43.7
Support the formation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel	73.4	62.2	66.3	*	88.8	68.6	68.7	63.7	71.3
Are not satisfied with Israeli citizenship	48.2	54.7	57.2	26.1	34.8	49.0	56.5	47.8	55.7

*Question not asked

Table 44 demonstrates a certain escalation in Arab rejectionist positions in the years 1976-2012, an end to this trend in 2013, followed by its exacerbation in 2015. Anti-coexistence attitudes hardened during the 2000s, compared to previous years. For example, the rate of denial of Israel's right to exist ranged from 7% to 27%, with an average of about 14%, until 2002. However in 2013 it stood at 11.0%, gradually increasing to 22.8% in 2012, dropping to 13.5% in 2013, and jumping to a record high of 26.9% in 2015. Until 2006 there was no consistent trend in the percentage of Arabs unwilling to have a Jewish friend, but since then rejection has risen steadily — from 15.7% in 2003 to 27.8% in 2012, dropping to 20.7% in 2013 and rising again to 24.3% in 2015.

Table 44 Selected Rejectionist Attitudes, Arabs, 1976-2015
(Percentages)

	Arabs								
	1976	1980	1985	1995	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015
Deny Israel's right to exist as a state	20.0	10.8	17.2	6.7	11.0	21.9	22.8	13.3	26.9
Support a Palestinian state in all of Palestine instead of Israel or in the 1947 borders	53.8	34.4	31.1	16.2	18.9	49.8	48.5	41.7	45.7
Support illegal demonstrations	17.1	6.9	10.6	6.0	4.9	12.6	15.4	11.3	22.6
Support the use of violence	17.8	7.5	8.0	2.6	3.0	13.1	10.5	7.2	15.6
Define themselves as Palestinian (without an Israeli component)	32.9	25.5	29.0	10.2	5.6	16.5	21.5	17.6	25.8
Are not willing to have Jewish friends	21.1	13.4	15.4	10.2	15.7	26.3	27.8	20.7	24.3

An additional remarkable finding concerns the 1995 survey, a poll which was extraordinary among all Arab attitude surveys because it revealed exceptionally moderate opinions. Only 6.7% denied Israel's right to exist as a state (Table 44) while a mere 34.6% denied its right to be a Jewish-Zionist state (Table 43). These especially low rejection rates were registered during the golden age of the second Rabin government (1992-1995), a regime that was greatly beneficial both to the Palestinians in terms of foreign policy and to Arab citizens in domestic policy. It is no surprise that the highest rates of denial of Israel's right to exist as a state (29.5%) and as a Jewish-Zionist state (66.4%) date to 2010 (the findings do not appear in the tables) under Netanyahu's second government, which aroused strong Arab opposition. Correspondence between a change in Arab attitudes and an alteration in the government policy toward them confirms that minority policy has a great impact on this public's outlook. Reduction of discrimination towards Arabs and truly striving for a

settlement with the Palestinians serve to moderate the opposition of Arab citizens to the Jewish-Zionist state and augment their reconciliation with and acceptance of it.

Like their Arab peers, Jewish citizens have also undergone various processes over the years. These include a rise in the strength of the radical right, a growth of the right as a whole, the impressive expansion of the political center, and the shrinking of the left. Inflammatory rhetoric and activities by the radical right create a hostile atmosphere toward Arabs and foster the mistaken impression that the Jewish public as a whole has become more intolerant and racist. The Index surveys disprove the prevalent but erroneous assumption that the Jewish public has become increasingly anti-Arab over time, as is revealed by the findings in Table 45. For instance, about 15% of Jews deny Arabs' right to live in Israel as a minority and this percentage has not changed in the years 1985-2015. Jewish citizens have learned over time to distinguish between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians across the Green Line. The Jewish public accepts Arab citizens as part of the state and society, despite reservations and objections due to their affiliation with the hostile Palestinian people and their ideological dissention (non-Zionists). All Israeli governments have maintained a sharp distinction between the Palestinians on either side of the Green Line. The state has partially acquiesced to the Arab struggle for civil equality and has learned over the years — particularly since the Arab unrest of October 2000 — not to cross the red lines laid down the Arab public: the police must not use live ammunition against Arab demonstrators; the state must not impose obligatory military or civil service on Arab youths; it must not legislate any law that explicitly discriminates against Arabs; and it must refrain from large-scale confiscation of Arab land, as occurred during the first decade and a half of statehood.

Relations between the state, the Arab minority, and the Jewish majority are characterized by calm, stability, and non-violence. Occasional flare-ups can be regarded as the exception proving the rule. Each side is aware of and refrains from crossing the red lines laid down by the other party.

Table 45 Selected Rejectionist Attitudes, Jews, 1980-2015 (Percentages)

	Jews							
	1980	1985	1995	2003	2008	2012	2013	2015
Deny Arabs' right to live in Israel as a minority	*	15.7	9.7	17.2	13.7	15.2	15.3	14.8
Reject the existence of an Arab minority with full civil rights in Israel	*	21.3	16.4	19.8	18.9	21.8	21.9	15.4
Deny Arabs the right to vote in Knesset elections	*	23.4	30.6	33.7	28.5	27.9	30.5	21.1
Think that Israel should encourage Arab citizens to leave the country**	48.5	38.7	36.4	38.9	34.1	*	*	*
Think that Israel is doing too much for the Arabs	38.1	37.0	32.0	31.3	*	*	37.1	*

*Question not asked

**Wording not identical over the years

CHAPTER 3

Conclusions

An analysis of developments since 1996, the findings of the 2003 to 2015 Indexes, and the results of attitude surveys conducted in the years 1976-2015 lead to several conclusions regarding Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.

Complex and Nuanced Attitudes

The Index of Arab-Jewish Relations reveals findings both in favor of and against Arab-Jewish coexistence, yielding a complex and nuanced picture of Arab and Jewish attitudes. On the one hand, 26.9% of Arabs in 2015 deny Israel's right to exist, 41.7% support the formation of a Palestinian state in lieu of Israel, 22.6% endorse the use of illegal demonstrations, 25.8% define their identity in Palestinian terms without any reference to Israel, 24.3% refuse to have a Jewish friend, 31.0% believe that the Holocaust never occurred, and 18.2% of Muslims do not regard the Islamic State (ISIS) as an extreme terrorist organization and as Arabs do not feel ashamed of it. On the other hand, 58.7% of the Arabs in 2015 think that the Jews, just as Arabs, have historical and national rights to the land, 54.2% regard Israel as a democracy for Arabs as well, 72.4% wish for Arab parties to join government coalitions, 60.2% personally want to live in Jewish neighborhoods, 64.0% feel that Israel is a good place to live, and 60.3% accept Israel with its Jewish majority.

Similarly, negative and positive attitudes exist among Jews. On the one hand, 58.9% of the Jews in 2015 think that it is good for Arabs and Jews always to live together in Israel, 54.1% are prepared

for Arabs to live in their neighborhood, 69.5% accept Arabs as full members of Israeli society, 82.4% agree that Arabs have the right to exist as a national minority with full civil rights, and 58.7% agree that Arabs receive by law their share of the state budget. On the other hand, 29.0% of Jews in 2015 are not willing to work under an Arab superior, 61.2% fear that Arabs endanger the state as a result of their struggle against its Jewish character, 66.5% believe that an Arab who identifies himself or herself as a Palestinian in Israel cannot be loyal to the state and its laws, 68.6% regard Israel as first and foremost a Jewish state and only then as a democratic state, and 29.5% support the outlawing of the Joint List. As in the Arab case, the picture of Jewish attitudes to Arab citizens is complex and nuanced.

Trend of Change of Attitudes

The trend of attitude change is different among Arabs and Jews. Most Arab attitudes hardened during the years 1976-2015 and some even radicalized. This is evident in intensified support of the struggle for equality and peace. The Arabs have become more nationalist in their views — their identity is more Palestinized, collective memory is more Nakba-based, and their demands for equality are more collective. Their endorsement of the use of parliamentary and legal extra-parliamentary means of protest, such as appeals to the Supreme Court, general strikes, protests abroad, boycotts of Knesset elections, and commemoration of Land Day and Nakba Day, has increased. They accord less legitimacy to Israel as a Jewish and Zionist state and their future vision of the state has become increasingly binational. The list of their claims and grievances has grown.

At the same time there has been a rise in the significant minority among the Arabs which rejects Arab-Jewish coexistence. This minority disagrees with the Arab mainstream, objecting to integration with Jews, denying Israel's right to exist, seeking to replace it with a Palestinian state, and backing the use of extra-legal means such as illegal demonstrations and violence.

There were certain points of change in Arab attitudes over the years. During the “golden age” of the second Rabin government, 1992-1995, Arab attitudes reached their most moderate level. In 2013 there was a striking halt in the trend of toughening Arab attitudes, but the exacerbation process was partially reignited in 2015 as a reaction to Operation Protective Edge and the 2015 Knesset election campaign.

In contrast to the Arabs, among Jews over the years 1980-2015 a trend of overall stability with some moderation is clear. Most Jews support integration and accept the Arabs’ right to live in Israel as a minority with full civil rights. Jews also favor the extension of cultural collective rights to Arabs. Yet there is a significant minority among Jews who reject Arab-Jewish coexistence, wish to deny the Arabs civil rights and refrain from contact with them. However, this population group has not grown over time. The trend among Jews counters the dominant view that over the years the Jews have been drifting towards the right and religion, becoming increasingly anti-Arab and less democratic.

Willingness to Make Concessions

A comprehensive examination of the attitudes to the steps necessary in order to improve Arab-Jewish relations reveals that while Jews are open to some change, the Arabs perceive themselves as the absolute victim, expect the state and the Jews to make concessions, and refuse to take any steps in order to win the trust and goodwill of the state and the Jews or motivate them to affect change.

This difference between the two sides’ willingness to make concessions is evident in responses to a series of suggested steps. For example, there is no majority agreement among Arabs regarding steps that may make them acceptable to Jews, including refraining from public identification with the Arab side if Israel is attacked, not viewing the Jews as foreign settlers who will eventually disappear, performing obligatory national

service, and accepting Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Yet a majority of Jews agree on steps that may make them and the state acceptable to Arabs, including recognition of unrecognized villages in the Negev, enactment of a law guaranteeing Arabs proper representation in state institutions and a proportional share of the state budget, granting Arabs cultural and educational autonomy, and the launch of an emergency program to bridge the Arab-Jewish socioeconomic gaps.

Although the Future Vision documents assume coexistence in Israel within the Green Line and a democratic Arab struggle, from a Jewish perspective they set forth an extreme goal and place the responsibility for change on the state and the Jews alone. According to these documents, the changes required on the part of the Arabs are internal and social in nature, intended to improve their lifestyle and intensify their endeavor to transform Israel into a binational state.

National Struggle

Since 1967, Arab citizens have experienced politicization and empowerment resulting from the developments in their milieu. Israel has undergone a comprehensive process of democratization (with a certain regression during the period of the most right wing governments to date, in the year years 2009-2015) and a spread of Jewish protest movements, changes that created opportunities for Arabs to organize and fight against discrimination and exclusion. The Arabs have accumulated power and exacted a price for their maltreatment by the state and Jews. Since the beginning of the 1970s, under Rakah leadership, they have concentrated their fight for civil equality and peace.

The Oslo Accords fostered among Arabs a feeling that these two goals will be fulfilled imminently, yet Rabin's assassination shattered their dreams. The improvement in the state's treatment of Arabs ceased, and the eruption of violence disillusioned them. They also realized that there is no salvation forthcoming from

the Palestinian leadership and a future Palestinian state. For this reason they shifted their collective goal from protest to national struggle. The Arab leadership of Hadash, Balad, Ra'am and Ta'al is no longer satisfied with using protest to uproot discrimination, obtain civil equality, and establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel, but rather strives to change Arabs' national status, obliterate Israel's Jewish identity, and form a binational state which will replace the Jewish nation-state. This undertaking received formal expression in the Future Vision documents which challenge both the Jewish state and the Palestinian national movement. The idea of transforming Israel into a binational state requires the Jews to renounce the Zionist project and the Jewish state, signaling to the Palestinian leaders that the Palestinian state will not offer a sufficient remedy to the Israeli segment of the Palestinian people. The objective of the Arab national struggle vis-à-vis the State of Israel and the Palestinian national movement is to escape from their double marginality — within Israeli society and even more within the Palestinian people — and to gain attention, respect, and help from both sides.

Arab Leadership

The state and the Jewish majority, led by the political right, interpret the Arab national struggle as an existential threat. Some voices explicitly proclaim that the menace from within represented by the Arabs in Israel might be even graver than the external Palestinian threat and the danger from other regional enemies. Jewish “defensive democracy” has embarked on a battle for containment. The anti-Arab legislation in the Knesset is a signal from the heads of the state to the Arab leadership to cease and desist, its fight being on the verge of crossing a red line.

The Jewish public and leadership perceive the Arab leadership as untrustworthy, unrepresentative, and ineffective, while the Arab public views it as representative but simultaneously untrustworthy and ineffective. This situation makes it difficult to

advance Arab-Jewish relations because minority leadership which is representative, trustworthy, and effective in the eyes of the minority, the majority, and the state is of central importance in promoting minority-majority relations. In the absence of power-sharing, the ideological Arab leadership engages in protest and national struggle, but the pragmatic Arab public expects it to share power, change policy, tackle daily problems, and offer practical solutions. The Jewish leadership does not feel the need or public responsibility to affect basic change, while the Arab leadership is not ready to modify its strategy in order to generate a change in policy and in the attitudes of the Jewish leadership and public. The outcome of this situation is a lingering impasse. Both the Jewish and Arab sides shake off public responsibility and avoid taking real steps for change.

The formation of the Joint List in January 2015 changed the status and role of the Arab leadership. As the third largest party and the only Arab party in the Knesset, achieving 83% of the Arab vote in 2015, the state, the Jewish public, the Palestinian Authority, the Arab countries, and the international community immediately perceived the Joint List as representative of the Israeli Arab population. Under the leadership of the Arab-Jewish Hadash Party and its new leader Ayman Odeh, the Joint List attempts to be more responsive to the Arab public and place increased emphasis on civic and socioeconomic equality rather than concentrating on peace and a change of the state's character.

The Joint List scored a victory by playing a role in a new government five-year plan to boost investment in the Arab sector, aiming to bring it to a par with the Jewish sector. This novel plan, adopted by the government at the end of December 2015, is unique in several respects. It was designed with the significant involvement of Arab-Jewish NGOs and the Joint List. It is large-scale, eradicates the institutional discrimination inherent in the state budget and applies affirmative action to Arabs in state funding. Its sustainability rests on the Ministry of Finance's objective to secure a high Israeli GNP by increasing Arabs' participation in the labor market and contribution to Israeli economy.

However, the Joint List remains an alignment of parties, not a unified single party. The new civic agenda is challenged internally by the nationalist Balad Party and from the outside by the outlawed Northern branch of the Islamic Movement. Another unexpected challenge is a threat from the right-wing government coalition to lower the threshold for admission into the Knesset: this would admit small radical parties and make the Joint List electorally redundant.

Peace Makers or Spoilers?

For years, many have expressed the view or indulged the hope that Arabs in Israel, with their connections to both sides and a strong stake in achieving peace, would constitute “a bridge for peace” with the Palestinians and the Arab world. However, this expectation is not realistic. The Arabs cannot fulfill the role of peace makers because they are absolutely on the Arab side and hence cannot serve as a fair mediator. Moreover, they lack the power and the resources vital for a conflict manager (such as the United States for instance).

By contrast, the Arab minority is liable to perform the role of “peace spoiler”. The Arab citizens might impede the attainment and stabilization of a peace treaty with the Palestinians by conducting a struggle to include their own demands in it, beginning an Intifada of their own, joining a Palestinian Intifada, or voting in a national referendum against a permanent settlement which ignores their own demands. Appreciable improvement of the Arab condition in Israel can curb this dire development.

Operative Consensus

Despite the deep rift between Arabs and Jews and the trend of toughening Arab attitudes, the Index findings point to the sustained infrastructure of Arab-Jewish coexistence in Israel. A

majority of both Arabs and Jews believe in a shared society, accept the state in its pre-1967 borders as the arena for their relations, feel that Israel is a good place to live, are committed to democracy as a mechanism for managing their mutual relations and conflicts, and agree that civil equality is the basis for coexistence and an important state goal.

A small majority of Arabs, over half, is also reconciled with Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and resigns itself to existence in a state with a Jewish majority, a Hebrew language, an Israeli-Hebrew culture, and a Jewish calendar. Arab reconciliation with a Jewish state is conditioned on full civil equality and fulfillment of Arab national aspirations by establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is clear that sharp power asymmetry between the Jewish state and the Jewish majority on the one hand and the Arab minority on the other underpins this reconciliation. Yet this is not the main force accounting for the continuous quiet and stability of the Arab minority in Israel. After all, a sharp power asymmetry also prevails between Israel and the Palestinians living under occupation but this has not prevented terrorism, mass revolts, and a struggle using diverse means and repression.

Operative consensus has crystallized between Arabs and Jews in Israel. It bridges the deep divide separating them, draws them closer, and prevents instability and violence. The cornerstones of this fundamental concord are the principle of two states, implying the Arabs' recognition of Israel's right to exist within the pre-1967 borders, loyalty to the state, civil equality, democracy as a mechanism for conflict management and a means of change, the extension of ethnic-cultural collective rights to the Arabs (separate education in Arabic, separate cultural institutions and separate religious courts, all funded by the state), exemption from any obligatory service to the state (both military and civil), and integration without assimilation. It is obvious that each side has its own interpretation of these principles and, as a result, their effectiveness is curtailed, yet they still pacify and stabilize Arab-Jewish coexistence.

Conditions for Sustained Calm and Stability

The conditions conducive to sustained tranquility and stability of Arab-Jewish relations are as follows:

1. The Arabs are undergoing Israelization, which offsets and reduces the effect of their Palestinization and Islamization. An Arab in Gaza or Nablus experiences Palestinization without Israelization, whereas an Arab in Nazareth or Jaffa experiences Palestinization together with Israelization. The process of Israelization experienced by an Arab in Israel moderates his Palestinization, ties him to Israel and draws him nearer to Jews in language, culture, lifestyle, and means of struggle. His status as an Israeli citizen carves for him a destiny that diverges from that of a non-citizen Palestinian. In the same vein, Israelization limits Islamization. A member of the Islamic Movement in Israel is not only linked to Israel by his way of life but is also aware of being a member of a Muslim minority which has no chance of becoming a majority and taking control of the country. He will be more moderate than a member of the Islamic Movement in Egypt, Afghanistan, the West Bank, or Gaza Strip, in which Islamization not only fails to set limits but also heightens the expectations of an Islamic revolution and ascendance to state power.
2. Israel is a strong and democratic state. Thanks to its continued democratization, it allows Arabs to conduct a legal and orderly struggle, provides them with services and benefits, and promotes a policy that differentiates between Palestinian citizens and non-citizen Palestinians. The rule of law and procedural democracy in Israel guarantee Arabs participation in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics, making a turn to illegal politics unnecessary. In view of Israel's effective security services, Arabs who resort to subversion and violence will in all probability be subdued and fail. Additionally, Israel is also a welfare state, a fact which benefits Arabs in particular because they are over-represented among the needy, have

large families, lower incomes, and live in underdeveloped communities. Moreover, Israel does not treat its Arab citizens in the same way as it does the Palestinians across the Green Line. The Arabs in Israel enjoy freedom of movement, access to employment all over the country, the right to vote for the Knesset, welfare services, the living conditions of a citizen, and a future in a democratic state. This is in contrast to the insecurity and vulnerability faced by members of their own people in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Diaspora.

3. The Jewish majority is shifting to the center and follows the state's distinction between Palestinians on either side of the Green Line. Israeli politics is moving from the left and right towards the center, which has become large and attractive despite its instability. Right-wingers moving to the center moderate their political attitudes and become more tolerant toward Arab citizens, explaining the absence of a trend of hardening attitudes among the silent Jewish public. Yet a vocal Jewish radical right has emerged which leverages its power by pushing legislation and legal motions that assault the Arab minority and create a nationalist and non-democratic atmosphere. This radical right failed to assume power and radicalize the Jewish public, but succeeded in reinforcing the alienation felt by the Arab minority and engendering a growing fear among the center-left elites that democracy is on the brink of collapse. The halt in the hardening of Arab attitudes in 2013 shows that the impact of the campaign by the anti-Arab radical right began to change direction by forcing Arab citizens to sense the danger of disconnection from Israel, to cherish the advantages of their life in Israel and to draw closer to the Jews and the state. This halt partially disappeared, however, after 2013 in response to Operation Protective Edge and the anti-Arab public statements made during the campaign for the 2015 Knesset elections.
4. Unlike Hamas and other Islamist movements, the Palestinian national movement assigns to the Palestinians in Israel the role of a political lobby for the Palestinian people and does

not expect them to join the Palestinian resistance movement, which seeks to subvert the very existence of the State of Israel. Like Israeli governments, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority distinguish between Palestinians outside Israel (including Arabs in East Jerusalem) and inside Israel ("Arabs of the interior"). They do not see themselves as representative of Israeli Arab citizens, do not reject Israel's policy that the problems of the Israeli Arabs are Israel's internal affair, do not recruit them for terrorism and war against Israel, and do not call upon them to boycott Knesset elections and disrupt law and order. They consider them an integral part of Israel and urge them to support the peace movement within Israel and act politically for the Palestinian cause. This stance grants legitimacy to the existence of the State of Israel and the continued presence of a Palestinian Arab minority within it. Only in special circumstances does the Palestinian Authority consider the needs of Arabs in Israel. Its rejection of the Netanyahu government's demand to recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people, for instance, is influenced by pressure from the Israeli Arab leaders who view this as over-determination of the state's Jewish-Zionist character, although the main consideration remains that such recognition might undermine the right of Arab refugees to return to Israel. Moreover, even in these exceptional cases the Palestinian Authority does not intervene directly in relations between the State of Israel and its Arab citizens. As a matter of fact, Arab citizens have a feeling, grounded in reality, that they are marginal to the Palestinian people, just as they are marginal to Israeli society. The prime motivation of the Future Vision documents was the feeling that the Palestinian national movement does not represent them, their interests differ from those of the other segments of the Palestinian people, and they should fight directly vis-à-vis the State of Israel to improve their status.

5. The international community does not intervene in Israel's internal affairs and its policies toward the Arab minority.

The United Nations, the European Union, and international non-governmental organizations support Arab civil society organizations, mostly with financial aid, but they do not press Israel to change its Jewish-Zionist character and its policy toward the Arab minority. The UN partition resolution of 1947 recognizes Israel as a Jewish state, as is accepted by most countries around the world, apart from the Arab states. The international criticism of Israel and the mounting pressure on it focus on terminating the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Hardening of Positions

The hardening of Arab, Jewish, and state positions has resulted from a certain weakening of these conditions. Yet these cohesive intergroup forces are still strong enough to ensure a *modus vivendi* between the three sides. Hardening of attitudes and behavior occurs without damaging the framework of coexistence and democratic procedures.

Hardening on the Arab side may be expressed in increasing support for the use of various extra-parliamentary means; reinforcement of opposition to the Jewish and Zionist character of the state and heightened calls for making Israel a binational state; expansion of protest and claims abroad; intensification of feelings of alienation and deprivation; increased fear of the Jews and the state; escalation of the combat for equality and peace; desertion of the Jewish political parties; augmentation of the distrust of Jews and state institutions; and a rise in the backing of the Palestinian people.

Jews' hardening attitudes may be expressed in a lack of preparedness to integrate Arabs into society and the state; increased distancing from them; intensified feelings of alienation from them; greater informal social discrimination against them; and blurring of the distinction between Arab citizens and non-citizen Palestinians.

Hardening of the state's position may be reflected in indirect legislation to curb Arab political activities; outlawing Arab organizations whose actions are on brink of illegality; an increase in discrimination within budget allocations; and blatant negligence and exclusion of the Arab sector.

Since the end of Rabin government in 1996, there has been a pronounced deterioration in the relations between the Arab minority, the Jewish majority and the state, showing most of the above signs of the hardening positions.

Mutual Red Lines

However, hardening of positions does not indicate a breakdown of the system of Arab-Jewish relations. The infrastructure of coexistence has remained intact and there has been almost no violence between Jews and Arabs as collectives after October 2000. Both Arabs and Jews, and certainly the state, do not want to break the rules of the game. Each side is cautious not to cross the red lines that the other sides have drawn. Crossing many red lines in appreciable ways might topple the relations, and this has so far been avoided.

The red lines that the state and the Jewish majority have laid down for the Arabs consist of many prohibitions. They include avoiding security violations, observing law and order outside the Arab communities, refraining from taking steps that would cause international interference in Israel's internal affairs, and not harming the Jewish-Zionist character of the state. The test lies in Arab behavior, rather than Arab attitudes, and therefore the toughening of Arab attitudes has not alarmed the authorities. Let me further elaborate: the Arabs could have broken the rules by disconnecting themselves from the Jews and the state and using non-democratic means for achieving rejectionist collective goals. This radicalization could entail rejection of coexistence and shared society; denial of Israel's right to exist by a majority of Arabs; dismissal of the Israeli component in their identity; refraining

from contact with Jews; civil disobedience and disruption of the country's daily routine; joining the Palestinian resistance movement and playing an active role in the Palestinian Intifadas; perpetration of terrorism against Jews; conducting illegal struggles; boycotting of Knesset elections and non-representation in the Knesset; acting through separate institutions instead of the shared state institutions, as the Northern branch of the Islamic Movement strives to do; and launching a secessionist movement.

The red lines that the Arabs and their leaders have drawn for the Jewish majority include rejecting Arabs' right to exist as a national minority with full civil rights; and blatant informal discrimination, daily humiliations, and occasional pogroms against them.

The state may cross red lines and break the rules by disenfranchising the Arabs; confiscating large tracts of their lands, imposing military government on their villages and towns; ethnically cleansing them; using violence against them; treating them in the same way that it treats the Palestinians under occupation; publicly pursuing a policy of transferring them to a Palestinian state or elsewhere; employing terror-tactics against Arab citizens; ceasing to grant them social benefits; repealing the exemption from military and civil service granted to them; enacting laws and administering policy of direct discrimination against them on the basis of national origin; outlawing Arab political parties and organizations of Arab civil society; and conducting administrative arrests of Arabs on a mass scale.

Mutual respect of these red lines is a common interest. Neither side desires to cross them because the price paid would be high. This lesson was learned during the October 2000 Arab uprising, which sharpened the red lines.

In contrast to the mutual radicalization thesis, the mutual rapprochement thesis posits that no process of breaking the rules is in evidence. If such process were underway, we would witness its above-mentioned concrete manifestations in the attitudes and actions of each of the three parties towards Arab-Jewish relations.

Breaking the rules is radicalization. The criticism of the radicalization thesis is that a process of breaking the rules is

not in evidence. The Jews as a dominant majority enjoy power and privilege, but the empowered Arab minority in Israel as a democratic state may and is using “democratic contentious politics” in order to improve its status without encountering repression from the state and Jewish majority.

A New Formula for a Jewish and Democratic State

In order to cope better with the division, discord, and conflict between Arabs and Jews, it is essential to reach peace with the Palestinians and the Arab world. A peace agreement will end occupation and terminate the status of the Palestinian Arab minority as part of an active enemy.

It is also necessary to fashion a more balanced formula for a Jewish and democratic state that will be fairer to the Arabs and tolerable for the Jews. In the new and reformed Israel, with a friendly Palestinian state alongside it, discrimination and exclusion of Arabs will be abolished and Arabs will be granted full civil equality, state recognition as a Palestinian national minority, cultural autonomy, representation in the state power structure, a proportional share of the state budget, and a state duty to consult with Arab political leadership in the Knesset on matters vital to the Arab minority. The Arabs, as the Jews, will perform obligatory service to the state. In this way, most of the demands set out by the Future Vision documents will be realized and the Arabs will cease their struggle to transform Israel into a binational state and accept its Jewish and democratic nature.

2015 Survey: Arabs

My name is _____ and I am an interviewer from the University of Haifa. We are conducting a scientific survey, carried out by the university, on the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. Participation in the survey will enable you to express your opinion on the topic and contribute to obtaining a true picture of public opinion in the state. You were randomly chosen for the purposes of the study. Your answers will not be transferred to any third party and will be used for statistical objectives only. There are no correct or incorrect answers to the questions. We thank you in advance for your participation, which is vital to the success of the study.

I will read to you several statements about the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel.

With regard to each of these statements, please indicate if you agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, or disagree.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
1	Joint organizations for Arabs and Jews	10.8	11.8	38.6	38.5	0.3
2	Arabs spend time at Jewish leisure places	8.9	17.9	29.8	42.9	0.5
3	Arabs study in Jewish high schools	24.3	28.9	23.0	23.5	0.3
4	Arabs live in Jewish neighborhoods	21.7	26.4	27.4	24.4	0.1
5	Arab political parties participate in coalition governments	14.3	12.5	34.0	38.4	0.8

And now I want to ask you personally:

		Definitely Want	Want	Do Not Want	Do Not Want at All	No Answer
6	Do you want or do not you want to join joint organizations for Arabs and Jews?	16.3	43.6	28.3	11.2	0.6
7	Do you want or do not you want to spend time at Jewish leisure places?	25.1	44.0	19.4	11.3	0.2
8	Do you want or do not you want your children study in Jewish high schools?	10.8	27.6	38.0	23.1	0.5
9	Do you want or do not you want to live in a Jewish neighborhood?	11.9	27.5	35.0	25.2	0.5

I want to ask you about your feelings when you happen to be with Jews:

		Definitely Feel at Ease	Feel at Ease	Do Not Feel at Ease	Definitely Do Not Feel at Ease	No Such Situation	No Answer
10	When in a shopping mall alongside Jews, how do you feel?	17.4	41.4	20.1	13.5	7.1	0.4
11	When receiving service in a government office in which Jews are also served, how do you feel?	15.2	47.2	17.1	14.0	5.9	0.5
12	When working in a workplace alongside Jews, how do you feel?	18.6	47.2	14.5	12.1	7.0	0.5

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
13	The country between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews	26.7	18.9	31.4	22.2	0.8
14	Israel is a good place to live	13.8	22.0	34.1	29.9	0.2
15	I prefer to live in the State of Israel than in any other country in the world	15.7	25.1	31.2	27.6	0.3
16	I feel proud of Israel's achievements in all areas, e.g., sports, science, and economy	24.9	26.6	29.5	18.8	0.1
17	I am prepared to make friends with Jews	12.3	12.0	38.1	37.4	0.2
18	I am prepared to have Jewish neighbors	19.0	20.2	30.7	29.7	0.4
19	Jews have many good and important values and customs that Arabs should adopt	17.9	18.6	35.6	27.7	0.2
20	Arab citizens and Jews should create together new common values and customs in addition to their own existing ones	13.1	18.8	39.2	28.5	0.4
21	Arab citizens are more similar in their way of life and behavior to the Jews in Israel than to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	19.9	21.3	36.2	21.9	0.6
22	When Arab citizens evaluate their achievements, most compare themselves mainly with Jews	20.3	21.9	35.3	22.0	0.4
23	Most Arab citizens will be more loyal to a Palestinian state in which they do not live than to Israel	22.4	30.8	26.2	20.4	0.1
24	The identity "Palestinian Arab in Israel" is appropriate for most Arab citizens in Israel	14.5	21.9	35.4	27.8	0.3

→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
25	I feel closer to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza than to the Jews in Israel	26.8	28.5	21.7	22.0	1.0	
26	I am prepared to move to a Palestinian state	42.0	30.2	18.1	9.4	0.3	
27	I feel distant from Jews in Israel	21.0	36.2	24.8	16.4	1.6	
28	As an Israeli citizen, I feel alien and rejected in Israel	24.0	27.4	28.3	19.7	0.6	
29	As an Israeli citizen, I feel alien and rejected by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	27.8	27.7	25.5	18.4	0.6	

The following statements concern Arab citizens' attitudes toward the state and Jews. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each one of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
30	Israel as a state has a right to exist	17.2	16.6	37.7	28.1	0.5
31	It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel	15.1	17.9	35.1	30.9	0.9
32	Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state	14.6	20.7	35.1	28.9	0.7
33	Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act to change their relations using only legal and democratic means	10.6	10.9	44.4	33.4	0.6
34	Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations such as personal friendships and participate in joint organizations	10.2	8.1	37.9	43.4	0.4
35	I avoid personal contact with Jews as much as possible	41.6	32.0	12.4	13.8	0.2

Here are some more statements about Jews in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of these statements.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
36	It is impossible to trust most Jews in Israel	18.4	26.7	29.6	24.6	0.7
37	Most Jews in Israel are swindlers	20.4	33.1	30.0	15.8	0.7
38	Most Jews in Israel are disposed to violent behavior	22.3	34.3	29.5	13.1	0.8
39	Most Jews in Israel are racist	18.9	25.2	30.9	24.2	0.7

To what extent do you fear or you do not fear each of the following eventualities, which may occur to Arab citizens in Israel in the coming years?

		Did Not Fear	Fear So-So	Fear to Some Extent	Fear	No Answer
40	Severe infringement of Arab citizens' rights	13.9	17.7	36.9	31.0	0.5
41	Mass confiscations of Arab lands	10.7	19.1	29.8	39.8	0.6
42	State violence against Arabs	13.7	18.6	30.7	36.4	0.6
43	Annexation of the Triangle to a future Palestinian state against the will of its Arab residents	20.9	24.9	24.4	29.1	0.7
44	A population transfer (mass expulsion) of some Arab citizens	26.1	18.7	19.8	34.7	0.7

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding Jews and the character of the state?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
45	Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is also a democracy for Arab citizens	20.6	22.2	33.6	22.6	0.9
46	Arab citizens can improve their situation using persuasion, political pressure, and voting	14.5	26.6	34.2	23.5	1.2

→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
47	Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights to the land	16.7	22.8	33.4	25.3	1.7	
48	The Jews in Israel are a people who have a right to a state	18.3	17.2	34.5	27.7	2.2	
49	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as an independent state in which Arabs and Jews live together	22.1	19.9	31.3	25.1	1.6	
50	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish and democratic state in which Arabs and Jews live together	25.9	19.0	29.8	23.8	1.5	
51	If there were a referendum regarding a constitution that defines Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, guaranteeing Arabs full civil rights, I would support it	28.0	18.9	25.5	26.2	1.4	
52	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that retains a Jewish majority	31.8	25.0	27.3	15.4	0.3	
53	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that serves the needs of Jews in Israel and around the world	29.4	29.8	24.2	16.3	0.3	
54	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state controlled by Jews	31.5	22.4	27.5	18.2	0.4	
55	I am reconciled with Israel today as a state in which there is a Jewish majority	18.7	20.6	30.4	29.9	0.4	
56	I am reconciled with Hebrew as the dominant language in Israel today	18.5	17.5	32.6	30.8	0.6.	
57	I am reconciled with Israel today as a state with the existing dominant culture	20.4	22.5	28.9	27.3	0.9	
58	I am reconciled with Saturday as the official day of rest in Israel today	21.4	16.4	26.3	34.4	1.5	
59	I am reconciled with the Law of Return in Israel today (the law that grants only Jews the right to immigrate to Israel and receive Israeli citizenship instantly)	34.4	25.6	23.1	15.9	0.9	→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
60	I am reconciled with Israel today as a state whose lands are controlled by Jews	25.8	24.6	30.1	18.6	0.9	
61	I am reconciled with the fact that today Israeli decision-makers are Jews	25.7	20.9	30.9	21.2	1.3	
62	I am reconciled with Israel today as a state which serves the needs of Jews in Israel and around the world	27.9	22.5	29.4	18.3	1.8	
63	I believe that a Holocaust took place in which millions of Jews were murdered by the Nazis	14.7	16.3	33.6	33.4	2.0	
64	It is justified that Israel observes Holocaust Memorial Day to remember the millions of Jews murdered by the Nazis	14.8	16.4	34.8	33.0	1.0	
65	Arab schools in Israel should also teach about the Holocaust	27.1	24.2	29.6	17.6	1.4	
66	It is justified that the state has Jewish symbols, but the state should also have Arab symbols with which Arabs can identify	13.7	14.9	39.6	31.3	0.5	
67	Israel as a Zionist state, in which Arabs and Jews live together, is racist	17.1	25.1	26.4	31.1	0.2	

Please indicate whether you regard each of the following statements, made during the 2015 Knesset election campaign, as racist or not racist.

		Definitely Racist	Racist	Not Racist	Definitely not Racist	No Answer
68	Prime Minister Netanyahu's call to his supporters to ensure they vote because the Arabs were voting en masse	54.7	31.1	11.5	2.4	0.3
69	The statement by the leader of Kulanu, Kahlon, that he will not join a coalition government based on Arab votes	47.4	35.2	12.2	4.7	0.5

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions in Israel?

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
70	Health institutions	2.7	12.9	45.3	38.9	0.2
71	Higher education institutions	3.5	17.3	43.2	35.8	0.3
72	The courts	13.4	24.5	42.4	19.0	0.7
73	The police	31.7	32.5	21.7	13.9	0.1
74	The Knesset	28.8	34.9	24.3	11.9	0.1
75	The government	40.5	27.3	19.2	13.0	0.1

76	Do you support or oppose the possibility of the Arabs conducting a struggle focused more on civil and socioeconomic equality than peace and changing the character of the state?					
	Definitely support					16.6
	Support					43.0
	Oppose					20.3
	Definitely oppose					7.5
	No answer					12.6

Let us return to questions about Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the possibility that Arab citizens use each of the following means to improve their situation in Israel?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
77	General strikes	10.6	18.7	28.1	42.4	0.1
78	Protest abroad	18.2	22.6	28.8	30.1	0.2
79	Illegal demonstrations	39.6	30.8	13.2	16.1	0.3
80	Boycott of Knesset elections	41.6	25.5	16.4	16.1	0.4
81	All means, including violence	52.4	28.7	8.9	9.6	0.3

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following arrangements for relations between Arab and Jewish citizens?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
82	Arab citizens should have the status of a national minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and come to terms with this	23.5	19.3	33.3	23.4	0.5
83	Arab citizens should enjoy democratic rights, receive a proportional share of budgets and run their own religious, educational, and cultural institutions	23.7	21.3	32.4	21.7	0.9
84	A Palestinian state should be established in all of Palestine instead of Israel	27.0	25.7	20.7	25.0	1.5

85	Are you prepared for an Arab youth to volunteer for a year of civil service and receive the benefits received by a person who performs military service?					
	Certainly yes					10.6
	Think so					20.7
	Do not think so					25.0
	Certainly not					29.0
	No answer					14.7

I will now read out to you several possible requirements to be met in order that the state and Jews will treat Arab citizens with equality, respect, and trust. With regard to each of them, please indicate if you agree or disagree that Arab citizens should take this step in order for the state and Jews to treat them with equality, respect and trust.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
86	Arab citizens should fulfill some kind of obligatory service to the state	33.8	26.0	23.1	16.4	0.7
87	Arab citizens should accept Israel as a Jewish and democratic state	27.2	29.3	23.3	19.6	0.5

→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
88	Arab citizens should accept Israel as the state of all Jews in the world, not just the state of the Jews in Israel	37.7	26.8	21.4	13.5	0.5	
89	Arab citizens should avoid struggling to change the Jewish-Zionist character of the state	36.7	23.7	22.0	17.0	0.5	
90	Arab citizens should avoid protesting against the state abroad	35.1	22.6	21.6	19.6	1.1	
91	Arab citizens should not publicly commemorate Nakba Day	43.5	23.7	13.9	18.0	0.9	
92	Arab citizens should not demand that the displaced persons (internal refugees) be allowed to reconstruct villages that were destroyed in 1948	42.6	22.0	21.9	12.9	0.5	
93	Arab citizens should not identify publicly with the Arab side if Israel is attacked verbally or physically	37.9	25.5	22.2	13.4	0.9	
94	Arab leaders should avoid making severe pronouncements against the state	32.1	21.5	28.7	15.6	1.9	
95	Arab leaders should unequivocally condemn violent actions by Arabs against Jews in Israel	30.4	28.1	26.2	14.4	0.9	
96	Arab citizens should renounce the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to the State of Israel	46.1	25.8	17.4	10.1	0.6	
97	Arab citizens should not view the Jews as alien settlers who usurped the lands of the country from the Arabs	34.0	21.8	24.0	19.4	0.8	
98	As long as there are no peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab citizens will not define their identity as "Palestinian-Arabs in Israel"	35.2	23.4	24.7	15.3	1.5	
99	Arab citizens should not demand to be recognized as a Palestinian national minority	39.6	31.5	14.1	13.6	1.2	→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
100	Arabs should see Israel as their state and support it, in the case of a dispute with the Palestinian state	43.4	27.1	17.6	11.1	0.7	
101	Arab citizens should recognize the Jews' right to determine the language, culture, symbols, and policies of the state, while at the same time recognizing the needs of its Arab citizens	32.7	19.6	28.0	18.7	1.0	

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following principles for settling the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	
102	Two states for two peoples	19.3	9.2	37.9	33.4	0.2	
103	The pre-1967 borders will be the borders between the two states, with an option of land swaps	22.2	17.0	35.6	25.0	0.2	
104	Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	39.9	21.5	22.8	15.4	0.4	
105	The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return only to the state of Palestine	28.7	18.0	29.1	24.2	0.1	
106	After the full implementation of these principles, all claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will cease	22.4	20.2	30.6	26.7	0.1	
107	Some of the Arab localities in the Triangle will be annexed to a Palestinian state	46.2	29.2	13.2	11.4	0.1	
108	Israel's launch of Operation Protective Edge (Gaza War) was justified	54.8	16.9	11.9	15.5	0.9	→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
109	I will support an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even if it does not include a solution to the problem of the lands expropriated from Israeli Arab citizens and the problem of the internal refugees	31.6	20.7	25.1	22.0	0.5	
110	I will support an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians even if it includes recognition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state but guarantees full civil equality to the Arabs	22.2	19.3	32.8	25.6	0.1	
111	As long as there is no peace between Israel and the Arab world, there should be a strong Arab or Muslim force that withstands Israel and hits it hard when necessary	23.9	26.3	26.2	23.4	0.2	

Now I will ask you some more questions about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel's status in the region. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	
112	I believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent agreement in the coming years	25.5	25.3	30.6	18.6	0.0	
113	The Jews are principally guilty for the protracted conflict between them and the Palestinians	9.7	22.2	34.5	33.7	0.0	
114	The Jews are principally responsible for the Nakba	11.2	18.0	30.9	39.6	0.3	
115	Zionism is a colonial and racist movement	8.0	13.6	28.0	29.1	1.3	
116	The Jews in Israel are foreign settlers who do not integrate into the region, are doomed to leave, and the country will revert to the Palestinians	16.2	28.4	25.9	28.8	0.8	→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
117	It is justified that the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza will embark upon a third Intifada if the political stalemate continues	17.9	22.9	30.4	28.3	0.5	
118	It is justified that Arab citizens in Israel will begin an Intifada of their own if their situation will not improve appreciably	23.5	22.4	30.1	23.9	0.1	
119	In the area of culture, Israel should integrate more into Europe-America than into the Middle East	18.2	18.8	35.2	26.8	0.9	
120	Israel should favor integration into the Western world over integration into the region's Arab and Muslim states	16.7	22.7	33.0	26.6	0.9	
121	Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries	17.9	28.3	30.8	22.1	0.9	

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding our region.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
122	When I see the unrest and instability in the Arab world since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, I feel it is good that I live in Israel	17.9	17.1	33.7	30.5	0.8
123	ISIS [Da'ash] is an extreme terrorist organization and as an Arab I feel ashamed of it	5.6	11.3	25.1	57.3	0.8
124	I welcome the nuclear agreement between the superpowers and Iran	15.0	20.9	41.7	21.1	1.3
125	Israel should act to prevent Iran from replacing it as the strongest regional state	28.8	29.3	21.9	18.7	1.2

Please indicate whether, in the aftermath of each of the following events, you feel closer to or more distant from the Jews:

		I Feel Much Closer to the Jews	I Feel a bit Closer	I Feel a bit More Distant	I Feel Much More Distant from the Jews	[Do not Read, No Change]	No Answer
126	In the aftermath of the Arab Spring	9.6	13.3	14.0	20.9	40.9	1.3
127	In the aftermath of Operation Protective Edge (Gaza War), summer 2014	3.6	8.5	25.9	42.7	18.1	1.2
128	In the aftermath of the 2015 Knesset election campaign	4.8	8.9	29.2	29.2	26.7	1.2

To what extent do you agree or disagree that each of the following organizations truly represents Arab citizens?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
129	The Higher Follow-Up Committee truly represents Arab citizens	15.1	24.3	37.6	22.0	0.9
130	The Committee of Arab Local Authorities truly represents Arab citizens	10.7	27.5	39.4	21.5	1.0
131	The Islamic Movement truly represents Arab citizens	17.4	24.6	31.6	25.4	1.0

Now I would like to ask you several questions about Arab leaders in Israel.

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
132	To what extent do you trust Arab leaders in Israel?	14.7	45.1	29.0	10.4	0.9

→

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer	←
133	To what extent do Arab leaders in Israel serve the Arab population in advancing practical solutions to its problems?	16.5	51.0	21.1	10.2	1.2	

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the Joint List of the Arab parties.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
134	The Joint List of the Arab parties truly represents the Arabs in Israel	17.2	25.8	36.8	19.1	1.2
135	It is important to me that the Joint List will continue to exist as one body and will not break up	13.7	17.3	36.3	31.6	1.2
136	The Joint List should concentrate on solving the Arab population's day to day problems	8.8	11.1	36.9	42.3	0.9
137	The Joint List should cooperate with the authorities and Jewish parties in order to advance the interests of the Arab population	9.2	13.9	39.8	35.9	1.2
138	If a left-center bloc will form the government, the Joint List should be ready to join the coalition and assume common responsibility for all government decisions and actions	18.0	22.8	35.0	22.6	1.6
139	I expect the Joint List to improve the conditions of the Arab population in Israel	18.8	27.3	33.0	19.5	1.5
140	I fear that the Joint List will deepen the divide between Arabs and Jews in Israel	21.8	31.3	25.0	20.0	1.9

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
141	The state should recognize a supreme body chosen by Arab citizens to represent them	7.0	10.7	40.3	41.2	0.8
142	The state should recognize the Higher Follow-Up Committee as a body representative of Arab citizens	10.8	16.3	33.4	38.7	0.8
143	The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational, and cultural institutions	11.2	10.3	37.2	40.4	0.8

144	Does Israel have a right to exist?					
	Yes					38.0
	Yes with reservations					31.4
	No					26.9
	No answer					3.6

145	Do you think that Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state?					
	Yes					19.8
	Yes with reservations					22.8
	No					53.9
	No answer					3.6

Are you in favor, reserved, or opposed to the use of the following means as part of the Arab citizens' struggle to advance their interests?

		In Favor	Reserved	Opposed	No Answer
146	Protest actions abroad	55.4	24.0	20.2	0.4
147	General strikes	63.7	23.4	12.4	0.5
148	Illegal demonstrations	22.6	28.2	48.7	0.5
149	Use of violence	15.6	19.0	64.9	0.5

150	How do you evaluate the relations between Arab citizens and Jews today?	
	Very good	6.3
	Sufficiently good	35.2
	Not sufficiently good	37.9
	Not good at all	19.7
	No answer	0.9

151	Do you expect improvement or deterioration in the relations between Arab citizens and Jews during the coming five years?	
	A lot of improvement	6.4
	Some improvement	30.3
	Some deterioration	41.1
	A lot of deterioration	20.7
	No answer	1.5

152	How does the government treat Arab citizens today?	
	As equal citizens	7.5
	As equal citizens with discrimination in certain areas	24.1
	As second class citizens	40.2
	As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	26.8
	No answer	1.4

We will end now with questions about you.

153	To what extent are you satisfied with your life as an Israeli citizen?	
	Definitely satisfied	15.3
	Satisfied	28.4
	Not sufficiently satisfied	38.3
	Not satisfied at all	17.4
	No answer	0.6

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154	According to your evaluation, has your personal situation as an Arab in Israel improved or deteriorated over the years?	
	Significantly improved	7.4
	Somewhat improved	35.2
	Somewhat worse	38.5
	Significantly worse	18.1
	No answer	0.7

155	Which of the following identities is the most important for you?	
	Being an Israeli citizen	13.4
	Being Muslem, Christian, or Druze	46.5
	Being a member of the Palestinian people	39.5
	No answer	0.6

156	How would you define your identity if you have to choose from the following possibilities?	
	Arab	11.5
	Israeli Arab	12.3
	Arab in Israel	6.5
	Israeli	5.9
	Palestinian Arab	20.3
	Israeli Palestinian	3.7
	Palestinian in Israel	6.6
	Palestinian Arab in Israel	26.8
	Palestinian	5.5
	No answer	1.0

157	As an Israeli citizen, to what extent do you consider yourself Palestinian-Arab or Israeli-Arab?	
	Only Palestinian-Arab and not at all Israeli-Arab	31.0
	Mainly Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Arab to some extent	32.0
	Equally Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Arab	15.8
	Mainly Israeli-Arab and Palestinian-Arab to some extent	11.6
	Only Israeli-Arab and not at all Palestinian-Arab	8.5
	No answer	1.0

158	To what extent is the memory of the Nakba important in your life?	
	To a very great degree	29.8
	To a great degree	26.8
	To some degree	29.8
	Not at all	13.4
	No answer	0.2

159	According to your understanding and definition of Zionism, are you:	
	Definitely Zionist	2.5
	Zionist	3.8
	Not Zionist	56.7
	Anti-Zionist	36.0
	No answer	1.0

160	Do you know enough Hebrew in order to conduct a conversation in Hebrew with an Israeli Jew on various topics?	
	Yes	81.2
	No	15.7
	No answer	3.2

161	How often do you meet Jews in your daily life?	
	Daily	26.4
	Often	38.6
	Seldom	27.4
	Almost never	6.8
	No answer	0.7

162	Do you have Jewish friends and have you visited them in their homes during the past two years?	
	Do not have Jewish friends	47.2
	Have Jewish friends but have not visited them in their homes	28.1
	Have Jewish friends and have visited them in their homes during the past two years	24.3
	No answer	0.4

Have you participated in each of the following events?

		Never	Once or Twice	Three to Five Times	Six or More Times	No Answer
163	In Land Day events	48.9	21.5	21.2	8.0	0.4
164	In events commemorating the Nakba	52.2	20.8	17.9	8.6	0.4
165	In protest actions such as legal demonstrations and processions	48.4	24.2	18.3	8.8	0.4
166	In protest actions such as illegal demonstrations and violent processions	69.5	14.9	7.4	7.8	0.4

167	Did you participate in Land Day events in March this year (2015)?					
	Did not participate					56.0
	Participated in one of the central events					25.4
	Participated in another event. Indicate which					15.3
	No answer					3.2

168	Did you participate in the Nakba events in April this year (2015)?					
	Did not participate					65.1
	I marched in the procession to the Hadatha village					12.5
	I marched in the procession to another village					15.2
	I marched in the procession to the Hadatha village and to another village					4.4
	No answer					2.7

Indicate whether, as an Arab, you have experienced any of the following.

		Never	Once or Twice	Three to Five Times	Six or More Times	No Answer
169	Received help from Jews?	41.4	32.5	15.1	10.7	0.3
170	Spent leisure time with Jews?	26.4	28.3	17.7	26.6	0.9
171	Personally encountered threats, humiliations, or blows from Jews against Arabs?	72.8	16.4	6.8	3.5	0.5

→

		Never	Once or Twice	Three to Five Times	Six or More Times	No Answer	←
172	Personally encountered discrimination by Jews or a state institution in any area (shops, workplaces, leisure attractions, public transportation, police, government offices)	50.6	26.4	12.1	10.4	0.5	

In addition, indicate whether you have experienced or fear any of the following eventualities.

		Yes	No	No Answer
173	In the past three years you have been harassed by the authorities because of participation in protest activities	12.0	87.1	0.9
174	In the past three years your livelihood has been adversely affected because of participation in protest activities	11.5	87.3	1.2
175	Fear harassment by the authorities because of participation in protest activities	29.3	69.4	1.3
176	Fear that your livelihood could be adversely affected because of participation in protest activities	31.0	67.5	1.5

177	With which TV channel from the following list do you most closely identify?		
	Al-Jazeera	19.2	
	Al-Arabia	11.0	
	TV channels from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt	36.5	
	The Israeli TV channel in Arabic	7.9	
	One of the Israeli TV channels in Hebrew	23.8	
	No answer	1.6	

178	With which political party or movement from the following list do you most closely identify?	
	Hadash led by Ayman Odeh	20.7
	Balad led by Jamal Zahalke	7.8
	Ta'al led by Ahmad Tibi	21.0
	Ra'am led by Mas'od Ghanayim	13.1
	The Arab National Party led by Mohammad Kan'an	0.1
	The Arab Unity Front led by Hashim Mahamid	0.6
	The Southern faction of the Islamic Movement led by Hamad Abu Da'abes	3.6
	The Northern faction of the Islamic Movement led by Raid Salah	9.4
	The Sons of the Village Movement	4.9
	Labor led by Itzhak Herzog	2.7
	Meretz led by Zehava Gal'on	4.9
	Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid	0.5
	Kadima led by Sha'ul Mofaz	0.1
	Hatnu'a led by Zipi Livni	0.9
	Kulanu led by Moshe Kahlon	1.0
	Likud led by Benjamin Netanyahu	2.5
	Yisrael Betenu led by Avigdor Lieberman	0.6
	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal led by Naftali Bennett	0.2
	Yahadut Hatora	0.1
	Shas led by Arye Der'i	0.8
	Another Jewish political party or movement	0.7
	No answer	3.7

179	If the election to the Knesset was held today, for which political party from the following list would you vote?	
	The Joint List led by Ayman Odeh	51.7
	Another Arab political party	0.7
	The Zionist Camp led by Herzog and Livni	3.1
	Meretz led by Zehava Gal'on	2.4
	Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid	0.5
	Kulanu led by Moshe Kahlon	0.8

→

Likud led by Benjamin Netanyahu	1.8	←
Yisrael Betenu led by Avigdor Lieberman	0.6	
Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal led by Naftali Bennett	0.2	
Yahadut Hatora	0.0	
Shas led by Arye Der'i	1.4	
Yahad led by Eli Yishai	0.0	
Another Jewish political party or movement	0.5	
Undecided	10.6	
Will not vote	15.2	
Empty ballot	3.4	
Refuse to answer	6.4	
No answer	0.7	

180	For which political party did you vote in the last Knesset elections in 2015?	
	The Joint List led by Ayman Odeh	52.4
	Other Arab political parties	0.5
	The Zionist Camp led by Herzog and Livni	3.2
	Meretz led by Zehava Gal'on	2.4
	Yesh Atid led by Yair Lapid	0.5
	Kulanu led by Moshe Kahlon	1.0
	Likud led by Benjamin Netanyahu	1.9
	Yisrael Betenu led by Avigdor Lieberman	0.5
	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal led by Naftali Bennett	0.2
	Yahadut Hatora	0.0
	Shas led by Arye Der'i	0.7
	Yahad led by Eli Yishai	0.0
	Another Jewish political party or movement	0.0
	I did not vote although I had the right to vote	23.2
	I did not vote and did not have the right to vote	0.7
	Empty ballot	1.6
	Refuse to answer	9.4
	No answer	1.7

181	What is your religion?	
	Muslim	82.0
	Christian	9.4
	Druze	7.8
	No answer	0.8

182	With regard to religious observance, do you consider yourself today:	
	Very religious	7.7
	Religious	33.6
	Religious to some extent	34.9
	Not religious	22.3
	No Answer	1.5

183	What is your attitude toward the Islamic Movement in Israel?	
	Opposed	7.6
	Neither opposed nor sympathetic	48.8
	Sympathetic	28.7
	A rank and file member	8.6
	An active member	4.9
	No answer	1.4

184	Would you allow or not allow a young, single Arab girl to have a boyfriend?	
	Yes allow	10.2
	To some extent	29.0
	No	58.9
	No answer	1.9

185	Since the proclamation of the state, have lands been expropriated from your family or parents?	
	Yes, a lot	21.3
	Yes, some	19.1
	Own lands but they were not expropriated	33.8
	My family or parents do not own land	23.8
	No answer	1.9

186	Are you a member of a displaced family (an internal refugee)?	
	Yes	25.3
	No	73.0
	No answer	1.7

187	Are you of Bedouin descent?	
	Yes	24.2
	No	73.6
	No answer	2.2

188	How old are you?	
	Age groups	
	18-21	12.6
	22-24	12.1
	25-30	20.3
	31-35	10.4
	36-40	12.1
	41-45	9.2
	46-50	8.7
	51-55	3.7
	56-60	5.6
	61 and over	4.5
	No answer	0.7

189	What is your marital status?	
	Single	33.1
	Married	61.9
	Divorced/separated	0.9
	Widowed	0.9
	No answer	3.2

190	Level of education?	
	Did not attend school	3.2
	Incomplete Heder or elementary school education	2.1
	Completed elementary school	8.0
	Incomplete high school (academic, vocational, or Yeshiva) education	5.3
	Completed high school	44.2
	Incomplete post-secondary school, college, or university education	7.1
	Completed college or university and received a B.A. degree	22.7
	Completed college or university and received an M.A. degree	5.3
	Completed university and received a Ph.D. degree	1.2
	No answer	1.0

191	Are you:	
	A wage earner (including a civilian employed by the military, a professional soldier, a Kibbutz or Moshav member)	50.8
	Self-employed	8.1
	A soldier performing mandatory service	0.2
	Not employed but seeking employment	6.1
	Not employed and not seeking employment	4.0
	Retired	3.2
	A student (in high school, college, university), a youth before the draft, volunteer	11.9
	A housewife	14.3
	No answer	1.2

192	The average expenditure per month in Israel for a six-member Arab family is 11,000 NIS. In comparison, your family expenditure is:	
	Far above the average	9.0
	To some extent above the average	20.0
	Average	14.6
	To some extent below the average	23.9
	Far below the average	29.9
	No answer	2.7

We have now finished. Thank you.

Interviewer's Report

193	In which sample list does the respondent appear?	
	In the original sample list	80.9
	In the substitute sample list	13.6
	Unknown	5.5

194	Gender.	
	Male	49.3
	Female	49.1
	Unknown	1.6

195	Name of place of residence.	
	Abu Snan	3.6
	A'atzam	5.5
	Ksefe	2.7
	Um al-Faham	5.3
	Iksal	3.5
	Bo'ene-Nojidat	2.7
	Julis	2.1
	Jat (in the Triangle)	3.5
	Daliat al-Carmel	3.6
	Zimer-Marja	3.5
	Haifa	3.0
	Bir al-Maksur	1.7
	Tira	3.8
	Kfar Yasif	3.5
	Kfar Manda	3.1
	Ar'ara	3.7
	Sha'ab	2.4
	Ramle	2.5
	Majdal al-Krum	4.4
	Na'ora	1.5

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Nahaf	4.8
Nazareth	6.0
Sakhnin	3.5
Akko	4.7
Rahat	6.3
Segev Shalom	2.2
Shefaram	4.8
Sheikh Danun	2.0

196	How do you evaluate the general reliability of the information that the respondent provided?	
	Unsatisfactory	4.9
	Satisfactory	21.2
	Good	24.6
	Very good	28.8
	No answer	20.5

197	Month in which the interview was held.	
	May 2015	22.4
	June 2015	40.4
	July 2015	35.5
	August 2015	0.4
	Unknown	1.4

198	Day of the month in which the interview was held.	
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199	Verification of the interview by the fieldwork supervisor.	
	Verified	42.2
	Unverified	1.8
	Unknown	56.1

New Service Variables

vote15 Vote in the 2015 Knesset election (based on question 180), used for computing weighting coefficients for the survey findings.

Joint List	52.9
Jewish political parties	10.4
Did not vote despite having the right to vote	23.2
Did not vote and did not have the right to vote (minor)	0.7
Other, missing	12.7

wgt Weighting coefficients for the survey findings.

Joint List	0.8348
Jewish political parties	0.6484
Did not vote despite having the right to vote	3.7760
Did not vote and did not have the right to vote (minor)	0.3827
Other, missing	1.0000

2015 Survey: Jews

My name is _____ and I am an interviewer from the University of Haifa. We are conducting a scientific survey, carried out by the university, on the relations between Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel. Participation in the survey will enable you to express your opinion on the topic and contribute to obtaining a true picture of public opinion in the state. You were randomly chosen for the purposes of the study. Your answers will not be transferred to any third party and will be used for statistical objectives only. There are no correct or incorrect answers to the questions. We thank you in advance for your participation, which is vital to the success of the study.

We will begin with questions regarding the possibilities of relations between you and Israeli Arabs.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
1	Do you agree or disagree to Arabs studying in Jewish high schools?	29.4	7.1	14.0	46.4	3.1
2	Do you agree or disagree to Arabs living in Jewish neighborhoods?	35.1	10.2	12.6	40.1	2.0
3	Do you agree or disagree to Arab political parties joining coalition governments?	36.7	8.5	13.1	38.4	3.3

And personally:

		Definitely Ready	Ready	Not Ready	Definitely Not Ready	No Answer
4	Are you prepared for Israeli Arabs to spend time in places alongside you?	23.6	41.5	13.7	18.1	3.0
5	Are you prepared for Israeli Arab children to study in your children's schools?	19.1	38.4	13.8	25.0	3.6
6	Are you prepared for Israeli Arabs to live in your neighborhood?	18.7	35.4	19.3	24.4	2.1

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
7	The country between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is a common homeland for Arabs and Jews	41.6	6.7	15.1	30.2	6.4
8	I accept Arab citizens as full members of Israeli society	23.0	5.9	16.9	52.6	1.7
9	I am prepared to have an Arab neighbor	35.9	5.1	10.5	47.5	1.0
10	I am prepared to work under an Arab superior in my job	26.5	2.5	13.4	53.6	3.9
11	Arabs have many good and important values and customs that Jews should adopt	35.3	9.2	17.2	28.5	9.9
12	Arab citizens and Jews should create together new common values and customs in addition to their own existing ones	32.4	6.6	13.1	45.5	2.5

To what extent do you agree or disagree that Arab citizens should be allowed:

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
13	To vote in Knesset elections	16.5	4.6	11.5	65.9	1.6
14	To buy land in any area they desire	43.4	12.4	8.4	31.5	4.3

To what extent do you agree or disagree that the state should:

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
15	Grant Jews some preference over Arab citizens	39.9	11.6	12.3	34.5	3.7

The following statements concern Arab citizens in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree or disagree with each of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
16	It is good that Arab and Jewish citizens will always live together in Israel	24.7	9.5	17.9	41.0	7.0
17	Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel should have equal rights and also an equal duty of loyalty to the state	10.6	3.9	12.6	72.1	0.8
18	Arab and Jewish citizens are allowed to act to change their relations using only legal and democratic means	6.9	1.7	7.9	81.0	2.6
19	Arab and Jewish citizens should also have voluntary relations such as personal friendships and participate in joint organizations	12.2	2.8	11.8	70.2	3.0
20	I avoid personal contact with Arabs as much as possible	62.9	6.1	5.1	23.4	2.5

Here are more statements about Arab citizens in Israel as a group. Indicate if you agree with each of them.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
21	It is impossible to trust most Arab citizens	40.2	13.4	9.4	32.4	4.6
22	Most Arab citizens are disposed to violent behavior	49.8	13.1	9.7	23.9	3.5
23	Most Arab citizens can never achieve the same cultural level as Jews	54.1	11.6	8.4	22.0	3.9
24	Most Arab citizens are not law-abiding	48.8	10.5	8.8	22.9	9.0
25	I feel distant from Arab citizens in Israel	32.1	6.5	13.8	44.1	3.5
26	I refrain from entering Arab localities in Israel	32.6	5.6	11.8	47.5	2.6

To what extent do you agree with each of the following opinions?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
27	Arab citizens endanger the state because of their struggle to change its Jewish character	27.2	7.4	13.1	48.1	4.2
28	Arab citizens endanger the state by their support of the Palestinian people's struggle	17.1	6.6	15.3	58.2	2.9
29	Arab citizens endanger the state because they may start a popular revolt	25.5	7.9	13.5	49.9	3.3

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the status of Arab citizens in Israel?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
30	Arab citizens and Jews should have equal individual rights, state budgets, and opportunities for education and employment	17.4	5.1	12.9	61.3	3.4
31	Arab citizens have a right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights	14.7	3.1	13.2	66.5	2.6
32	Arab citizens have the right to live in the state as a minority with full civil rights, whether they accept Israel's right to be a Jewish state or not	54.5	8.7	7.3	24.9	4.7
33	An Arab citizen who defines himself as "a Palestinian Arab in Israel" cannot be loyal to the state and its laws	21.1	7.0	10.3	56.2	5.4

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the state's character and the Jews and Arabs living in it?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
34	Despite its shortcomings, the regime in Israel is also a democracy for Arab citizens	11.7	6.6	10.6	66.6	4.5
35	Arabs, like Jews, have historical and national rights to the land	47.3	9.3	11.8	24.7	7.0
36	In my eyes Israel is first and foremost a Jewish state and only then a democratic state	22.6	5.5	9.2	59.4	3.4
37	A law is required stating that democracy should prevail in Israel on the condition that it does not harm the Jewish state	22.8	4.8	7.3	60.0	5.3
38	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state that retains a Jewish majority	7.2	2.9	10.0	74.7	5.2

→

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer	←
39	Israel within the Green Line has a right to exist as a state controlled by Jews	7.1	1.5	8.7	78.4	4.2	
40	Decisions regarding the character and borders of the state require a majority from among the Jews, while a majority from among the population at large is not sufficient	17.4	4.7	7.9	61.5	8.5	

Please indicate whether you regard each of the following statements, made during the 2015 Knesset election campaign, as racist or not racist.

		Definitely Racist	Racist	Not Racist	Definitely not Racist	No Answer
41	Prime Minister Netanyahu's call to his supporters to ensure they vote because Arabs were voting en masse	18.3	23.9	27.7	24.8	5.3
42	The statement by the leader of Kulanu, Kahlon, that he will not join a coalition government based on Arab votes	8.8	29.9	35.9	17.9	7.4

To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions in Israel?

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
43	Health institutions	6.9	16.1	48.9	26.2	1.9
44	Higher education institutions	9.4	11.7	40.7	30.2	8.1
45	The courts	19.5	18.6	31.5	25.3	5.1
46	The police	20.7	31.2	33.9	11.5	2.7
47	The Knesset	21.2	33.5	33.9	9.5	1.8
48	The government	22.3	33.4	31.3	10.5	2.5

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following arrangements for the relations between Arab citizens and Jews?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
49	Arab citizens should leave the country and receive proper compensation	50.4	13.3	9.4	22.8	4.1
50	Jews should rule and Arab citizens should not be accorded democratic rights	69.1	10.0	3.7	14.1	3.1
51	Arab citizens should have the status of national minority with equal civil rights in a Jewish and democratic state and come to terms with this	15.7	5.2	12.3	62.6	4.2
52	In the case of a contradiction between the democratic and Jewish character of the state, I prefer the Jewish character	22.8	7.0	6.4	58.9	4.9

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinians?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
53	The Palestinians are Arabs who settled in the Land of Israel, which belongs to the Jewish people	22.8	9.6	9.6	52.4	5.5
54	The Palestinians lack national rights to the land because they are not its original inhabitants	24.4	8.1	8.3	53.5	5.7
55	I believe that in 1948 a disaster (Nakba) occurred to the Palestinian Arabs: they lost the war against the Jews, became refugees, their localities were destroyed, and they did not establish a state of their own	48.2	6.1	10.6	28.2	6.9

I will read to you several possible steps which may be necessary in order to make Arab citizens feel that Israel is their state and they are citizens with equal rights. Please indicate if you agree or disagree that the Jews should take any of the following steps to make Arabs feel that Israel is their state and they are citizens with equal rights.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
56	The Jews and the Palestinians will make painful concessions and a Palestinian state will be established in the pre-1967 borders, with a land swap option	46.7	4.2	12.6	31.1	5.5
57	In the framework of peace with the Palestinians, the state will compensate Arab citizens with land or money for the lands it expropriated from them	42.9	5.4	15.2	31.8	4.7
58	The state should grant official status to the currently unrecognized Arab localities and provide them with resources, such as connection to the water and electricity grids, as are accorded to recognized localities	32.9	6.7	14.4	41.8	4.2
59	The state should give Arab citizens proper expression in its symbols, flag, and anthem	59.0	7.8	10.1	18.0	5.1
60	The state should let Arab citizens conduct their own educational, religious, and cultural affairs	35.0	6.4	13.9	41.9	2.8
61	There will be no differences between Arabs and Jews in security checks at border crossings	60.5	9.3	6.9	19.5	3.8
62	The state will guarantee that Arab citizens may live in any locality they desire	42.9	6.7	12.7	34.5	3.2
63	The state should recognize a supreme body chosen by Arab citizens to represent them	38.9	5.4	14.6	32.5	8.6
64	The state should consult with Arab leaders regarding important decisions pertinent to the Arab population	25.2	3.8	17.5	48.3	5.3

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
65	The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive proper representation in all state institutions and public bodies	34.6	6.1	18.6	36.5	4.2
66	Arab political parties should be invited to participate in government coalitions, in the same way as Jewish political parties	37.2	7.5	14.4	33.6	7.3
67	The state should determine by law that Arab citizens will receive a proportional share of the state budget	29.9	4.9	18.5	40.7	6.0
68	The Arabic language should be used in state institutions, just as the Hebrew language, and its instruction should be obligatory in Jewish schools	42.0	5.6	14.6	35.3	2.6
69	The state should recognize Arab citizens as Palestinians and guarantee their right to maintain relations with the Palestinian people and Arab nation	57.5	10.5	9.3	15.9	6.9
70	The state should recognize its responsibility for the Nakba, i.e., the disaster that happened to the Palestinians during the 1948 war	74.6	7.7	3.6	8.0	6.1
71	Arab citizens should be granted preferential treatment in admission to state institutions, universities, and colleges	59.2	5.7	9.5	21.8	3.9
72	The state should launch an emergency program to bridge the gaps between Arab and Jewish citizens	35.9	4.9	20.7	34.3	4.2

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following principles for settling the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
73	Two states for two peoples	32.0	2.9	11.4	48.6	5.1
74	The pre-1967 borders should be the borders between the two states, with an option of land swaps	48.0	4.8	9.3	31.2	6.6
75	The settlements outside the settlement blocs across the Green Line will be dismantled	52.8	5.9	9.5	27.0	4.8
76	Jerusalem will be divided into two separate cities, one Jewish and one Arab	72.4	3.4	6.7	13.5	4.0
77	The Palestinian refugees will receive compensation and be allowed to return only to the state of Palestine	45.9	3.8	12.2	31.6	6.6
78	After the full implementation of these principles, all the claims of both sides will end and the conflict between them will cease	40.5	5.0	10.2	38.3	6.0

Now I will ask you some more questions about the termination of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel's status in the region. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
79	Some of the Arab localities in the Triangle (Wadi A'ara) will be annexed to the Palestinian state	38.1	6.3	9.5	31.0	15.0
80	Recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people should be a condition for an agreement with the Palestinians	16.7	1.4	6.5	73.2	2.2
81	Israel should take risks in order to reach an agreement with the Palestinians	35.9	4.0	13.1	43.5	3.5

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
82	I believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will lead to a permanent agreement in the coming years	47.2	10.9	11.5	26.3	4.0
83	Operation Protective Edge (Gaza War) was justified	8.5	2.0	7.2	78.2	4.3
84	The Palestinians are principally responsible for their protracted conflict with the Jews	18.1	6.6	9.7	62.5	3.2
85	In the area of culture, Israel should integrate into Europe-America than into the Middle East	23.0	6.7	11.6	47.3	13.3
86	Israel should integrate into the West and maintain only necessary relations with Arab countries	24.7	7.6	13.9	46.7	7.2

Please indicate whether, in the aftermath of each of the following events, you feel closer to or more distant from Arab citizens.

		I Feel Much Closer to Arabs	I Feel a bit Closer	I Feel a bit Distant	I Feel Much More Distant from Arabs	[Do not Read, No Change, No Answer]
87	Operation Protective Edge (Gaza War), summer of 2014	1.9	2.8	21.4	40.7	33.2
88	2015 Knesset election campaign	2.6	7.4	17.6	27.3	45.1

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements concerning the organizations of Arab citizens?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
89	The Committee of Arab Local Authorities truly represents Arab citizens	35.9	7.2	12.4	22.0	22.5
90	The state should grant Arab citizens the authority of self-rule over their religious, educational, and cultural institutions	29.5	7.3	16.8	42.2	4.2

Please indicate if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the Joint List of the Arab parties.

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
91	The Joint List of the Arab parties truly represents the Arabs in Israel	37.8	8.8	14.5	24.5	14.4
92	The Jewish parties should accept the Joint List as a legitimate candidate for membership in a government coalition, like any other party	38.1	7.6	14.2	32.5	7.6
93	The Joint List should be outlawed	55.6	8.9	3.5	26.0	6.0

Now I would like to ask you a question about Arab leaders in Israel.

		Not at All	To a Small Degree	To a Sufficient Degree	To a Large Degree	No Answer
94	To what extent do you trust Arab leaders in Israel?	54.6	25.4	11.3	2.3	6.4

To what extent do you agree or disagree that Arab citizens use each of the following means to improve their situation in Israel?

		Disagree	Tend to Disagree	Tend to Agree	Agree	No Answer
95	General strikes	55.1	6.6	11.2	22.8	4.3
96	Protest abroad	67.5	7.1	5.0	15.7	4.7

97	Do you think that an Arab national minority with full civil rights has a right to exist in Israel?					
	Yes					45.0
	Yes with reservations					37.4
	No					15.4
	No answer					2.1

98	Do you accept the existence of an Arab minority in the State of Israel today?	
	Yes	53.5
	Yes with reservations	29.5
	No	14.8
	No answer	2.3

99	How do you evaluate the relations between Arab citizens and Jews today?	
	Very good	1.7
	Sufficiently good	24.9
	Not sufficiently good	44.0
	Not good at all	26.2
	No answer	3.2

100	Do you expect improvement or deterioration in relations between Arab citizens and Jews during the coming five years?	
	A lot of improvement	3.2
	Some improvement	25.2
	Some deterioration	33.8
	A lot of deterioration	15.3
	No answer	9.5

101	How does the government treat Arab citizens today?	
	As equal citizens	28.9
	As equal citizens with discrimination in certain areas	35.0
	As second class citizens	19.8
	As hostile citizens who do not deserve equality	8.9
	No answer	7.4

We will end now with questions about you.

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102	To what extent are you satisfied with your life as an Israeli citizen?	
	Definitely satisfied	50.2
	Sufficiently satisfied	37.5
	Not sufficiently satisfied	6.5
	Not satisfied at all	4.7
	No answer	1.1

103	Which of the following identities is the most important for you?	
	Being an Israeli citizen	35.1
	Belonging to the Jewish religion	15.6
	Being a member of the Jewish people	45.6
	No answer	3.8

104	Do you consider yourself?	
	Only Jewish and not at all Israeli	6.8
	Mainly Jewish and Israeli to some extent	13.9
	Equally Jewish and Israeli	61.1
	Mainly Israeli and Jewish to some extent	12.6
	Only Israeli and not at all Jewish	3.3
	No answer	2.3

105	According to your understanding and definition of Zionism, are you:	
	Definitely Zionist	41.2
	Zionist	40.0
	Not Zionist	12.5
	Anti-Zionist	2.8
	No answer	3.6

106	Have you received help from Arab citizens?	
	Daily	4.2
	Often	14.6
	Seldom	26.4
	Almost never	53.1
	No answer	1.8

107	Have you spent time with Arab citizens?	
	Daily	8.7
	Often	18.1
	Seldom	33.5
	Almost never	37.8
	No answer	1.9

108	Do you have Arab friends and have you visited them in their homes during the past two years?	
	Do not have Arab friends	67.9
	Have Arab friends but have not visited them in their homes	16.3
	Have Arab friends and have visited them in their homes during the past two years	14.0
	No answer	1.9

109	Have you personally encountered threats, humiliations, or blows perpetrated by Arab citizens against Jews?	
	Almost never	78.2
	Once or twice	11.1
	Three to five times	3.0
	Six or more times	6.4
	No answer	1.2

110	With which political party do you most closely identify?	
	Labor	13.1
	Meretz	3.9
	Yesh Atid	8.6
	Kadima	0.2
	Hatnu'a	0.7
	Kulanu led by Kahlon	3.3
	Likud	18.7
	Yisrael Betenu led by Avigdor Lieberman	4.5
	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal	6.9

Yahadut Hatora	5.3
Shas	4.1
Yahad-Yisrael Itanu led by Eli Yishai	0.9
Kach (Jewish National Front led by Baruch Marzel), Kahane Hai Movement	0.2
Ale Yarok	0.4
Another Jewish political party	0.1
Joint List	0.7
Hadash (Rakah) led by Ayman Odeh	0.1
Balad led by Jamal Zahalke	0.0
Ra'am led by Ibrahim Tzartzur	0.6
Ta'al led by Ahmad Tibi	0.0
Da'am-Workers' Party	0.0
Another Arab party	0.0
None	15.9
Refuse to answer	5.5
No answer	6.6

111	For which political party would you vote if elections were held today?	
	The Zionist Camp (Labor-Hatnu'a)	15.7
	Meretz	3.3
	Kadima	0.2
	Yesh Atid	9.2
	Kulanu	4.4
	Likud	16.9
	Yisrael Betenu led by Avigdor Lieberman	4.8
	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal	7.4
	Yahadut Hatora	5.0
	Shas	5.1
	Yahad-Yisrael Itanu led by Eli Yishai	1.1
	Kach (Jewish National Front headed by Baruch Marzel), Kahane Hai Movement	0.5
	Ale Yarok	0.4
	Another Jewish political party	0.7

Joint List	0.1
Hadash (Rakah) led by Ayman Odeh	0.1
Balad led by Jamal Zahalke	0.0
Ra'am led by Ibrahim Tzartzur	0.6
Ta'al led by Ahmad Tibi	0.0
Da'am-Workers' Party	0.0
Another Arab party	0.0
None	4.6
Undecided	3.9
Empty ballot	2.0
Will not vote	3.3
No answer	10.7

112	For which political party did you vote in the 2015 Knesset elections?	
	The Zionist Camp (Labor-Hatnu'a)	15.3
	Meretz	3.0
	Kadima	0.2
	Yesh Atid	7.4
	Kulanu	6.0
	Likud	19.6
	Yisrael Betenu led by Avigdor Lieberman	4.1
	Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal	5.7
	Yahadut Hatora	4.2
	Shas	4.7
	Yahad-Yisrael Itanu led by Eli Yishai	2.5
	Kach (Jewish National Front led by Baruch Marzel), Kahane Hai Movement	0.1
	Ale Yarok	0.6
	Another Jewish political party	0.2
	Joint List	0.1
	Another Arab party	0.0
	I did not vote despite having the right to vote	17.0
	I did not vote and did not have the right to vote	0.5

Do not remember	0.5
Refuse to answer	7.0
No answer	1.2

113	According to your understanding and definition of right, center, and left, to which stream do you belong?	
	Right	25.9
	Moderate right	24.8
	Center	26.3
	Moderate left	10.2
	Left	5.9
	No answer	6.9

114	Are you Haredi, Dati, Masorti, or Hiloni?	
	Haredi [ultra-Orthodox]	12.0
	Dati [national-religious]	12.9
	Masorti [traditional]	24.5
	Hiloni [secular]	50.1
	No answer	0.6

115	In which country were you born?	
	Israel	61.8
	Morocco, Tangier	2.3
	Algeria, Tunisia, Libya	1.2
	Iraq	1.9
	Yemen, Aden	1.6
	Syria, Lebanon, Egypt	0.8
	Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece	1.1
	Other countries in Asia and Africa	2.0
	Former Soviet Union (Russia)	17.4
	Poland	1.4
	Rumania	2.2
	Germany	0.1

English-speaking countries (Great Britain, United States, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand)	2.1
Other countries in Europe and America	3.7
No answer	0.6

116 In what year did you immigrate to Israel?	
Period of immigration	
Before 1989	19.4
After 1989	18.9
Israeli born	61.7

117 In which country was your father born?	
Israel	23.6
Morocco, Tangier	7.4
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya	0.5
Iraq	4.8
Yemen, Aden	2.7
Syria, Lebanon, Egypt	2.3
Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece	2.6
Other countries in Asia and Africa	6.4
Former Soviet Union (Russia)	19.2
Poland	10.3
Rumania	5.1
Germany	2.2
English-speaking countries (Great Britain, United States, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand)	4.2
Other countries in Europe and America	6.8
No answer	2.0

118 Which of the following best defines your ethnic descent?	
A member of Mizrahi communities, Mizrahi, Sephardi	32.2
Ashkenazi	49.9
Mixed	14.3
No answer	3.6

119	How old are you? Age in years.	
	Age groups	
	18-21	4.3
	22-24	4.9
	25-30	9.1
	31-35	8.1
	36-40	5.1
	41-45	7.2
	46-50	5.8
	51-55	7.2
	56-60	10.4
	61-65	10.1
	66-74	16.4
	75 and over	10.5
	No answer	0.8

120	What is your marital status?	
	Single	16.7
	Married	65.8
	Divorced/separated	8.9
	Widowed	8.0
	No answer	0.6

121	Level of education?	
	Did not attend school	0.2
	Incomplete Heder or elementary school education	0.4
	Completed elementary school	1.3
	Incomplete high school (academic, vocational, or Yeshiva) education	6.6
	Completed high school	27.4
	Incomplete post-secondary school, college, or university education	13.5
	Completed college or university and received a B.A. degree	29.0
	Completed college or university and received an M.A. degree	16.6
	Completed university and received a Ph.D. degree	4.0
	No answer	1.1

122	Are you:	
	A wage earner (including a civilian employed by the military, professional soldier, a Kibbutz or Moshav member)	42.1
	Self-employed	11.5
	A soldier performing mandatory service	1.1
	Not employed but seeking employment	2.6
	Not employed and not seeking employment	3.4
	Retired	30.7
	A student (in high school, college, university, Yeshiva), youth before the draft, a volunteer	4.6
	A housewife	2.0
	No answer	2.0

123	The average expenditure per month for a four-member family in Israel is 13,000 NIS. In comparison, the expenditure of your family is:	
	Far above the average	14.1
	To some extent above the average	16.0
	Same as the average	24.2
	To some extent below the average	16.2
	Far below the average	19.9
	No answer	9.6

Thank you. We have now finished.

Interviewer’s Report

Gender	
Male	43.9
Female	56.1

Yishuv_name. Hebrew name of place of residence.

Yishuv_code. Numerical code of place of residence.

Municipal status. Municipal status of place of residence.	
City	83.5
Moshav/rural community	4.2
Kibbutz	1.9
Settlement across the Green Line	4.7
Unknown, refused to answer	5.8

District. Region of residence.	
Jerusalem	11.6
North	11.2
Haifa	14.6
Center	22.5
Tel Aviv	19.8
South	15.2
Judea and Samaria	5.1

Group. Sampling category.	
Mainstream	70.9
Members of Moshavim/rural communities	4.2
Members of Kibbutzim	1.8
Settlers	4.5
Immigrants	14.0
Unknown, refused to answer	4.6

Language. Language of interview.	
Hebrew	86.0
Russian	14.0

Immigration. Israeli born/period of immigration.	
Israeli born	61.8
Immigrated before 1989 (old-timers)	19.4
Immigrated since 1989 (immigrants)	18.7

Sector. Veterans/immigrants.	
Veterans	86.0
Immigrants	14.0

Date. Date of interview.	
07/06/2015	1.4
08/06/2015	3.8
09/06/2015	4.3
10/06/2015	10.6
11/06/2015	1.2
14/06/2015	14.7
16/06/2015	5.9
17/06/2015	1.2
18/06/2015	3.2
21/06/2015	11.9
22/06/2015	0.4
23/06/2015	4.2
24/06/2015	10.3
25/06/2015	12.7
28/06/2015	14.2

New Service Variables

vote15. Vote in the 2015 Knesset elections (based on question 112).	
Likud	19.6
Yesh Atid	7.4
Kulanu	6.0
Zionist Camp	15.3
Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal	5.7
Shas	4.7
Yahadut Hatora	4.2
Yisrael Betenu	4.1
Meretz	3.0
Joint List	0.1
Yahad	2.5
Voted for political parties that did not pass the threshold, excluding Yahad	1.1
Did not vote despite having the right to vote	17.0
Did not vote and did not have the right to vote (minors)	0.5
Unknown	8.8

wgt. Weighting coefficients for the survey findings (based on vote15).	
Likud	0.9657
Yesh Atid	0.8444
Kulanu	1.5172
Zionist Camp	0.8057
Habayit Hayehudi-Mafdal	0.8425
Shas	1.4282
Yahadut Hatora	0.7845
Yisrael Betenu	0.5020
Meretz	0.4026
Joint List	0.3671
Yahad	1.3127
Voted for political parties that did not pass the threshold, excluding Yahad	0.7093
Did not vote despite having the right to vote	4.4080
Did not vote and did not have the right to vote (minors)	0.6564
Unknown	1.0000

Many believe that in Israel the Jews are drifting to the right and religion, the State is increasingly entrenched in its Jewish-Zionist mission and occupation, and the Palestinian-Arab citizens are steadily undergoing Palestinization and Islamization. The outcome is a long-term process of mutual alienation and radicalization of all sides. Annual surveys of the attitudes of Arabs and Jews toward each other and toward the state can shed light on the validity of this radicalization approach. This is what the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel aims to accomplish since its launch in 2003. It is based on representative national surveys and provides a nuanced, detailed and complex picture of the stands of Israeli Jews and Arabs. It is unique for being the only Index drawing on public opinion polls taken every year and focusing exclusively on these two deeply divided populations.

Some of the questions posed to Arabs in the survey: Do you want your children study in Jewish schools? Does Israel have a right to exist? Are you reconciled to Israel today as a state with a Jewish majority? Do you fear mass deportation (transfer) of part of Arab citizens? To what extent is your identity Israeli or Palestinian? To what extent do you trust Arab leaders? Which steps should Arabs in Israel take in order for the state and Jews to treat them with equality, respect and trust?

And some of the questions Jews are asked: Are you ready to let Arabs study in the schools in which your children study? Are you ready to have an Arab as superior in your job? Is it possible to trust most Arab citizens? Do you fear that Arab citizens endanger the state by starting a popular revolt? Do Arabs have a right to live in Israel as a minority with full civil rights? Which steps should Jews take in order for Arab citizens feel that Israel is their state and they citizens of it with equal rights?

This publication in English reports the findings of the 2015 surveys on 16 key issues and presents a systematic comparison with surveys since 2003 and to some extent earlier surveys. A full coverage of the study appears in the Hebrew book published by Pardes Publishing.

Prof. Sammy Smooha is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Haifa and the Israel Prize laureate for sociology in 2008. He studies Israeli society and state in a comparative perspective, with a focus on Arab-Jewish relations. He is the founding director of the Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel.

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