

A Conditional Partnership

JEWES AND ARABS



ISRAEL 2017

Tamar Hermann

Chanan Cohen / Fadi Omar / Ella Heller / Tzipy Lazar-Shoef



THE ISRAEL
DEMOCRACY
INSTITUTE

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Main Findings

- The complex relationship between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel exists on three levels that do not necessarily overlap with one another: the state level, the societal level, and the interpersonal level. The study's findings show that while there are substantive disagreements between Jews and Arabs at the state level, relations are less tense at the societal level and still less at the day-to-day interpersonal level, and in some fields are actually positive.
- Among Jews, the two primary competing identities are "Israeli" and "Jewish." At present, the proportion of Jews who define themselves as "primarily Israeli" (38%) is greater than that of those who define themselves as "primarily Jewish" (29%).
- Among Jews, secularism is strongly linked with self-definition as **primarily** "Israeli," although the two do not necessarily overlap completely. Those who define themselves as "traditional" are divided between Israeli and Jewish as primary identities. Religiously observant people have a marked tendency to choose "Jewish" as their primary identity, while Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) respondents are divided between "Jewish" and "Haredi" as their primary identity.
- As a rule, those who identify themselves first and foremost as Jews tend to express more discriminatory and exclusionary views regarding Arabs than do those who identify themselves as primarily Israeli.
- Accordingly, Haredi, religious, and right-wing respondents tend to oppose civic equality between Jews and Arabs or support only a scaled-down version of it. On the other hand, high percentages of Center/Left and secular respondents tend to support a more inclusive civic approach.
- The two leading primary identities chosen by Arab respondents are "Arab" (39%) and their religious identity (either Muslim, Christian, or Druze—34%). Only a minority (14%) selected "Palestinian" as their primary identity, and an even smaller minority (10%) chose "Israeli."
- Palestinian identity is more commonly cited as the primary identity among Muslims, among younger and more educated segments of the Arab population, and among those who have first-degree relatives living in the territories. The minority who define themselves as Palestinian tend to have more critical opinions of the State of Israel and of Israeli Jews, and are more skeptical regarding the possibility of integrating into the state.
- Most of the Arab respondents (69%) report that they speak fluent Hebrew, as compared with a tiny minority of Jews (6%) who speak Arabic. This means that Arabs understand what is happening on the Jewish side more than vice versa. The Arab respondents also report feeling more at ease in Jewish environments than Jews report feeling in Arab environments.

- Most of the Jewish respondents (68%) believe that it is impossible to feel part of the Palestinian people and be loyal citizens of the State of Israel at the same time. Only on the Jewish Left does the majority of respondents believe this is possible.
- Most of the Jewish respondents (63%) believe that Arabs feel that they are not part of Israeli society. Similarly, most of the Arab respondents (69%) feel that Jews do not see them as part of Israeli society.
- A majority of Arab respondents, though smaller than the majority among Jews, reports feeling part of Israeli society (54%) and taking pride in Israel's achievements in areas such as sports and science (66%). The share of Muslim Arabs who feel that way is lower than those among Christians and Druze.
- Both Arab (42%) and Jewish (51%) respondents share a common belief that relations between the two groups are "so-so" at present. A high percentage of Arabs (48%) also believes that relations between the two populations are worse than they were during the state's early years.
- A small majority of Jewish respondents (52%) believes that Jews and Arabs are better off living separately so that Jews can preserve their Jewish identity. However, the majority of Arab respondents (77%) do not wish to live separately. Among the Jewish population, Haredi, religious, and right-wing respondents tend to support separation far more than do secular, centrist, or left-wing respondents. Among the Arab respondents, Druze show the most support for separation between the groups, while Christians show the least.
- Slightly more than half of the Arab sample (56%) believe that the Arab members of Knesset, the Joint List, and the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel do a good job of representing Israel's Arab sector, as opposed to a minority among Jews (35%) and Druze who hold this opinion.
- A small majority of the Jewish respondents (52.5%, higher than in previous surveys) believes that the Arabs in Israel are unreconciled to the State of Israel's existence and wish for its destruction. This view has a clear majority among right-wing, Haredi, religious, and traditional respondents.
- A majority of Jewish respondents (59%) believes that Israel can be both a Jewish state in the full sense of the term and a democratic state at the same time. Approximately half of the Arab respondents (52%) agree that Israel can live up to the full sense of both definitions.
- Most of the survey's Arab respondents (67%) said that the State of Israel had no right to be defined as the Jewish nation-state. We found that a majority of Druze also believed that Israel had no such right, even though the positions held by the Druze on many subjects are closer to those held by Jews. At the same time, a majority of Jewish respondents (58%) think that the right to vote should be denied to those who are unwilling to declare that Israel is the Jewish nation-state. This then, is an issue on which there is substantive and serious disagreement between the two groups.

- Another point of disagreement is the Israeli state's treatment of the Arab population. Most of the Jewish respondents (67%) believe that Israel behaves democratically toward its Arab citizens, while only a minority among the Arab respondents (45%) agree with this statement.
- The survey findings show that a large majority of the Arab population desires full equality in all areas of life, as well as involvement in making decisions regarding all issues on the general public agenda. Yet a majority of Arab respondents (77%) believes that as a rule and over the years, the Israeli government has not behaved equitably and fairly toward Arab citizens. Approximately half of the Jewish respondents (52%), most of them centrist and left-wing though also a certain percentage from the Right, also agree that there is discrimination against Arabs in Israel.
- A high percentage of Arab respondents (43%) reported that their feelings toward the State of Israel had become more negative in recent years (since the events of October 2000). The majority of Jewish respondents also feel that the Arab population's attitude toward the state has become increasingly negative.
- Only a minority (40%) of Jewish respondents, though a substantial one, thinks that Israel's Jewish citizens should have more rights than Arab citizens. However, a comparison of five opinion polls on this issue in recent years shows that in the current survey, the percentage of Jews who oppose granting more rights to Jewish citizens is the lowest.
- A large majority of both Jewish (64%) and Arab (90%) respondents believes that the state should develop and implement a comprehensive program to narrow the gaps between Arab and Jewish citizens.
- However, only a minority of Jewish respondents (29%) believes that Arab citizens should be allowed to purchase land anywhere in Israel. Most Jewish respondents believe that Arab citizens should either be allowed to purchase land only in Arab towns or neighborhoods (41%) or should not be allowed to purchase land at all (25%).
- Among the Jewish respondents, a majority believes that Arabs should be given equal and fair treatment in employment (59.5%) and in budgetary allocations for local government (58%). Yet only a minority, the size of which has decreased steadily in recent years, is willing to give Arabs a role in making policy decisions, such as on issues of peace and security (16%) or governance and economy (24%). Most of the Jewish respondents (66%) also oppose bringing Arab parties into the government and appointing Arab ministers.
- Most of the Arab respondents (71%) think that the state should involve Arab professionals in decision-making processes in public agencies which affect the general public, but only a minority of Jewish respondents (33%) believes that the state should be required to do so.
- A very high percentage of Jewish (69%) and Arab (74%) respondents report that they have been or are currently employed in workplaces in which there are both Jewish and Arab

workers. An overwhelming majority of them (89.5% of Jews and 95% of Arabs) describes relations between employees from both groups as good or very good.

- A fairly large minority of respondents in both groups (33% of Jews and 47% of Arabs) are Facebook friends with members of the other group, though Arabs are exposed to Jews online more than Jews are to Arabs.
- Most of the Jewish respondents (58.5%) reported that they make an effort to avoid entering Arab localities, as opposed to only a tiny minority of Arab respondents (16%) who report that they avoid entering Jewish areas. Most of the Arab respondents (71%) also report that they feel comfortable speaking Arabic in public in Jewish environments.
- In a series of questions about stereotypes, we found that Arab respondents' perceptions of Jews are equally or more positive than Jewish respondents' perceptions of Arabs, for all parameters except the parameter of isolationism: the proportion of Arab respondents (49%) who believe that Jews tend to distance themselves from non-Jews is higher than the equivalent proportion of Jews (40%) who think the same of Arabs. Haredi respondents attribute more negative stereotypes to Arabs than do other Jewish respondents.
- Most of the Arab respondents (67%) are willing to observe a new holiday marking the shared citizenship of all Israeli citizens as a symbolic way of bringing both groups together, while only a minority of Jewish respondents (31%) support this idea. Among the Jewish respondents, opposition to a shared civic holiday is particularly strong among Haredi Jews, religious Jews, and those on the Right.
- Most of the Arab respondents (57%) oppose mandatory civilian national service for Israeli citizens who are exempt from military service, while a majority of Jewish respondents (70%) support it. Haredi respondents also oppose requiring those who are exempt from military service to perform civilian national service.

Introduction

The State of Israel is the national home of the Jewish people, who returned to their land after two millennia of exile. This was its very purpose. However, the State of Israel will also always be the homeland of a large Arab population that numbers more than one-and-a-half million and constitutes more than twenty percent of the country's citizens. The Arab population of the State of Israel is not a marginal group in Israeli society. This is a population which is part and parcel of this land, a distinct population with a shared national identity and culture, which will always be a fundamental component of Israel society. And so, even if none of us had sought it, we were destined to live side by side, together, with a shared fate.¹

This statement by President Reuven Rivlin describes the appropriate relationship in a nation-state between the majority group and the indigenous minority group. His description is compatible with the definition of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state,” and includes a partnership between both population groups and their equal integration while also preserving the state's Jewish character. However, experience shows that this vision is not accepted by everyone, and that it is not easily implemented in the particularly complex case of Israel. First, as many studies demonstrate, and as shown by the statistical data presented in the second part of this report, the president's remarks do not describe the current reality. His recognition of the common destiny shared by the Jewish and Arab populations in a Jewish and democratic nation-state is far from an accurate reflection of the prevalent mood, and is not shared by fairly large segments of the Jewish and Arab communities alike.

Rivlin's considered and respectful remarks and with his well-known speech on tribal schisms in Israeli society in which he referred to Israeli Arabs as one tribe among four living in Israel,² were well received by some of the Jewish population. At the same time, many statements were made by other Jewish Israelis—including political leaders, members of the clergy, media personalities, and bloggers—rejecting the rights of Arabs to be considered part of the national collective, and viewing them as outsiders at best or a fifth column at worst. As we have shown repeatedly in the Israeli Democracy Index, and will discuss in this report as well, sentiments opposing equality and partnership with Israel's Arab citizens have gained a foothold among fairly large segments of Israel's Jewish population. These groups and their representatives in government demand that

1 Reuven Rivlin, “Arabs and Jews: Destined, not doomed, to live together,” *Times of Israel*, October 18, 2014.

2 Reuven Rivlin, “Address to the Fifteenth Herzliya Conference,” June 7, 2015.

Israel become a Jewish state, deliberately put aside certain components of its civic-democratic character, such as complete civic equality, and grant more privileges to Jews in certain areas of life. Implicit in this prioritization of “Jewish” over “democratic” in defining the State of Israel is the political and social exclusion of the Arab minority.

As we will see later in this report, the possibility of integration and cooperation between Jews and Arabs in Israel is one of the issues that clearly differentiates between the left-wing and right-wing political camps,³ while the centrist camp swings between both extremes, depending on the specific issue. The data from the survey on which this report is based indicate that the issue of the Arab population’s place in Israel also divides those who see themselves primarily as Israelis from those who give their primary identity as Jewish—with these self-definitions largely conforming with where respondents place themselves on the spectrum of religiosity from Haredi to secular and, to a fairly large extent, with their ethnic self-definition as well.

The status of Israel’s Arab citizens is therefore one of the most divisive issues among the Jewish national majority. However, not only is the balance of power between the various subgroups on this issue uneven, it is also not necessarily stable in the sense of there being a fixed one-to-one relationship between group characteristics and views and attitudes. Thus, as we will see below, the camp that is skeptical of, and even hostile to, the idea of equal integration of Arabs in Israel is much larger than the opposite camp, with the latter being willing to give up its higher status and integrate the Arab population on an equal footing with regards to political and social issues, though without abandoning the definition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Due to the large gaps in political, economic, and social power between Jews and Arabs, it is difficult and perhaps even incorrect to compare the majority to the minority and present similar questions and demands to each group. Yet it is impossible, and also wrong, to ignore the fact that on both the Jewish and Arab sides there are those who support integration and cooperation for the benefit of the entire country, while there are others who reject and even deny this possibility.

On the Arab side, there are leaders and ideological forces who stress the feasibility of living in partnership and who are focused on promoting equality and improving the Arab population’s life conditions. They do so based on the belief that given the proper conditions—the abolition of discrimination and allowing Arab-Israeli collective expression—there is a chance for fruitful and mutually-beneficial coexistence, even in a Jewish state.

However, at the same time, other voices of authority—Arab politicians, intellectuals, and religious leaders have been heard any number of times, including in the Knesset, vehemently dismissing any chance of creating a shared civic Israeli Jewish-Arab identity. Some also oppose it

3 In this report, the terms “political camp” and “political orientation” are used to refer to respondents’ self-declared political orientation (from Left to Right) regarding foreign policy and security issues, rather than social or economic issues.

on principle. Adherents of this view usually justify it by positing that coexistence is an offensive concept that obscures the differences between the strong and the weak and between settlers and indigenous people, and turns its back on the true ethic of peace. In their view, the ethic of peace requires that the Jewish population and its leaders acknowledge the fact that they are members of a majority group of first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants who, as a colonial force, deprived and continue to deprive the indigenous minority of their rights, and that this situation must be exposed rather than be blurred by a discourse of partnership. These voices dispute Israel's right to define itself as the homeland of the Jewish people and wish to transform it into a neutral state in terms of nationhood—in other words, a state of all its citizens. As the findings of our report demonstrate, this view has penetrated deeply into the consciousness of Israel's Arab population. It may be seen, for example, in the Future Vision document published in 2006, in which the Arab minority called for official recognition as an indigenous national minority and demanded full partnership in government.⁴

Whether one accepts or rejects the statements and ideas set forth in that publication, the facts show that issuing such a statement intensified the tension between Jews and Arabs, which was already prominent in the Israeli public consciousness. As evidence, the Israeli Democracy Indices over the years have consistently demonstrated that Israeli public opinion views the tension between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel as more powerful than any of the other social tensions in Israel (between Left and Right, secular and religious, rich and poor, and Mizrahim and Ashkenazim).⁵

Year	Believe that the tension between Jews and Arabs is stronger than all other social tensions in Israel (%)	
	Arabs	Jews
2012	47	50
2015	64	44
2016	50	68

4 Yousef Taiseer Jabarin, *An Equal Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel* (Haifa: Mossawa Center, 2006); Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi, ed., *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel* (Nazareth: The National Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006); Mada al-Carmel, *The Haifa Declaration* (Haifa: Mada al-Carmel, 2007); Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, *The Democratic Constitution* (Shefar'am: Adalah, 2007).

5 Tamar Hermann et al., *The Israeli Democracy Index* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2012, 2015, 2016).

The complexity that is characteristic of the discourse on both the Jewish and Arab sides is also apparent in daily life. On the one hand, an increasing degree of behavioral similarity is evident, and is confirmed by the data (see, for example, the similar fertility rate of Jewish and Arab women), alongside increasing integration of Jews and Arabs in places of education, commerce, work, and leisure. On the other hand, blatant manifestations of deliberate racism toward and discrimination against Arabs, such as “price tag” attacks, are evident on the Jewish side, together with employment discrimination, which is less violent but just as destructive. On the Arab side, we are witness to anti-Israel statements and, in rare cases, the participation of Arab citizens of Israel in acts of terrorism against Jewish Israelis.

In other words, **we believe that it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify a single clear direction in the development of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel**, since two contradictory trends—of integration and of rejection—exist side by side. This complexity is exemplified in the lack of consensus not only between the two population groups, but also within each of them, regarding a single linguistic term that might “correctly” characterize the Arab public to the satisfaction of all: The Arabs of Israel? Arab citizens of Israel? Arab-Israelis? Israeli-Arabs? Palestinian-Israelis? Or Arabs in Israel, which is the term we have chosen to use in this book?⁶

Research Background in Brief

The longstanding, charged, and complex relationship between the Jewish majority group in the State of Israel and the indigenous Arab minority group that lives and works within the framework of a state that defines itself in ethnic terms—as a Jewish, albeit also democratic, state—has been explored over many years in many studies of various kinds: normative, theoretical, empirical, and prescriptive.⁷ Mohanad Mustafa and As’ad Ghanem show that events

6 This complexity is expressed very well in the book *Whose Land Is It?* which describes a series of discussions with Jewish and Arab intellectuals and activists on the sensitive question contained in the title. See Uzi Benziman, *Whose Land Is It? A Quest for a Jewish-Arab Compact in Israel* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2006).

7 Due to the large number studies in this field, we have selected only a few examples for presentation here, in order of publication, from the 1970s to the present day. See, for example, the following works in Hebrew: Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: A study in the Effective Control of a Minority Population* (Haifa: Mifras Publishing House, 1985); Elie Rekhess, “Israeli Arabs and Arabs in the Territories: Political Affiliation and National Solidarity, 1967–1988,” *HaMizrah HeHadash* 32 (1989): 165–191; Benjamin Neuberger, “Democracy with Stains,” *Panim: Quarterly for Society, Culture and Education* 9 (Spring 1999): 104–108; Dan Schueftan, *Palestinians in Israel: The Arab Minority and the Jewish State* (Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 2011); Ilana Kaufman, Mustafa Kabha, and Sara Ozacky-Lazar, *Arab Society in Israel: From a Majority to a National Minority*, vol. 1 (Ra’anana: The Open University, 2012); Sammy Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules: Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel in 2013* (Jerusalem and Haifa: The Israel Democracy Institute and the University of Haifa, 2013); Amal Jamal and Ephraim Lavie, eds., *The Nakba in Israel’s*

in the political and social arenas over the years have resulted in paradigm shifts in deciphering this tangled relationship.⁸ In fact, at any given moment there are conflicting interpretational paradigms that exist side by side. For example, some researchers on the Jewish side (such as Sammy Smooha) have spoken for years about Israelization, referring to efforts by Arabs in Israel to integrate, while others (such as Elie Rekhess) have characterized the Arabs' developing awareness as Palestinization, meaning a strengthening of national identity as opposed to civic identity. Needless to say, it is now fairly clear that these two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather can coexist.

There are other approaches as well. For example, one approach that is prevalent among Arab researchers as well as on the tiny non-Zionist Jewish Left, characterizes the Zionist project as colonialist and oppressive toward the Arab minority, particularly since the establishment of the state but perhaps even earlier, and sees this as the cause of the strongest intra-Israeli tension: the tension between Jews and Arabs. A "softer" but similar version defines Israel as a democratic-ethnic project of the sort that is familiar in other countries, which is capable of including the minority group only to a limited extent. Another, less controversial, approach presents Israel as a democracy, though a flawed and "stained" one, due to the difficulties over many years in integrating the Arab public into general society. Yet another approach focuses mainly on the economic and political hardships experienced by Arabs in Israel, the insufficient allocation of land for construction, the neglect of physical infrastructures, and the state's inadequate investment in the Arab education system, which is far smaller than its investment in Jewish students.⁹ This

National Memory (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2015); Ephraim Lavie, ed., *Arab-Palestinian Society in the State of Israel: A Time for Strategic Change in the Processes of Integration and Equality* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2016); Amal Jamal, *Arab Civic Society in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 2017). See also the following works in English: Elia Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Nadim Rouhana and As'ad Ganem, "The Crisis Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27 (1–2) (1998): 85–96; Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy, Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, "Israeli Arabs: Between the Nation and the State," *Indigenous Law Journal* 6 (1) (2007): 179–192. The four books edited by Mustafa Kabha and Ilana Kaufman in the series *Arab Society in Israel* (Hebrew), published by the Open University over a number of years, contain a great deal of factual and research material.

8 According to the analysis of Mustafa and Ghanem, it is possible to identify three "generations" of research, each of which is motivated by a different epistemology. In the first generation, most of whose researchers were Jewish-Israeli, the subject was studied using paradigms that were used at the time to study societies in general, such as the modernization paradigm. By the second generation of research, there was a considerable presence of Arab researchers, who dealt largely with the national conflict, the discourse of indigenous rights, and the tension arising from Israel's definition as a Jewish state. In the third, current generation, the dominant paradigms are the colonialist and neo-colonialist. See Mohamad Mustafa and As'ad Ghanem, "The Palestinians in Israel—Between State and Homeland: A Survey of the Development of the Research," *Megamot* 51 (2) (2017): 143–165.

9 See the data on the disparity in government investment, class size, and scholastic achievements between Arab and Jewish school students in the collection of statistical data in Part 2 of this report.

approach states, at least by implication, that had the state treated the Arab minority fairly and equally from the start, the Arabs would have felt “at home” and attributed less importance to the fact that the State of Israel defined itself primarily as Jewish. In this vein, some segments of the Arab public stress equality of rights as the primary goal, with demands for both in-principle and practical recognition of the Arab population’s distinct self-definition coming second.

A close look at the differences between the various studies from a slightly different angle shows that the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a constant presence in the background of almost all of them. Yet there is no wall-to-wall consensus regarding the basic causes of this conflict that might offer an interpretation of the essence of the tension between Jews and Arabs in Israel and the chances of mitigating it. Some focus on the territorial aspect—the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs over ownership of the land, a conflict that was exacerbated with the establishment of the State of Israel and deteriorated still further with Israel’s territorial expansion following the Six Day War. Others turn the spotlight on religious enmity between Judaism and Islam, citing it as the impediment to building bridges not only between Israel and the Arab world in general (and the Palestinians in particular), but also between Jewish Israelis and Muslim Arab Israelis. And others focus their analysis on the issue of broader identities, which cannot be contained in a single narrow Israeli identity: the Jewish identity of the majority group, which links it more to the Jewish people around the globe than to Arabs in Israel; and the Palestinian identity of the minority group, which links it more to other Palestinians, in the territories or abroad, and of course to the Arab world as a whole. Another explanation for the persistence of the conflict focuses upon the contradictory narratives of both sides, as demonstrated by the exchange of words in *Haaretz* regarding the circumstances of the birth of the State of Israel. In an essay looking back at the mid-20th century, the journalist Odeh Bisharat reflected on the roots of the ongoing conflict: “In 1948, the world was mobilized in support of the establishment of a Jewish state alongside an Arab state. Along the way, most of the Palestinian people were expelled, and the boundaries of the territory of the long-awaited country were expanded by about 50 percent. And the world, in the absence of any official decision, recognized the enlarged territory.”¹⁰ Shlomo Avineri responded to these statements as follows: “It is hard to understand what Bisharat hopes to accomplish by such a distorted rendition of what happened in 1948. Does he truly believe that Jews in Israel can be convinced to accept such messages? On the other hand, the very fact that they are repeated again and again does not help the effort to bring about reconciliation between both national movements, but rather only supports the Israeli Right when it says that ‘There is no one to talk to.’”¹¹

10 Odeh Bisharat, “Zionism Never Intended on Establishing a State,” *Haaretz.com*, February 22, 2017.

11 Shlomo Avineri, “1948 and ‘Alternative Facts,’” *Haaretz.com*, March 2, 2017.

The Goals of the Report

In this research report—the second in a series of periodic reports on this topic¹²—we will not delve deeply into these weighty questions, nor will we attempt to pass judgement on the various approaches and explanations presented briefly above. Rather, the purpose of this report is to provide an up-to-date picture of the situation on two levels: The perceptual—the views and attitudes of the Jewish majority and the Arab minority regarding life in the State of Israel and the relationship between the two groups; and the factual—a comparison of objective parameters characterizing the Jewish and Arab populations and subgroups in Arab society. This combination of views, attitudes and facts is intended to help the reader decide whether there is truth to the claim that there are two categories of citizens even within the Green Line: those who are more equal and those who are less so in the eyes of the state, with all this implies in terms of a sense of discrimination; or, alternatively, whether there is a population that rejects the Jewish and democratic definition of the state in which it lives and yet also thrives in many areas (economically, for example).

An additional purpose of this study is to identify the preferred models for the relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority as perceived among various groups, as well as the preferred character of the state in the eyes of the majority and the minority: Jewish? Democratic? Jewish and democratic? Democratic and Jewish? A state of all its citizens? We will also assess the extent of homogeneity or heterogeneity within the minority group on both attitudinal and objective levels and examine whether, as indicated in the various Democracy Indices, the minority group, like the majority group, is also divided into stronger and weaker subgroups that are more or less positive with regard to integration and partnership with the majority group.

The survey interviews on which this report is based were held shortly after the home demolitions in Qalansawe and the deadly clashes in Umm al-Hiran in January 2017. We have no way of assessing the extent to which these events influenced the attitudes and opinions of the Arab and Jewish respondents. We will be able to draw clearer conclusions about this when we repeat key questions of this survey in the next one.

The Structure of the Report

The report is composed of two parts, with the first part divided into four chapters: Chapter 1 focuses on the identity of Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel; Chapter 2 examines how the

12 The first report in this series was Fadi Omar et al., *The Israeli Democracy Index 2016: Opinions of Israel's Arab Citizens* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2017).

Arab minority group and the Jewish majority group view the relationship between the Arab population and the State of Israel, as a state that defines itself as both Jewish and democratic; Chapter 3 discusses the willingness of each population to engage in partnership with the other, at the level of the state and society; and Chapter 4 investigates their degree of openness to maintaining day-to-day, personal relationships with one another.

The division of the survey questions into these four chapters is at times somewhat arbitrary, since almost all the questions could be grouped together in other ways. Therefore, it was mostly left to the research team's discretion to decide in which chapter to include each question. Readers are welcome to disregard the arrangement if they wish, as they read the report and draw their own conclusions from the data.

The second part of the report comprises a collection of statistical data, some of which compare the Jewish and Arab populations, while others compare subgroups within the Arab population. The goal of this section is to provide factual information on the current state of the Arab population in Israel and to offer some explanations of the views expressed by the survey's Arab respondents. As is customary in such data sets, the subjects are divided into categories such as population size, family, age, life expectancy, income, and consumption.

Analysis of the Survey Findings

The questions in the survey (Appendix 1) included attitudinal questions and background questions (on variables such as age, sex, area of residence, education, income, and religion). In most cases, we analyzed the attitudinal questions according to the background questions. For example, we analyzed whether respondents felt part of Israeli society according to parameters such as their sex, age, income, education, and religion, and the political party for which they voted in the elections. We also used some of the attitudinal questions as background variables (that is, as independent variables). For example, we used the respondents' chosen primary identities to analyze their responses on other topics, such as their sense of belonging to Israeli society.

We are well aware that in many cases there is an overlap between independent variables. For example, among the Jewish respondents, a clear majority of those who defined themselves as religious place themselves on the right of the political map regarding foreign policy/security issues. Secular respondents, on the other hand, identify themselves far more often as being politically centrist and left-wing. This means that when we analyze the data according to political camp, we are in fact also implicitly analyzing the data according to where the respondents place themselves along the scale from Haredi to secular, and vice versa. Furthermore, it is known that there is a strong association between education and income, between age and education (the average education level of the youngest age group is naturally lower than that of the older age

groups, since the younger people have not yet graduated college, for example), and so on. Of course, these overlaps exist in both groups.

Despite these limitations, there is a research-based rationale for breaking down and analyzing the data by a specific variable in order to emphasize it, while being aware of the fact that it reflects a set of variables. However, since overlaps of this kind sometimes make it difficult to establish which is the “truly” influential variable, we used more complex statistical techniques at certain points in the report in order to study particular issues in greater depth. Since this report is targeted at readers who have an interest in the topic rather than at trained social science researchers, we have not included the details of these statistical procedures, and have generally restricted ourselves to presenting the results. Those who are interested in and familiar with these analytical techniques can find the raw data file on the Israel Democracy Institute’s website, and apply to the data any statistical procedures they choose.

Finally, we do not always present the analyses according to **all** the available variables. Some of them were omitted when the differences between the categories of the explanatory (independent) variable were not statistically significant.

Methodology

Two research institutes carried out the field work:

- The Hebrew survey was carried out by the Dialog Institute in Tel Aviv.
- The Arabic survey was carried out by the Statnet Institute in Daliyat al-Karmel.

Sample

The sample was a representative sample of people aged 18 and over in each population group, comprising a total of 1,000 interviewees (500 Jews and 500 Arabs). The size of both samples allowed us to break down each one of them into subgroups according to various parameters while maintaining an acceptable level of statistical significance of the findings. It is important to note that this study included only Arabs who are Israeli citizens and who live within the boundaries of the Green Line, and thus all the statements contained in this report regarding Arabs in Israel apply only to those who meet this definition.

It should be borne in mind that in this study, unlike in our other studies, we did not combine both samples to form a single sample. Had we done so, we would have had to represent the Arab population statistically according to its proportion in the population, and thus many of the unique views and attitudes of the Arab minority would have been “drowned out” by the attitudes and opinions of the Jewish majority.

The sample quotas were determined according to data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics using the following parameters:

- The Jewish sample: sex, age, residential district, religiosity (on the secular–Haredi spectrum)
- The Arab sample: sex, age, residential district, religion

The maximum sampling error for each of the samples is $\pm 4.5\%$, with a confidence level of 95%.

Questionnaires

Two questionnaires were composed for the survey: one for the Jewish sample, who were all interviewed in Hebrew; and one for the Arab sample, who were all interviewed in Arabic.¹³

Both questionnaires contained three types of questions:

1. Questions of identity: These appeared identically in both questionnaires. For example, in both, Question 1 read: “To what extent do you feel part of Israeli society?”
2. “Mirror” questions: Arab respondents were asked to give their opinions about Jews, and vice versa. For example, in Question 12, each side was asked to provide their views about stereotypes of the other.
3. Questions presented to only one of the samples due to their specific relevance: For example, Question 20 addressed the opinions of Jews on land purchases by Arabs, while Question 21 addressed the extent to which Arabs were comfortable speaking Arabic in a Jewish environment.

For all questions, the response “Don’t know / refuse to respond” was not offered as an option to the interviewees, but was recorded when given.

Data Collection

The data were collected between January 23 and February 2, 2017.

In order to overcome the difficulty in contacting those who do not have landline telephones—a difficulty now well known to anyone engaging in collecting data via telephone surveys, and particularly common among younger respondents—for the most part, we called mobile telephones.

13 In a previous poll conducted at the Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research, we prepared a Hebrew version for Arab respondents. We did not do so this time because there was no demand for this option, and also because the responses given to the same question may be different in various languages, due to differences in meaning stemming from the translation, or due to the interviewees’ sense of connection or alienation when their responses are not in their native language.

The table below shows the distribution of interviews in each sample by type of telephone (in percentages):

Sample	Mobile	Landline	Total
Jewish	78.6	21.4	100
Arab	60.6	39.4	100

Navigating the Report

To help readers find their way around this report, a reference appears in the margin next to each question. This reference leads to the page in the appendix (“Distribution of Survey Responses”) on which the question appears. These references appear as follows:

Primary identity

Questions 6, 7

pp. 167, 168


Likewise, in the appendix, a reference appears in the margin next to each question referring the reader to the place where the question is addressed in the body of the report.

One small final comment: For ease of reading, we rounded the data to whole numbers in the text and in the tables and figures. The original numbers, rounded to one decimal point, may be found in the appendices. At times, this rounding resulted in minute differences between the data provided in the report and those in the appendices. In research terms, these differences are insignificant.

Part 1

Together or Separate?

Public Opinion on Jewish-Arab
Relations in Israel



Chapter 1 / Primary and Secondary Identities and their Implications

One of the issues at the heart of the disagreements and tensions between the Jewish and Arab populations in Israel is the question of personal and collective identity. In the past, theoretical and empirical analysis of majority-minority relations in nation-states focused on the objective and material differences and disparities between the majority and the minority. Today, however, in analyzing the relations between the two groups the focus has shifted to identity politics, which stress consciousness and subjective-emotional aspects.

Yet identity is a challenging topic for research, as it is not a concept that is easily translated into unambiguous terms. Moreover, it is an extremely sensitive and explosive issue, inasmuch as most of the conflicts in the world today are fed by disagreement and hostility stemming from the recognition, or lack of recognition, of identities of one type or another. The analytical elusiveness and the emotional baggage that accompany debates about identity deter many researchers from examining this issue empirically, as there will always be a methodological question mark over their findings, and they can also expect to be criticized for their results—mainly by those who use identity as a tool for political-ideological mobilization. The latter are likely to claim that the findings stemmed from the interviewer’s own bias and did not reflect the “truth.” These barriers to researching identity result in a public discourse based on statements that were never examined in depth, and in a plethora of manipulations. For this reason, we decided to take the plunge and examine the issue of identity first. Our working assumption is, of course, that identity plays a major role in Israel in the formation and structuring of the relationship between the Jewish majority group and the indigenous Arab minority group, and so we decided to present relevant empirical data, even if it is liable to be disputed, as long as we ourselves adhere to accepted research methods and are aware of the pitfalls in our path.

Personal and collective identities are always multi-dimensional. For example, Israel’s Jewish citizens are not only citizens of the state, and not only do they share their citizenship with a large Arab population, but they are also part of a larger whole that is not contained within Israel’s territorial borders—the Jewish people, including diaspora Jewry. Similarly, Arabs in Israel share their Israeli citizenship with a Jewish population, but at the same time many of them see themselves, to a greater or lesser extent, as part of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation, and many also see themselves as part of the Muslim religious community. This multiplicity of parallel identities generates significant tension; this is evident—as we will see later on—in Jewish attitudes toward Arabs, which range from reserved to hostile, and in the fact that Arabs struggle to feel that Israel is their country.

The tension is so great that the validity of the responses to questions about identities in public-opinion surveys such as ours is always in question. At best, their validity may be compromised due to the inherent complexity of the respondents' identities which cannot be fully expressed when they are asked to provide a primary identity. In the worst case, the validity of the responses may be compromised due to Arab respondents' fear of identifying themselves with a collective viewed by the majority as a bitter enemy. Moreover, past experience shows that the choice of a primary identity is often influenced by the broader context of the question. For example, if a survey questionnaire focuses on Jewish-Arab relations, the responses to questions on identity may be slightly different from what they would be if the overall subject of the survey was, for example, the quality of government, since people think of themselves differently in different contexts. In order to understand this, we may ask ourselves how we would respond to a question about our primary identity if we were asked this question in a poll conducted at our workplace (our professional identity would probably surface immediately) versus how we would respond to the same question if the poll were to take place at a parents' meeting at school (when our identity as parents would likely take precedence) or at a political meeting (when our party affiliation would probably be the first to come to mind).

Even if we could overcome these problems of validity, any chapter on identity will inevitably draw criticism from one direction or another, since, as stated, empirical findings on the subject of identity will almost necessarily clash with certain political agendas. Responses that do not suit these agendas will be disqualified, not necessarily on a factual basis, but rather on ideological and/or political grounds. Political leaderships of the majority and minority groups alike develop and promote identity narratives that serve as a platform for their demands, and thus, they have difficulty accepting empirical data that contradict these narratives in theory or in practice.

We should note that although we were interested in identity as a subject in and of itself, throughout the report we also used the distinction between the primary identities chosen by the respondents as explanatory (independent) variables in order to analyze attitudes and views on other subjects. Indeed, as we will see later on, the choice of identity proved itself as an efficient and systematic variable.¹⁴

14 There will always be some who propose that the question about primary identity be replaced with one that offers a "hyphenated" identity, with the reasoning being that every person's identity is multifaceted. But we believe that in many cases, this critique is ideological-political in nature: those who make such a claim feel that there is a "right" and a "wrong" identity (the "wrong" identity being one that does not serve their political-ideological interests). Furthermore, this type of criticism is a way of avoiding facing up to the authentic choice of the general public, which may not suit the critics' preference. In our view, a "hyphenated" identity makes it possible for respondents to "sit on the fence" and avoid clearly stating what is important to them and what is not; it also cannot be used as an independent variable. Instead, as we will see later on, our decision to put the respondents on the spot by asking them to name their **primary identity**, with the vast majority of them doing so naturally and without evasion (for example, by choosing the "other" option), proved itself, since we found clear and systematic differences among the opinions and attitudes of various groups in accordance with the primary identities they chose. Were this variable not valid, the responses given by the identity groups

Before we begin to examine the identities of the Jewish majority and the Arab minority, and as background to our discussion, we will touch briefly on the topic of language, which is an inherent component of identity. We asked the respondents whether they spoke the language of the “other”—in other words, whether the Jews spoke Arabic or the Arabs spoke Hebrew. In line with all the theories regarding the linguistic aspect of majority-minority relations, which state that the minority has a far greater need to be fluent in the language of the majority than does the majority in the language of the minority, we found that the percentage of Arabs who speak Hebrew was much higher than the percentage of Jews who speak Arabic.

Table 1.1 / Fluency in non-native language (%)

Sample	Do not speak the language (Hebrew/ Arabic) at all	Speak it a little	Speak it fluently	Don't know/ other	Total
Jews (Arabic)	74	20	6	—	100
Arabs (Hebrew)	4	26	69	1	100

The practical implication of the information in the table is that most Arabs in Israel can follow a conversation in Hebrew and consume Hebrew-language media (such as radio, television, and the press), while Jews cannot do so in Arabic. We can therefore assume that the Arabs are much more conversant with what happens on the Jewish side than the Jews are with what is happening on the Arab side.

What, then, were the primary identities chosen by the Jewish and Arab interviewees?

Each group was given **different** lists of primary identities.¹⁵ The Jewish respondents were given the following options to choose from as their primary identity: Israeli, Jewish, and ethnic group (Mizrahi, Ashkenazi, mixed), as well as religious self-definition using a scale from Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) to secular (Haredi, religious, traditional religious, traditional non-religious, secular). As shown in the figure below, a larger share of Jewish respondents chose to identify themselves as Israeli than any of the other primary identities that were offered to them. The Jewish identity came in a fairly close second.


would not have differed so strongly from one another, as emerged from our analysis of the survey results.

15 The identities were given to the respondents in rotation during the interview. In other words, the options were presented to them in a random order so as to avoid creating a bias toward a specific identity.

Primary identity
Questions 6, 7
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When we compare our results to those of previous surveys—the 2016 Israeli Democracy Index,¹⁶ for example—we see that in the current survey, a far greater proportion of Jews indicated that their primary identity was the one on the Haredi–secular scale. Additional studies will be needed, of course, to understand whether this is an outlying result or whether it represents a substantial change in self-identity. Either way, the two most frequently-chosen responses among the Jewish population in this survey (as in previous surveys) were Israeli identity and Jewish identity. Later on, we will see that respondents’ self-identification as either Jewish or Israeli is very closely linked to their opinions and attitudes on Jewish-Arab relations and on the status of Arabs in Israel.

Figure 1.1 / Do you see yourself primarily as...? (Jews, %)



A breakdown of the responses to this question by religiosity revealed a clear relationship between the two variables. Among Haredi respondents, the largest share (49%) identified themselves primarily according to their location on the Haredi–secular scale; that is, as Haredim first and foremost. Among religious respondents, the highest percentage identified themselves primarily as Jews (49%), which was also the case among the traditional religious (43%). The traditional non-religious were equally split regarding their primary identity, between those who identified themselves primarily as Jews and those who identified themselves primarily as Israelis (36% in both categories). The secular group was the only one with a majority (56%) who identified themselves primarily as Israeli. Breaking down responses by political orientation showed that among those on the Right, the primary identity most commonly chosen was Jewish (36%,¹⁷ as opposed to 29% who chose Israeli as their primary identity), while in the Center and

¹⁶ Tamar Hermann, Ella Heller, Chanan Cohen, Dana Bublil, and Fadi Omar, *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2016).


¹⁷ The fact that those who identified themselves as Jews do not form a majority on the Right stems from the large number of Haredi respondents, who, as stated, selected “Haredi” as their primary identity.

on the Left, Israeli identity was the most commonly chosen (51% for those in the Center and 57.5% for those on the Left).

We also examined the possibility of a link between the chosen primary identity and the degree of the (Jewish) respondent's fluency in Arabic, but found that there was no variability in this regard. In other words, in all groups, the majority does not speak Arabic, indicating that this is characteristic of Jewish society as a whole.

Arab respondents were offered the following primary identities: Arab, religion (Muslim, Christian, or Druze), Palestinian, and Israeli.¹⁸ We found that the primary identity chosen by more respondents than any other was Arab, followed by religious identity (Muslim, Christian, or Druze). Palestinian identity took third place, while Israeli identity came in fourth.

Figure 1.2 / Do you see yourself primarily as ...? (Arabs, %)



In the 2008 Israeli Democracy Index, a plurality of Arab interviewees (49%) defined their Arab identity as their primary identity, followed, at a significant distance, by Palestinian (25%), Israeli (18%), and religious (8%).¹⁹ A year ago (in 2016), the largest share of the Arab respondents (approximately 29%) selected religious identity as their primary identity,²⁰ perhaps under the influence of the civil war in Syria and the massacre of non-Muslim religious minorities in Iraq, which were then at their height. In any case, our data show that in recent years (according to the interviewees' responses), the Palestinian identity of Arabs in Israel is not growing stronger.²¹

18 In an additional question, Arab Muslim respondents were also given the option of choosing Bedouin as their primary identity. Approximately 4% did so.

19 Asher Arian, Tamar Hermann, Nir Atmor, Yael Hadar, Yuval Lebel, and Hila Zaban, *The 2008 Israeli Democracy Index: Between the State and Civil Society* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2008), 126.

20 Hermann et al., *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*, 78.

21 A survey conducted by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) for 2017 resulted in similar data. In

Table 1.2 / Primary identity (Arabs, by year, %)

Primary identity	2008	2016	2017
Israeli	17	25	10
Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	8	29	34
Arab	45	24	39
Palestinian	24	12	14
Don't know/other/refused to respond	7	10	3
Total	100	100	100

It is noticeable that the responses are not clustered around a single identity—and in particular, not around the Palestinian identity, which is so strongly emphasized by most Arab intellectuals and politicians in Israel. This suggests that a more in-depth and bias-free exploration is needed into the lack of consensus among Arabs today regarding their official institutional definition and the alternative that they would choose, if they had the option, in determining their future civic status.²² We found a fascinating illustration of this issue in the statements of Maharan Radi, an Arab professional soccer player in Israel, quoted by Sarah Ozacky-Lazar and Yoav Stern: “In terms of our identity as Arabs, we have not yet found the balance as to where we ought to be. I visit Jordan and Egypt, and there people look at me as though I am not truly an Arab. They don’t know how to deal with you. And here in Israel, people look at you as though you’re something alien.”²³

The breakdown of Arab respondents’ primary identity by religion revealed the following results:

response to a question about identity which offered three options, 58.7% of the Arab respondents said that their primary identity was Arab; 23% chose Israeli; and 14.7% chose Palestinian. See Shmuel Rosner, Noah Slepko, and Steven W. Popper, “2017 Pluralism Index Survey Results,” *JMPI*, April 20, 2017.

22 For a similar opinion, see Lavie, *Arab-Palestinian Society in the State of Israel*, 185.

23 Quoted in Sarah Ozacky-Lazar and Yoav Stern, *Locals: Conversations with Arab Citizens in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel Aviv University, 2016).

Table 1.3 / Primary identity by religion (Arabs, %)

Primary identity	Muslim	Christian	Druze
Israeli	8	15.5	18
Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	34	24	51
Arab	38	45	27
Palestinian	17	7	—
Don't know/other	3	8.5	4
Total	100	100	100

As the table shows, among Muslim and Christian respondents the highest percentage selected their Arab identity as their primary one. Among Druze respondents, the Druze religion is the leading primary identity. Israeli identity received the highest rating among Druze respondents, although still not particularly high (18%), followed by Christians and then Muslims. Regarding Palestinian identity, the highest percentage among the three groups who identify themselves primarily as such was among the Muslims, with the Christians a distant second.

None of the Druze respondents in the survey chose Palestinian identity as their primary identity, evidently because at least some of them see the Druze community to which they belong not only as a religion, but also as a nation. In the context of the issue of identity, the claim is sometimes made that the Druze are different from the Arabs due to the different relationship they have enjoyed with the Jewish majority group since the early days of the state, and due to their unique political-religious culture, which makes no demand for self-definition as a sovereign nation and instead preaches adaptation to the existing regime. However, our results demonstrate that on many of the topics surveyed, the views expressed by the Druze are no different from those of Muslim or Christian Arabs, and that their opinions do not always reflect a desire to become integrated in the state. This might call into question the prevalent assumption that the relationship of the Druze to the State of Israel is assured under all circumstances.

In order to confirm this assertion, we conducted variance analysis to examine whether the responses of the Druze, as a group, were significantly different from those of the Muslim and Christian respondents. We found that on such questions as feeling part of Israeli society, the importance of a “strong Israel,” and pride in Israel’s achievements in science, sports, and the like, the Druze were more positive on average than the other groups. They were more critical when it came to questions about the degree of representation afforded by politicians and by groups representing Arabs. However, the Druze stood out in their ethnic insularity and lack

of desire for social integration with the Jewish majority group. Regarding most of the other subjects in the survey, their views were not significantly different from those of Arabs in Israel overall.

When we compared the views of Christian Arabs with those of the other groups—a subject of interest since, among other things, there has recently been an increase in the proportion of young Christians interested in enlisting to the IDF—we found that Christians are more interested in integrating into Jewish society and feel more comfortable within it than Muslims or even Druze (for example, they are less afraid to speak Arabic in a Jewish public space). Their opinions regarding representation by Arab politicians and Arab organizations are less positive than those expressed by the Muslim respondents, but more positive than those expressed by the Druze. On all other subjects, the Christian Arabs' responses were similar to those of the general Arab population.

Analysis by age revealed that only among the oldest respondents was there a majority (53%) who chose Arab identity as their primary identity. This was the most common response in the intermediate age group (40%). In the youngest age group, the largest share (37%) cited their religious identity (Muslim, Christian, or Druze) as their primary identity, with Arab identity coming second (31%). In other words, it appears that the young generation attributes slightly more importance to belonging to a religious framework than do the older age groups. Religious affiliation may also have political significance; this should be investigated in further studies.

As the table below shows, interesting differences were found, mainly regarding the Israeli and Palestinian identities, among those who reported that they had first-degree relatives living in the territories and those who did not have relatives living there. Those who have relatives living in the territories have a far greater tendency to define themselves as Palestinian and much less as Israeli than those who do not. Among respondents who do not have relatives living in the territories, the percentage of those who identify themselves as Palestinian and as Israeli is almost equal. In both groups, the strongest primary identity is Arab, followed by religious identity.


Table 1.4 / Primary identity by relatives in the territories (Arabs, %)

Primary identity	Israeli	Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	Arab	Palestinian	Don't know/ other	Total
With first-degree relatives living in the territories	1.5	30	40	27	1.5	100
Without first-degree relatives living in the territories	11	34	39	12	4	100

We also examined the relationship between Arab respondents' primary identity and their ability to hold a conversation in Hebrew. Here we found differences. Among those who cited their primary identity as Israeli, 79% said that they spoke fluent Hebrew, as opposed to 59% among those who cited their primary identity as Palestinian. No real differences regarding Hebrew fluency were found between those who cited their primary identity as Arab (71%) and those who cited religion as their primary identity (69%).

Identity can also be linked to social status. For this reason, we examined the sense of belonging to strong or weak groups in Israeli society in four of the Israeli Democracy Indices (for 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015), as well as in the current survey. The results were interesting and unexpected. We asked: "Every society on earth is divided into strong groups and weak groups. To which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong?" The figure below shows the distribution of responses in each sample, from both Jewish and Arab respondents.

Figure 1.3 / To which group in Israeli society do you feel you belong? (strong or fairly strong group; Jews and Arabs, %)



Belonging to a strong or weak social group

Question 15

p. 172

The graph (above) shows clearly that in each of the surveys, the Jewish respondents' sense of belonging to the stronger groups in society is significantly greater than that of the Arab respondents (the average for Jews over the years is 65.9%, while that of the Arabs is 42.4%). In addition, it seems that the disparity between the two groups is growing larger. We were also interested in the internal distribution in each population, and so we examined who among the Jews felt stronger. We found that the main explanatory variables here were ethnic origin, education, and income.

Table 1.5 / Sense of belonging to stronger groups, by ethnic origin, education, and income (Jews, %)

Sense of belonging to strong or fairly strong groups	
Ethnic Origin	
Ashkenazi	83
Mizrahi	76
Sephardi ²⁴	73.5
Mixed (Ashkenazi/Mizrahi)	77
Education	
Less than full secondary	75
Full secondary and post-secondary	77
Partial or complete college degree	82
Income	
Below average	74
Average	81
Above average	84

24 After studying the issue, we found that a fairly large population among immigrants from Arab countries and their descendants prefer to be identified by the term "Sephardi," which was widely-accepted in the past, rather than by the currently conventional term "Mizrahi." We therefore gave them the option of identifying themselves as such in our survey.

These figures show that not only is the overall average for Jewish respondents higher than for Arab respondents, but also that among each of the Jewish subgroups, the proportion who feel they belong to strong groups is higher than that of the Arab respondents as a whole, and thus also than that of each of the Arab subgroups.

Who among the Arab respondents feels stronger? Among all the variables we examined, the largest difference was found by respondents' religion: Only 43% of Muslims feel that they belong to stronger groups in society, compared with 53.3% of Christians and 56% of Druze. As expected, a higher rate among those who feel Israeli (a minority, as stated) also feel that they belong to stronger groups in society (56%, compared with 45% of those who gave their primary identity as Palestinian, and 44% of those who gave their primary identity as Muslim, Christian, or Druze). The differences in the other variables are not large.

It is interesting that among the Arab respondents, the variables of education and income did not exert a systematic influence for this question, even though it was reasonable to expect that those who are more educated and better-off would feel stronger. It is possible that, in fact, the greater exposure of these "privileged" groups to the discriminatory reality in Israeli society lessens the feeling of power that their significant human capital might have given them under different circumstances.

We wanted to find out whether Jewish respondents²⁵ felt that the Israeli and Palestinian identities can be reconciled or whether they view them as fundamentally contradictory. We asked a question that has already been examined in the past: "In your opinion, is it possible or impossible for an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people to also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel?" Our survey from 2015 found that a majority of the Jewish population (56%) felt that the feeling of being Palestinian could not be reconciled with loyalty to the State of Israel.²⁶ In the current survey, we found an even larger majority (68%) who think or are certain that such a reconciliation is impossible.


Feeling part of the Palestinian people while also being a loyal Israeli citizen

Question 18
p. 173

25 Arab respondents were not asked this question this time because it was previously found to engender resistance among them.

26 Tamar Hermann, Chanan Cohen, Ella Heller, and Dana Bublil, *The 2015 Israel Democracy Index*. (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2015), 176.

Figure 1.4 / Can an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel? (Jews, %)



Which variable was found to have the strongest link with the opinions on this question? As expected, the foreign policy/security stance seems to be the key. A majority of the Jewish respondents who defined themselves as left-wing believes that the two can be reconciled, compared with a small minority on the Right and a slightly larger minority in the Center.

Table 1.6 / Possibility of feeling Palestinian and being a loyal Israeli citizen, by political camp (Jews, %)

Political camp	Think or are sure that Arab citizens of Israel who feel part of the Palestinian people can also be loyal citizens of Israel
Right	18
Center	39
Left	63

Interestingly, despite claims that serving in the IDF makes Jews more militaristic and less tolerant of Arabs, it was not found to exert a hawkish influence, but rather the opposite. Thus, among Jewish respondents who had served in the military, 34% believed that Arabs could be both emotionally connected to the Palestinian people and loyal citizens of Israel, while only 21% of those who had not served felt this way. Of course, we should remember the relationship—which we have already noted—between military service and secularism, and between secularism and left-wing tendencies, a chain of links that certainly contributes to this finding.

From here, we proceeded to examine various aspects of the Jewish and Arab populations' attitude toward being Israeli.


Feeling part of Israeli society

Question 1

p. 165

We asked: “To what extent do you feel part of Israeli society?” There was almost complete consensus on feeling part of Israeli society to a large or fairly large extent among the Jewish respondents. This level of agreement makes analysis by subgroups unnecessary. Among the Arab respondents as well, the majority gave a positive response to the question, though the majority was much smaller. The percentage of Arab respondents who feel that they are not at all part of Israeli society (13%) is much higher than among their Jewish counterparts (2.5%).²⁷

Figure 1.5 / To what extent do you feel part of Israeli society? (Jews and Arabs, %)



Not surprisingly, a breakdown of the data by religion revealed that the Druze respondents (65%) feel more a part of Israeli society than do Muslims (53%) or Christians (47%). On this question, we also found a substantial difference between those who had first-degree relatives living over the Green Line and those who did not: 43% of the former felt part of Israeli society versus 56% of the latter.

²⁷ The JPPI survey from 2017 asked a similar question: How comfortable do you feel in Israel? Among the Jewish respondents, 87.2 percent said that they felt fairly or very comfortable, and 74 percent of the Arab respondents said the same. See Rosner, Slepko, and Popper, “2017 Pluralism Index Survey Results.”

A breakdown of the data by primary identity showed, quite naturally, that the feeling of belonging to Israeli society was highest among those who gave their primary identity as Israeli (73%) and lowest among those who gave their primary identity as Palestinian (30%). Among those who cited their primary identity as religious or Arab, 56% felt part of Israeli society. It therefore appears that the main identity clash on this issue is between the Palestinian and Israeli identities.

We tried to create a multi-dimensional portrayal of the characteristics shared by the group within the Arab population that feels more a part of Israeli society as compared with the others, using a statistical technique called clustering. We found that this is a not very homogeneous group, and includes Druze, Christians, academics, the non-religious, people without first-degree relatives living in the territories, voters for Zionist parties, people who define themselves as Israelis, people with higher income, and younger people. Of course, not everyone who fits one of these descriptions feels part of Israeli society, but taken as a whole, these characteristics increase the probability that an Arab citizen of Israel will report feeling part of Israeli society.


From the feeling of belonging to Israeli society at the level of the individual, we proceeded to examine perceptions of the Arabs' sense of belonging to Israeli society, as a group.

Arabs as part of Israeli society

Questions 2, 3
pp. 165, 166

We asked the Jewish respondents: "To what extent do you think Israel's Arab citizens feel part of Israeli society?" Our question for the Arab respondents was: "To what extent do you think Jews see Arabs as part of Israeli society?" Despite the different wording, we found an extremely interesting consensus on this question between both populations. Only a minority, almost equal in size, responded that Arab citizens of Israel currently feel part of Israeli society to a fairly or very large degree (Jewish respondents—30%) or that Jews see Israel's Arab citizens as part of Israeli society (Arab respondents—29%). However, as the figure below shows, a certain gap between both groups becomes apparent when comparing the proportion of Jewish respondents who think that Israel's Arab citizens feel that they are not at all part of Israeli society (13%) with the considerably higher proportion of Arab respondents who think that Jews do not at all consider them part of Israeli society (22%).

Figure 1.6 / To what extent do Israel's Arab citizens feel part of Israeli society? (Jews, %) / To what extent do Jews see Arabs as part of Israeli society? (Arabs, %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample by political camp indicated that a larger percentage of those who defined themselves as right-wing believed that Arabs felt part of Israeli society (32%) than among those who defined themselves as centrist or left-wing (25% in total). We have no way of knowing whether the respondents perceive the sense of feeling part of Israeli society among Arabs as positive or negative, since all or some of those on the Right who gave this response may attribute to it a meaning of the Arabs “taking over” Israeli society, while those in the Center and on the Left may see Arabs feeling part of Israeli society as a desirable situation, or even regret that more Arabs do not feel this way.

Breaking down the Jewish sample by education brought to light a difference in views on this issue between those who had not completed secondary education and those who had completed secondary or post-secondary education. A higher percentage of the Jewish respondents with less education (39%) think that the Arabs feel part of Israeli society, compared with 31% of those with full secondary education and 30% of those with an academic education. Here, too, we are uncertain as to whether feeling part of Israeli society is perceived as positive or negative. This higher percentage may be the result of more points of contact, such as in workplaces, between Jews with a low level of education and Arabs.

Finally, although religiosity was found to be a non-systematic variable, we should still note that 43% of Haredi Jews believe that Arabs feel part of Israeli society as compared with only 23.5% of those who defined themselves as secular. Once again, we are not sure whether this is intended as a positive or a negative statement, though in light of the other responses of Haredim, there is a basis for assuming that they perceive this situation as negative.

While differences in viewpoints were found among the Arab respondents as well, they were relatively small. Among the Muslim respondents, 28% thought that Jews see Arabs as part of Israeli society to a large or fairly large extent, as compared with 33% of Christians and 31 percent of Druze. The last finding is particularly interesting: although most Druze men serve in the IDF, less than one-third of the respondents from the Druze community felt that the Jews see them as part of Israeli society.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by primary identity once again revealed a range of views, with those who chose Israeli as their primary identity at one end (42% of whom believe that Jews see Arabs as part of Israeli society) and those who chose Palestinian as their primary identity at the other (among whom only 13% hold that opinion). Those who defined themselves by religion (32.5%) or as Arabs (27%) lie between these poles.

The next question was an attempt to arrive at a more concrete conceptualization of what it means to feel part of Israeli society.


We asked the respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: “I feel pride when Israel attains an important achievement, such as in sports or in science.” As the figure below shows, an impressive majority of both Jewish and Arab respondents agreed with the statement, though the majority was substantially higher among Jews.

Pride in Israel's achievements

Question 23

p. 176

Figure 1.7 / “I feel pride when Israel attains an important achievement, such as in sports or in science” (Jews and Arabs, %)



Among Jews, a majority of each subgroup takes pride in Israel’s accomplishments. However, breaking down the data by religiosity shows that the rate of Haredi respondents who are very proud or fairly proud was exactly 50%, as compared with more than 90% in the other groups.

We found more significant inter-group differences among the Arab respondents, as summarized in the table below. The largest majority of those who are proud of Israeli achievements was found among Druze respondents, and is similar to that among Jewish respondents, but a majority of Christians and Muslims also take pride in Israel’s achievements. Those with a higher level of education reported a lower level of pride, perhaps because of their stronger sense of rejection by the state or their higher level of awareness of structural discrimination against Arabs—a result of their being more educated, as we have already mentioned.

A clear majority of those who have no first-degree relatives living in the territories takes pride in Israel’s achievements, as compared with approximately 50% of those who do have first-degree relatives living there. Almost all those who define themselves as Israeli take pride in Israel’s accomplishments, as compared with 38% of those who define their identity as Palestinian.

Table 1.7 / Pride in Israel's achievements, by religion, education, relatives in the territories, and primary identity (Arabs, %)

Arabs	Very proud or fairly proud of Israel's achievements
Religion	
Muslims	64
Christians	62
Druze	80
Education	
Less than full secondary	72
Full secondary	63
Academic	62
First-degree relatives living in the territories	
With	49
Without	68
Primary identity	
Israeli	87.5
Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	69
Arab	67.5
Palestinian	38


Survey findings also indicate that Arabs in Israel take pride in Israel's accomplishments while also maintaining a unique Arab identity. This is consistent with the testimony of the soccer player quoted above (Maharan Radi), who spoke about this when describing his experience of playing for the Israeli national team: "It's something to be proud of. The best players are there... It's a really good, special feeling: you're a player on the team, representing the country, representing the national team. I see myself no differently from a player on any other national team... I'm an Arab Muslim player, and I'm proud to represent the country as a good soccer player for the national team, and I have no problem with that... If people ask me why I don't sing the national anthem, I respond right away that it's a trick question. Why do you aim the

camera at a particular player while they are singing? It's meant as a provocation, and I won't allow myself to be provoked."²⁸

While we will elaborate on the willingness to live together in Chapters 3 and 4, we will now present the responses of the Jewish and Arab respondents to an almost identical question on the desire for separation as a means for empowering group identity.

We asked to what extent the respondents agreed with the statement: "In order to preserve Jewish identity (for Jews) / Arab identity (for Arabs), it is preferable that Jews and Arabs in Israel live separately from one another." As shown in the figure below, while the Jewish sample was evenly split on this question, with a slight preference for separation, a clear majority of the Arab respondents did not support living separately in order to preserve Arab identity.²⁹

Figure 1.8 / "In order to preserve Jewish identity (for Jews) / Arab identity (for Arabs), it is preferable that Jews and Arabs live separately from one another" (Jews and Arabs, %)



28 Quoted in Ozacky-Lazar and Stern, 2016, 155.

29 The JPPI's 2017 survey found a majority among both Jewish (68%) and Arab (73%) respondents who felt that Jews and Arabs should not live in mixed neighborhoods. See Rosner, Slepkov, and Popper, "2017 Pluralism Index Survey Results."

In order to maintain identity, it is preferable that Jews and Arabs live separately

Questions 43.1, 43.2
pp. 187, 188

The following quote, from an interview with voters in Upper Nazareth during the 2013 local elections, illustrates the duality that exists in the Jewish population's attitude toward living together with Arabs: "'Habayit Hayehudi [an Orthodox Jewish, religious Zionist political party] is coming to save the city so that there will be a Jewish majority here for good,' says a driver [...] 'This is a Jewish city as conceived by Ben-Gurion, a city of righteous people. It is important that you explain that we are not racists. There are currently about 20% Arabs, but the city is about to run away from us. And Habayit Hayehudi is sending settlers here, and there are two hesder yeshivot [an Israeli yeshiva program combining military service with Torah studies]. It is important that you write that relations with the Arabs are excellent, and we go to Nazareth to eat in the restaurants, shop in the stores, and go to doctors, but we do not want to hand the city over to them. No Jew lives there, and it is important to us that there be a Jewish majority here.'"³⁰

Who among the Jewish population supports separation in order to preserve identity? A breakdown by religiosity shows that there is a majority in favor of separation in all groups except for the secular respondents, most of whom are opposed to it. (In favor of separation: Haredi—83%; religious—67%; traditional religious—63%; traditional non-religious—55%; secular—38%).

The distribution of the findings by political camp reveals a solid majority among right-wing respondents in favor of separation in order to preserve Jewish identity (65%), but only a minority, if not a small one, in favor in the Center (39%) and on the Left (26%).

A breakdown of the findings by ethnic origin shows that except for Ashkenazi respondents, among whom only a minority (46%) supports separation in order to preserve Jewish identity, all other ethnic groups have a majority in favor (Mizrahim—64%; Sephardim—57%; respondents of mixed ethnic origin—58%).

Who among the Arabs supports separation, contrary to the majority position among this population? Surprisingly, it is the Druze who stand out in their support for separation, although this is still a minority (33%, as compared with 23% of Muslims and 5% of Christians). Religiosity also plays a role in determining views on this issue: 28% of those who defined themselves as religious, 20% of the traditional respondents, and 17% of the non-religious respondents supported separation between Jews and Arabs for the sake of preserving identity.

Identity and Representativeness

Identity is also reflected in political representation. In almost all the Democracy Indices over the years, we examined perceptions of the representativeness of elected bodies. We consistently found that a small majority of the Israeli population thinks that the Knesset reflects the differences of opinion among the public very well, with only small differences on this matter

30 Roy Chicky Arad, "A Journey among Israel's Polling Stations," *Haaretz*, October 22, 2013 (Hebrew).

between the Jewish and Arab samples. Yet when we examined the perceived representativeness of Arab office-holders and organizations, we found an interesting phenomenon: Most of the Jewish population believed that the Arab leadership does not represent the views of “its” public, while the prevalent perception among the Arab public, was that the leadership does, in fact, represent them properly. This difference was clearly noticeable in the 2012 Democracy Index, in which 62.5% of Jews responded that “the Arab leadership is more extreme in its criticism of the state than most of Israel’s Arab citizens,” as compared with only 20% of Arab respondents who expressed this view. (In the same survey, 38% of Arab respondents said that the leadership represents the accepted views among the Arab public, and 36% said that it is more moderate than most of the public).³¹

Some claim that the Jewish respondents’ stance on this question is the result of successful delegitimization of the Arab leadership by the Jewish leadership. This is a plausible explanation, though the phenomenon may also be the result of the Jewish majority group’s insufficient familiarity with the Arab minority group and with its leaders. After all, as we have noted, the language barrier (among other factors) prevents most Jews from following the internal discourse among the Arab population. In any case, this is a phenomenon that could, and perhaps does, have an effect on the extent of the Jewish population’s willingness to recognize the Arab leadership as representing its voting public well.


In this survey, we sought to examine this issue as it regards Arab members of Knesset, the Joint List political party, and the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel.

We asked the respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: “The Arab members of Knesset represent the Arab sector well in terms of the differences of opinion and points of agreement among the Arab public in Israel.” A small majority of the Arab respondents believe that this is indeed the case, compared with a minority of the Jewish respondents. In other words, a majority of Arabs in Israel believes that the internal diversity among them is properly represented, while among the Jews, only a minority believes that the Arab members of Knesset faithfully represent the diverse opinions of the Arab public.

**Arab members
of Knesset**
Question 22
p. 176

31 Tamar Hermann, Nir Atmor, Ella Heller, and Yuval Lebel, *The 2012 Israel Democracy Index* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2012), 66.

Figure 1.9 / “The Arab members of Knesset represent the Arab sector well in terms of the differences of opinion and points of agreement among the Arab public in Israel” (agree, Jews and Arabs, %)



A breakdown of the Jewish respondents by political camp showed that among those on the Right, the minority that believes that the Arab members of Knesset are indeed representative of their public (38%) is larger than the parallel percentage on the Left (31.5%) and in the Center (28%). This may result from the fact that those on the Right, more than those in the Center or on the Left, tend to attribute more extreme opinions (to Jewish ears) to the entire Arab public of the sort that at least some Arab members of Knesset have been expressing in recent years.

We analyzed the responses of the Arab interviewees by several variables in order to see whether the majority of each of the subgroups views the Arab Knesset members as representative. We found considerable differences in most of the variables.

Table 1.8 / Representativeness of Arab Knesset members, by sex, religion, education, residential district, primary identity, and voting pattern in the 2015 Knesset elections (Arabs, %)

Somewhat agree or strongly agree that the Arab Knesset members represent the Arab sector well	
Sex	
Men	50
Women	63
Religion	
Muslims	62
Christians	50
Druze	24
Education	
Less than full secondary	61
Full secondary	60
Academic	47
Residential District	
South	58
Haifa	49
Jerusalem	40
Center	63
North	57

Somewhat agree or strongly agree that the Arab Knesset members represent the Arab sector well

Primary Identity	
Israeli	40
Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	53
Arab	61
Palestinian	68
Voting Pattern in the 2015 Elections	
Joint List	69
Zionist parties	29

The table shows, among other things, that the perception of proper representation is stronger among women, Muslims, residents of the central district, those who define themselves primarily as Palestinian, those without an academic education, and, of course, those who voted for the Joint List in the 2015 elections. This view is much less pronounced among the Druze, those with an academic education, those who live in the Haifa district, those who define themselves as primarily Israeli, and those who voted for the Zionist parties in the 2015 elections.

We then proceeded to examine the extent to which the Joint List—at present, the only Arab party with representation in the Knesset, and the only one comprising representatives from different social groupings in Arab society, as well as both Arabs and Jews—is viewed as a good representative of the Arab population.


The respondents were asked to express their opinion on the following statement: “The Joint List represents Arab citizens well.” As in the previous question, here too, a majority of the Arab respondents—though, once again, not a large majority—supported the statement, as compared with a minority of Jewish respondents. In other words, again, perhaps influenced by segregationist messages coming from the Jewish national leadership and due to the difficulty in following the internal Arab discourse, the Jews choose to differentiate between the Arab public and its political leadership.

The Joint List

Question 27

p. 178

Figure 1.10 / “The Joint List represents Arab citizens well” (agree, Jews and Arabs, %)



We segmented the Arab sample into subgroups. The table below shows the percentages of those who somewhat agree and strongly agree with the statement that the Joint List represents Arab citizens well. The resulting picture closely resembles that of the previous question about the representativeness of Arab members of Knesset.

Table 1.9 / Representativeness of the Joint List, by sex, religion, education, residential district, primary identity, and voting pattern in the 2015 Knesset elections (Arabs, %)

Somewhat agree or strongly agree that the Joint List represents Arab citizens well	
Sex	
Men	51
Women	62


Somewhat agree or strongly agree that the Joint List represents Arab citizens well

Religion	
Muslims	61.5
Christians	53
Druze	27
Education	
Less than full secondary	59
Full secondary	60
Academic	49
Residential District	
South	61
Haifa	52
Jerusalem	40
Center	68
North	54
Primary Identity	
Israeli	35
Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	56
Arab	59
Palestinian	68
Voting Pattern in the 2015 Elections	
Joint List	70
Zionist parties	29

Thus, we see that the Joint List's main support base is among their voters (as expected) and among those who live in the central district, women, those who define themselves primarily as Palestinians, and those who do not have an academic education.

We asked the respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: "The Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel represents Arab citizens well."³² The same pattern was also found here: A majority of the Arab respondents agreed with the statement, while a minority of less than a quarter of the Jewish respondents were in agreement. We should note that a very large share of the Jewish respondents (46%, compared with 16% of Arab respondents) expressed no opinion regarding this organization, which may not be at all familiar to them.

Figure 1.11 / "The Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel represents Arab citizens well" (agree, Jews and Arabs, %)



32 The Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel is an umbrella organization founded in 1982 to coordinate all the political activities of the Arab population.

The table below shows the views of the subgroups in the Arab population regarding the representativeness of the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel.

Table 1.10 / Representativeness of Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel, by sex, religion, education, residential district, primary identity, and voting pattern in the 2015 Knesset elections (Arabs, %)

Somewhat agree or strongly agree that the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel represents Arab citizens well	
Sex	
Men	50
Women	59.5
Religion	
Muslims	58
Christians	50
Druze	38
Education	
Less than full secondary	59.5
Full secondary	53
Academic	50
Residential District	
South	65
Haifa	49
Jerusalem	30
Center	55
North	55



**Somewhat agree or strongly agree that the
Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs
in Israel represents Arab citizens well**

Primary Identity	
Israeli	48
Religious (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	58
Arab	55
Palestinian	55
Voting Pattern in the 2015 Elections	
Joint List	62
Zionist parties	46

Similar to the disparity among the responses to the previous question about the representativeness of the Joint List, here too, we found a large difference between voters for the Joint List (62%) and voters for the Zionist parties (46%), though this difference was slightly smaller than that found in that previous question. In other words, it seems that politically speaking, the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel is slightly less controversial than the Joint List, and is perceived as being somewhat more representative.

In conclusion, regarding representativeness, we can say that the attitudes of the Jewish and Arab respondents toward the groups that represent the Arab public display a steady pattern: An Arab majority maintains that they are representative, as compared with a small Jewish minority. A breakdown of the Arab population by subgroup also leads to a very similar result.

Chapter 2 / Connection to Israel and the Definition of Israel as a “Jewish and Democratic State”

In the previous chapter, we discussed the issue of individual identity of Jews and Arabs in Israel, along with its various implications. In this chapter, we will proceed to examine the complex nature of the relationship between the Jewish population, the Arab population, and the state, primarily in the context of Israel’s definition as a Jewish and democratic country.

As one might expect, the differences between the two populations on this issue are very significant. Moreover, the relationships between these two populations and among themselves, at the political, social, and individual levels, are profoundly influenced by the different nature of the connection of each of them with the State of Israel. Our claim, which we will attempt to validate here, is that the Jewish population has a sense of total ownership over the state, and from a strategic perspective is unwilling to share that ownership with the Arab population. The Arabs, for their part, demand their civil right to equality not only in terms of individual or group rights, but also in terms of their representation in the state’s institutions and their influence on the state’s character and its symbols, and on the formation of its policy. Regarding citizenship, the Jews’ view of the Arab collective “other” is at the very minimum characterized by suspicion if not by downright hostility; while the Arabs, as a non-Jewish national-indigenous minority, do not tend to harbor positive feelings toward the state, which defines itself as Jewish, if also democratic. All this takes place, as noted, in the constant shadow of the ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people and the Arab world in general.

In this chapter we will attempt to provide some understanding of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel from the perspective of their attitudes toward the Jewish and democratic State of Israel.

Who has a stronger connection to the land?


Question 10

p. 169

We wanted to examine the respondents’ opinions as to which of the two collectives, Jewish or Arab, has a stronger connection to the land of Israel. As expected, each of the two populations believes that its connection is stronger. We found a large difference between the two groups on two counts. First, a two-thirds majority of the Jewish respondents said that they had a stronger connection to the land, while fewer than half of the Arab respondents said that their connection to the land was stronger. Second, as the figure below shows, the Arab respondents were more “cooperative” than the Jewish ones; in other words, a higher proportion of Arabs than Jews said that the connection of both people to the land was equally strong, although there may be

a validity problem here due to the fear of giving a response that those conducting the survey might not wish to hear.³³

Figure 2.1 / Who has a stronger connection to the land—Jews or Arabs? (Jews and Arabs, %)



A breakdown of the responses of the Jewish sample reveals that only a minority in each subgroup, with the exception of those who define themselves as left-wing, believes that both peoples have an equally strong connection to the land. However, this view is much more widely held among the following groups: secular respondents (41.5%, as compared with 2% of Haredi respondents, 9% of religious respondents, 15% of traditional religious respondents, and 25% of traditional non-religious respondents); those who define themselves as left-wing (66%, as compared with 34.5% of those who define themselves as centrist and 13% of those who define themselves as right-wing); and those who define their primary identity as Israeli (39%, as compared with 17% among those who gave their primary identity as Jewish).

No significant differences were found among the subgroups of the Arab respondents.

³³ This is a possibility despite the fact that the interviewers were indigenous Arabic-speakers.

As we will see below, among the Jewish majority group not only is there a widely-held view that Jews have a stronger connection to the land, but it is also commonly held that the Arabs who live in Israel have not come to terms with the existence of the state. This finding corresponds to the finding we presented in the previous chapter: that according to the common perception among the Jewish population, it is impossible for an Arab in Israel both to be a loyal Israeli citizen and to feel part of the Palestinian people.

Is it true that most Arabs are unreconciled to the state's existence?

Question 46


p. 189

Do Jews think that Arabs have harmful intentions toward the state? Our analysis of the Israeli Democracy Indices of 2015 and 2016 found a close connection between Jewish respondents' assessment of Arab citizens' basic attitude toward the existence of the State of Israel (and whether they wish for its continued existence) and a variety of issues relating to the broader context of Jewish-Arab relations in the country. Therefore in this survey, we once again examined whether the Jewish respondents believe that Israel's Arab citizens remain unreconciled to the existence of the State of Israel and would like to see it destroyed.

It emerged that during the first quarter of 2017, a (small) majority among the Jewish respondents held the hardline view that the Arabs in Israel are not reconciled to the existence of the state and would like to see it destroyed. Assuming that this measurement is reliable and not the temporary result of two events that took place just before the survey was conducted (the home demolitions in Qalansawe and the Umm al-Hiran incident in January 2017), it appears that there has been an increase in the percentage of people who are of this opinion relative to the previous two years, when this question was asked in the more general context of the respondents' views on the quality of Israeli democracy.³⁴ Another possibility (which we mentioned previously) is that the measurement is reliable, but that the context of the current survey, which focuses on Jewish-Arab relations, led the Jewish respondents to take more extreme positions. Either way, the result is bleak in terms of the chances of developing a sense of civic partnership.

34 See Tamar Hermann et al., *The 2015 Israeli Democracy Index and The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute).

Figure 2.2 / “Most of Israel’s Arab citizens are unreconciled to the state’s existence and support its destruction” (strongly agree and somewhat agree, Jews, by year, %)



Breaking down the responses by different variables revealed that this opinion is common primarily among those who defined themselves as right-wing, and is held only by a minority of those who defined themselves as left-wing or centrists, though the minority among the centrists was fairly large (Right—68%; Center—40%; Left—16%). A breakdown by religiosity revealed that except for the secular group, a majority of each grouping on the Haredi–secular scale believes that the Arabs are unreconciled to the existence of the State of Israel and would like to see it destroyed (Haredi—81%; religious—57%; traditional religious—60%; traditional non-religious—59%; secular—40%). Interestingly, we found that the proportion of those who hold this view among respondents who served in the IDF (48%) is clearly lower than among those who have not served (62%). Once more, we see that military service in and of itself does not necessarily lead to negative opinions of Arabs.

We could not ask Arab respondents whether they agreed with the statement discussed above, since there was very little chance that they would respond to such a question even if they did agree with the idea expressed. Therefore, we prepared a different question for them, in order to examine the extent to which Arab respondents care about the welfare of the State of Israel.

**It is important
that the State of
Israel be strong
in terms of
security**

Question 34

p. 182

We asked Arab respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, “It is important that Israel be strong in terms of security,” and found a very large majority in agreement. We can hypothesize that this depth of support stems from the military conflicts that have afflicted the region in recent years, and thus is motivated in large part by self-interest. Still, we believe this finding contradicts, at least partially, the assertion that Arabs in Israel want to see the destruction of the state in which they live, because the security threat to Israel’s welfare comes exclusively from Arab or Islamic countries and groups in the region. Once again, with more than 80% of the Arab respondents agreeing with this statement, there was no reason to try to segment the responses by subgroups.

Table 2.1 / Importance of strong Israel in security terms (Arabs, %)

Arabs	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don’t know
It is important that the State of Israel be strong in terms of security	67	17	4	5	7

If the lion’s share of the Jewish majority group considers the duality in Palestinian-Israeli identity to be problematic, the question arises as to whether the respondents feel that another type of duality is possible: Can the State of Israel be a fully Jewish state and a fully democratic state at one and the same time? Before posing that question, we looked at how the respondents understand the meaning of the term “Judaism.”


**What is
Judaism?**

Question 14

p. 171

We asked the respondents to choose a definition of Judaism from among three options: a religion only, a nationality only, or both a nationality and a religion. This question has a great deal of significance due to the fact that certain spokespeople in the Palestinian leadership have stated repeatedly that Judaism is a religion only (and therefore the Jews have no right to a sovereign state³⁵ according to the internationally-accepted principle of self-definition). We wanted to know the extent to which this view has become part of the consensus among the Arab public. The figure below shows the distribution of the responses to this question from the Jewish and Arab respondents. Among the Jewish respondents, approximately three-quarters believe that Judaism is both a religion and a nationality, while approximately half of the Arab respondents hold this view.

35 Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian delegate, expressed this view in an interview that he gave in April 2009. See Nir Yahav, “A-Zahar: ‘We Cannot Recognize the Zionist Enemy,’” *Walla News*, April 17, 2009 (Hebrew).

Figure 2.3 / What is Judaism? (Jews and Arabs, %)

We examined which subgroups in both populations had higher percentages of people who feel that Judaism is a religion only. An analysis of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals that among secular and Haredi respondents alike, the proportion of people who hold this view is extremely high: more than one-quarter in both these subgroups believe that Judaism is a religion only, while the percentage of those who hold this view is much lower among other groups. Among both Haredi and secular respondents, we found smaller shares of those who believe that Judaism is both a religion and a nationality (Haredi—70% and secular—65%, as compared with religious—85.5%, traditional religious—77%, and traditional non-religious—80%).

Breaking down the data by political orientation—which is in many cases, as we have pointed out, is significantly linked to where respondents place themselves on the Haredi–secular scale—shows that among those who placed themselves on the Left, 36% define Judaism as a religion only, as compared with 30% of those in the Center and only 16% of those on the Right. There is a similar but converse difference in the percentages of respondents in each subgroup who define Judaism as both a religion and a nationality: Left—55%; Center—64%; Right—81%. A breakdown of results by primary identity shows that among those who define themselves as Israeli, 27% believe that Judaism is a religion only, while only 10% of those who chose Jewish as their primary identity feel this way. Among those who chose Israeli as their primary identity, 67% believe that Judaism is both a religion and a nationality, as compared with 85.5% of those who chose Jewish as their primary identity.

What about the breakdown of responses among the different subgroups of the Arab sample? We have already seen that almost one-third of the overall Arab sample believe that Judaism is a religion only. This response is highly significant because, as we have stated, territorial self-definition is dependent upon nationality rather than religion; in other words, those who define Judaism as a religion only will find it hard to see the logic behind a sovereign Jewish state.

Dividing up the Arab sample by religion revealed only negligible differences. The highest percentage of those who believe that Judaism is a religion only was found among the Druze (34.5%, as compared with 30% of Muslims and 28% of Christians). Larger differences were found based on religiosity. Thus, among the Arab respondents who defined themselves as religious, 24.5% believe that Judaism is only a religion, compared with 30% of those who defined themselves as traditional and fully 41.5% of those who defined themselves as non-religious. We also found substantial differences between those who defined their primary identity as Israeli and those who defined their primary identity as Palestinian. Among the former, 33% said that Judaism was a religion only (which probably makes it easier for them to define themselves as Israeli), while 26% of the latter held this view, although one might have hypothesized that this figure would be higher due to the Palestinian leadership’s rhetoric on this issue.


**Is Israel both
Jewish and
democratic?**

Question 32

p. 181

We wanted to find out what the public thinks about the possibility of Israel being both fully Jewish and fully democratic. This is a highly sensitive question that lies at the heart of the public debate over the state’s character—as it has done in the past and will do in the future—because, although “Jewish and democratic” is Israel’s official definition, there are many who claim that its Jewish character is more important than its meeting democratic standards, while many say exactly the opposite. The data from the current survey show that a majority of both the Jewish and the Arab respondents believe that this combination is possible.

Figure 2.4 / “Israel can be both a fully Jewish state and a fully democratic state at one and the same time” (certain it can or think it can, Jews and Arabs, %)



We wanted to find out who **did not** believe that this combination was possible. While among all the subgroups in the Jewish sample there was a majority who believed that it was, substantial differences were found in the size of this majority. Segmentation by religiosity reveals that the lowest percentages of those who agreed that it was possible were found in the groups at either extreme: secular (52%) and Haredi (54%) respondents, as compared with the religious (81%), the traditional religious (65.5%), and the traditional non-religious (60.5%). The foreign policy/security variable revealed that a clear majority of respondents who defined themselves as right-wing (65%) felt that a combination of “Jewish” and “democratic” was possible, as compared with a small majority of those who defined themselves as centrist (51%) or left-wing (53%). Older respondents (65%) supported this possibility more than did middle-aged (59.5%) or young (52%) respondents. Those who defined their primary identity as Jewish (66%) supported the possibility of “Jewish and democratic” at a much higher rate than those who gave their primary identity as Israeli (56%).

Among the Arab respondents, the lowest level of belief in the possibility that Israel could be “fully Jewish and also fully democratic” was found when we divided up the sample by identity: Only approximately one-third of those who defined themselves primarily as Palestinians (33%)

felt that way, as compared with a large majority of those who defined themselves primarily as Israeli (62.5%).

Those who view the definition of Israel as “Jewish and democratic” favorably may see these results as encouraging. However, the distribution of the Arab sample’s responses to the following question, about the definition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, may dampen this positive outlook.


Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people

Question 45

p. 189

Against the background of the lively public debate on this issue in recent years and the discussions about the Nation-State Bill, we asked the Arab respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people.” As the figure below shows, we found a majority (67%) who oppose Israel’s right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people, just as we did in the 2016 Democracy Index (77%).³⁶ While the share of those who disagreed in this survey is somewhat smaller than that of the 2016 survey, it is still a solid majority.

Figure 2.5 / “Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people” (Arabs, %)



Segmentation by different variables shows that while a majority in all the subgroups of the Arab sample opposes this definition of Israel, there are some differences in the size of this majority. Opposition is particularly strong among Christians (78%, as compared with 69% of Muslims and 53% of Druze); those with a higher level of education (academic education—73%; full secondary education—70%; less than full secondary education—61%); non-religious respondents (71%, compared with 69% of those who define themselves as traditional and 62% of those who define themselves as religious); and those who chose Palestinian as their primary identity (71%, as compared with 67% of those who chose Israeli as their primary identity).

³⁶ Hermann et al., *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*, 233.

Cross-referencing with results from the two previous questions—regarding Israel’s ability to be fully Jewish and fully democratic at one and the same time, and regarding its right to define itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people — shows that they are closely connected. Approximately two-thirds of those who agree with the statement that the State of Israel has a right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people agree that it can be both fully democratic and fully Jewish. On the other hand, fewer than half of those who disagree with the statement that the State of Israel has the right to be defined as the Jewish people’s nation-state believe that it can be both fully Jewish and fully democratic.

We also broke down the Arab sample’s responses to the question regarding whether Israel had the right to define itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people by their responses to the question “What is Judaism?”, and found no connection between them. In other words, the three responses—that Judaism is a religion only, that Judaism is a nationality only, or that Judaism is both—yield the same result: More than two-thirds believe that Israel does not have the right to define itself as the Jewish people’s nation-state.

Further to the question regarding Israel’s right to define itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people, we asked the Jewish respondents what the attitude should be toward those who do not recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

In the current survey, we found—as in the 2016 Israeli Democracy Index³⁷—a majority of Jewish respondents who agreed that those who are not prepared to affirm that Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose the right to vote, a majority that was even slightly larger than that found in the 2016 Index.

Table 2.2 / Denying voting rights to those who refuse to affirm Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people (strongly agree and somewhat agree, Jews, by year, %)

Year	Somewhat agree or strongly agree that people who refuse to affirm the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose the right to vote
2016	52.5
2017	58


Denial of the right to vote for anyone who does not recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people

Question 35
p. 183

37 Hermann et al., *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*, 237.

The figure below shows the differences between the levels of support for denying the right to vote to anyone who refuses to declare that Israel is the Jewish people’s nation-state among the subgroups of the Jewish sample, by variables that were found to be influential.

Figure 2.6 / “Those who refuse to affirm Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people should lose the right to vote” (strongly agree or somewhat agree, Jews, by different variables, %)



As can be seen, the breakdown of the Jewish sample by religiosity reveals a majority in all the groups, except for the secular group, that is in favor of denying the right to vote under the circumstances described in the question. There is also a majority in favor among those who placed themselves on the Right politically. A large minority (almost half) in the Center holds this view, as does a small minority on the Left. Segmentation by education shows that only among those with an academic education is there a majority that opposes denying the right to vote, while a majority of the other groups supports doing so. An analysis of the responses by primary identity shows that support for denying the right to vote was expressed by approximately half of those who defined themselves primarily as “Israeli,” but enjoyed a strong majority among those who defined themselves primarily as “Jewish.”

We also broke down the responses to this question in the Jewish sample according to the interviewees’ responses to the question “Have Israel’s Arab citizens reconciled themselves to Israel’s existence?,” and found a strong connection between them: Three-quarters (75%) of those who strongly agreed that the Arabs had not come to terms with the State of Israel’s existence were willing to deny the right to vote to those who refused to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, as compared with approximately one-third of those who strongly disagreed with the statement that the Arabs are in favor of Israel’s destruction.

Analyzing this cluster of responses indicates that the recognition of the right to vote in elections as a basic civil right, regardless of a citizen’s opinions, is not firmly established among most of Israel’s Jewish population.


We wanted to examine whether the Jewish and Arab respondents felt that the system of government in the State of Israel was democratic for all. We found a wide gap on this issue between the two populations, as shown in the figure below.

**Is Israel
democratic for
Arabs too?**

Question 26

p. 178

Figure 2.7 / “The system of government in Israel is also democratic for Arab citizens” (Jews and Arabs, %)



Not only did we find a majority among the Jewish respondents who felt that the system of government in Israel was democratic for Arabs as well, and a majority among the Arab respondents who felt exactly the opposite, but we also found a plurality of Jews at the positive extreme of the agree-disagree scale (strongly agree—40%), and a plurality of Arabs at the negative extreme (strongly disagree—32%).³⁸

Which subgroups of the Jewish population are less convinced that Israel’s system of government is democratic for the country’s Arab citizens? The only subgroup without a majority that believes that Israel’s system of government is democratic for the Arab citizens is those who defined themselves as being on the Left. There was a majority of one size or another in all other groups across all the variables that we checked.

38 We should note that a high percentage of Jewish respondents—78 percent—also agreed with a similar statement presented by Sammy Smooha in a poll in 2013 (“Despite its flaws, the system of government in Israel is democratic toward Arab citizens as well”). The gap between the two poll results may be attributed to the different wording of the question, or alternatively to a certain erosion that has without doubt affected the belief of the Jewish population in recent years that the system of government in Israel is indeed also democratic for Arab citizens. See Sammy Smooha, *Still Playing by the Rules*, 64.

And which subgroups of the Arab population believe that the Israeli system of government is democratic for them? A breakdown by religion shows that approximately half of the Druze and Christian respondents believe that the system of government in Israel is democratic also for Arabs, while only a minority of Muslims (though not a small one—43%) holds this view. Breaking down the data by primary identity showed the expected result: A considerable majority (71%) of those who defined their primary identity as Israeli believe that the system of government in Israel is also democratic for Arab citizens, as opposed to only a minority of those who cited their primary identity as Palestinian (27.5%). Approximately half of those who cited religion as their primary identity hold this view, evidently influenced by the high proportion of Druze and Christians in this group. Those who defined themselves as primarily Arab believe that the government is democratic toward Arab citizens. We also found a clear difference between those who have first-degree relatives living in the territories and those who do not: While only a minority in both cases believes that the Israeli government is democratic for Arabs, this minority is larger among those who do not have first-degree relatives living in the territories (47%) than those who do (36%).

Another relevant question on this issue regards the state’s fairness toward its Arab citizens.

All the respondents—Jewish and Arab—seem to agree, albeit to varying extents, that Israel’s governments have not treated Arabs equally and fairly over the years.

Table 2.3 / Fair and equal government treatment of Arab citizens (Jews and Arabs, %)

Believe that over the years, the government has not treated Arab citizens fairly and equally at all, or only to a very small extent	
Jews	52
Arabs	77

We wanted to find out which subgroups in the Jewish sample believe that the government has indeed treated Arab citizens fairly and equally over the years. We found a majority of respondents who hold this view in the Haredi group (60%), the religious (64%), those who identified themselves as being on the Right (58%), and those who gave their primary identity as Jewish (57%).

Fairness and equality in the state’s treatment of the Arab citizens

Question 17


p. 173

Should Jews have greater rights?

Question 25
p. 177

Thus, a majority of Jewish respondents think that the government in Israel is also democratic for Arab citizens. But do they themselves hold democratic opinions regarding the Arab population? Here, too, we found that a majority of Jewish respondents is opposed—in principle—to giving more rights to Israel’s Jewish citizens than to its Arab citizens. That is, they evince a position that is egalitarian and democratic.

Figure 2.8 / “In Israel, Jewish citizens should have more rights than Arab citizens” (Jews, %)



The table below shows the proportion of respondents who have held this democratic view over the years—in other words, those who strongly or somewhat disagree with the statement that Israel’s Jewish citizens should have more rights than its Arab citizens. Although this year too, a majority held this view, this was a smaller majority than in the past (except for in 2013). The question is whether this is a “real” decline, or whether the drop is the result of the different context in which the question was asked. We will be able to respond to this question with more confidence only in the next survey.

Table 2.4 / Greater rights for Israel’s Jewish citizens (Jews, by year, %)

	2009	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Strongly disagree and somewhat disagree that Israel’s Jewish citizens should have more rights than its Arab citizens	62	47	63	71	70	56

Which subgroups in the Jewish population do support giving more rights to Jews? Segmentation by the different variables found support for this position only among the Haredi respondents (71%), those who defined themselves as right-wing (53%), and those who defined themselves as Mizrahi (51%).

One possible explanation for the fact that this time there was only a small majority that rejected the idea of giving more privileges to Jews is the erosion of a basic democratic principle: civic equality. This explanation is bolstered by the Jewish population’s opinions regarding the sensitive issue of the purchase of land by Arabs.


Most of the respondents in the Jewish sample believe that Arabs should be allowed to buy land only in Arab towns and neighborhoods or not allowed to buy land at all (within Israel’s borders). Less than one-third of the Jewish respondents supported allowing Arabs to buy land wherever they wish.

Land purchase in Israel by Arabs

Question 20

p. 175

Figure 2.9 / “Arab citizens of Israel should be allowed to buy land” (Jews, %)



Segmentation by political camp—the variable that was found to have the strongest influence—revealed that the majority of left-wing respondents think that Arabs should be allowed to buy land anywhere, as compared with a minority of those on the Right (35%) and in the Center (15%).

Table 2.5 / Arab land purchase, by political orientation (Jews, %)

Israel's Arab citizens should be allowed to buy land	Right	Center	Left
Anywhere	15	35	74
Only in Arab towns and neighborhoods	45	48	22
Not at all	36.5	10	3
Don't know/other	3.5	7	1
Total	100	100	100

From here, we proceeded to two hypothetical questions about measures that might build bridges between Jews and Arabs in Israel.

Equal and fair treatment as a basis for recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people

Question 47
p. 190

While only a hypothetical question, we wanted to examine whether the respondents feel that fair and equal treatment by the State of Israel would enable Arab citizens to accept its definition as the nation-state of the Jewish people. In other words, would things look differently if the state treated its Arab citizens exactly as it treats its Jewish citizens, with no discrimination or injustice on the civic level?

Here, too, we found a marked similarity between the Jewish and Arab respondents' opinions. Both groups believe that fair and equal treatment would **not** lead to a situation in which the Arabs could accept the definition of Israel as the Jewish people's nation-state. In other words, the definition of the State of Israel as the Jewish national homeland has deep significance for both sides that transcends considerations of fairness and equality in areas unrelated to national identity. Only around one-third of both groups believes that fairness and equality could change the Arab population's stance on this issue.

Table 2.6 / Fair and equal treatment as a means to allow Arabs to accept Israel as the Jewish nation-state (Jews and Arabs, %)

Fair and equal treatment would allow Arabs to accept the definition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people	Think it would, or are certain it would	Think it would not, or are certain it would not	Don't know	Total
Jews	39	56	5	100
Arabs	29	64	7	100


A shared civic holiday for Israel

Question 42

p. 187

One way to create a sense of shared citizenship is to institute special occasions or civic holidays that are not unique to a specific group, so that everyone can join in wholeheartedly. We therefore asked the respondents in the survey whether they agreed with the statement: “A new holiday marking the shared citizenship of all Israeli citizens, Jewish and Arab, should be added to the Israeli calendar.” As the figure below shows, while approximately two-thirds of the Arab respondents are in favor of such a holiday, only about one-third of the Jewish respondents agree—perhaps because in their view, a holiday of this kind would detract from the primacy of the Jewish narrative that underpins the state.

Figure 2.10 / “A new holiday marking the shared citizenship of all Israeli citizens, Jewish and Arab, should be added to the Israeli calendar” (strongly agree or somewhat agree, Jews and Arabs, %)



It is worth investigating the characteristics of those on the Jewish side who are in favor of such a civic holiday, and those on the Arab side who do not.

Among the Jewish respondents, segmentation by religiosity shows that while no group has a majority in favor of such a holiday, the lower the level of religiosity, the greater the support (Haredi—4%; religious—11%; traditional religious—23%; traditional non-religious—39.5%; secular—40%). A breakdown by political camp reveals that only a minority of those who define themselves as right-wing (18%) support the proposal, as compared with half of those in the

Center (50%) and a small majority on the Left (56%). Segmentation by primary identity shows that the highest proportion in favor of establishing a shared civic holiday is to be found among those who defined themselves as primarily Israeli (43.5%). The corresponding percentage among those who defined their primary identity as Jewish was only 21.5%.

Although a majority among all the subgroups of the Arab sample supported the establishment of a shared civic holiday, opposition to it was stronger among Muslims (33%, as compared with 24% of Druze and 21% of Christians); young people (33.5% of those aged 18–24, as compared with 29% of those aged 35–54 and 23% of those aged 55 and over); those who defined themselves as religious (38%, as compared with traditional—24% and non-religious—32%); and those who gave their primary identity as Palestinian (45%, as compared with religious identity—32.5%; Arab identity—26%; and Israeli identity—19%). Education level turned out to have no influence on this issue.

Chapter 3 / On the Question of Partnership in the State and in Society

In the previous chapter, we examined the definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, as well as the complexities and tensions that this dual identity creates in the relationship between Jews and Arabs at the state level. We saw that it was very difficult for the Arab respondents to accept the definition “Jewish and democratic,” while large groups in the Jewish sample were willing to deny a basic civil right—the right to vote—to citizens who refuse to accept Israel’s right to define itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

It might be expected that on issues that pose no real threat to the Jewish majority in terms of symbolism or identity, we would find equal treatment by the state of its Jewish and Arab citizens. But many studies conducted in recent years, as well as the conclusions of the Or Commission (2003), show that the Arab population does not receive an equal share or fair treatment in its interactions with state institutions. Thus, this chapter addresses Israelis’ perceptions of the existing and ideal situations regarding the extent of Arab citizens’ equality and involvement in state and society.

As we will see later in this chapter, we found that Arab respondents desire full equality in all areas of life and full involvement in making decisions on all the issues on Israel’s public agenda. We found almost no difference among the various subgroups in the Arab sample on these issues. The views of the Jewish sample on this issue are less uniform. While a certain majority of the Jewish respondents would like to give Arabs equal and fair treatment in employment and in budget allocations, only a minority is willing to give them any real foothold in decision making on vital issues. In other words, most of the Jewish respondents support equal treatment of the Arab minority by the state and in society, as long as this minority does not plan to “take the reins” and does not seek to be a full partner in government. This is consistent with the findings of previous surveys,³⁹ even if this year—or perhaps only in this survey, due to its focus on Jewish-Arab relations—the Jewish respondents had stronger views regarding Jewish ownership of the state than in the past. Of course, there are large differences on this issue among the subgroups in the Jewish sample. Right-wing, Haredi, and religious respondents tend to oppose civic equality or support only a limited version of it, while higher percentages of centrist, left-wing, and secular respondents tend to support a broader civic approach. Since parties and politicians who represent the Right have been in control of the government for many years, and since no change appears to be on the horizon, this is a worrisome finding for the future of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel.


39 See, for example, Hermann et al., *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*.

Arab attitudes toward Israel

Questions 4, 5
pp. 166, 167

We asked the Arab respondents whether their feelings for the state had become more positive or more negative since the incidents of October 2000. At the same time, we asked the Jewish respondents to state whether they thought that the Arabs' attitude toward the state had improved or deteriorated since then.⁴⁰ As the figure below shows, a plurality of Arab respondents said that their feelings toward the State of Israel in recent years were more negative, approximately one-third said that their feelings had not changed, and only about one-fifth said that their feelings had become more positive. The Jewish respondents' evaluation of the situation was much worse. Most of them said that the attitude of Israel's Arab citizens toward the state had become more negative, while only a minority believes that there has been no change, and an even smaller minority believes that the situation has improved.

Figure 3.1 / (For Jewish respondents:) Has the attitude of Israel's Arab citizens toward the State of Israel become more positive or more negative in recent years than in the past, particularly since the events of October 2000? / (For Arab respondents:) Has your attitude toward the State of Israel become more positive or more negative in recent years, particularly since the events of October 2000? (%)



40 While mentioning the incidents of October 2000 may have led to a negative bias, we had to provide a specific point in time in this question. We chose this point because most discussions on this issue refer to these incidents as a watershed event, particularly on the Arab side.

A breakdown of the Arab sample by religion showed that the Druze had the most positive attitude of the groups: 38% said that their attitude toward the state had become more positive in recent years, as compared with 22% of Christians and 20% of Muslims. Of those who had first-degree relatives living in the West Bank or in Gaza, 52% reported that their attitude toward the State of Israel had become more negative, as compared with 40% of those without first-degree relatives living there. Segmentation by primary identity showed that the largest share of those who reported that their feelings toward the state had become negative in recent years was found among those who chose Palestinian as their primary identity (64%), followed by 44% of those who chose Arab, 39% of those who chose their religion, and 25% of those who chose Israeli.

We found negligible and non-systematic differences among the subgroups in the Jewish population on this question. For example, there was no match between political orientation or religiosity (for example) and the view of Arab citizens' attitude toward the State of Israel.

Next, we proceeded to evaluate the public's position on equality in the areas of budget allocation, employment in the public sector, and education.

We asked the Jewish respondents whether they agreed with the following statement: "The State of Israel should allocate budgets equally to Jewish and Arab localities."⁴¹ A small majority (58%) of the Jewish population supports allocating equal budgets to Jewish and Arab localities, while a fairly large minority (38%) opposes it.


Equal budgets

Question 37

p. 184

41 This question was not asked of the Arab respondents since it is obvious that for them, equal budget allocation is a desirable thing, and some of them even believe that Arab residential communities should receive preferential treatment in budget allocations to compensate for the many years of neglect. However, since such preferential treatment is unrealistic, we did not present it as an option.

Figure 3.2 / “The State of Israel should allocate budgets equally to Jewish and Arab localities” (somewhat agree and strongly agree, Jews by political affiliation, %)



The distribution of the responses here resembles to a large extent that found for a similar question in the 2015 Israeli Democracy Index. There too, more than half of the Jewish respondents supported equal budget allocations for Jewish and Arab localities, while a minority—more than one-third—was opposed.⁴²

Breakdowns by subgroup revealed that the stance on equal budget allocation was closely associated with political orientation. Respondents on the Right (51%) had a slightly stronger tendency to oppose equal allocation of budgets than to support it, while those in the Center or on the Left leaned strongly toward supporting equal budget allocation. Segmentation by religious or secular group showed smaller differences. The Haredi group had the highest percentage of opponents of equal budget allocation for Arab localities (61%), followed by the traditional religious group (52%). Of the remaining groups, only a minority—though in some cases a fairly large one—opposed equal budget allocation: religious respondents—47%, traditional non-religious respondents—43%, and secular respondents—25%. The opposition of the Haredi and traditional religious respondents to equal budget allocation can also be interpreted as a class

42 Hermann et al., *The 2015 Israeli Democracy Index*, 110.

struggle, as these are the two poorest groups in the Jewish population and may perceive the shifting of budgets to the Arab population as a threat to their chances of receiving larger budget allocations from the state. Relatively high percentages of support for equal budget allocation were found among older respondents, those with higher levels of education, and those with higher incomes, as compared with other subgroups in the Jewish population.

Moving on, we explored whether the public supports giving equal representation to Arabs in the ranks of the civil service.⁴³ We asked respondents whether they agree with the following statement: “The state should ensure that Arab citizens of Israel are represented in the civil service in accordance with their proportion in the population.” Not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the Arab population would like to see a higher level of representation in the civil service than the current one. In the Jewish population, opinions are divided. While slightly more than half of the Jewish respondents support proportional representation, a large minority (40%) is opposed. This represents a slight increase in the opposition to proportional representation relative to the findings of the 2015 Israeli Democracy Index, in which only approximately one-third of the Jews opposed proportional representation for Arabs in the civil service in response to a similar question.⁴⁴

**Arab
representation
in the civil
service**


Question 38

p. 184

43 In April 2017, the Prime Minister’s Office announced that the goal set by the Olmert government in 2007 for representation of Arabs in the civil service—10.6%— had been met. However, this is lower than the proportion of the Arab public in the national population as a whole (approximately 15%). It should be noted, too, that this average also includes departments in which Arab representation is very high, such as the government hospitals, and departments where they have very low representation, such as the Prime Minister’s Office or the Ministry of Public Security. See Tali Heruti-Sover, “Goal for Arab Representation in the Civil Service Met—Four Years Late,” *The Marker*, April 12, 2017 (Hebrew).

44 Hermann et al., *The 2015 Israeli Democracy Index*, 110.

Figure 3.3 / “The state should ensure that Israel’s Arab citizens are represented in the civil service in accordance with their proportion in the population” (Jews and Arabs, %)



For this question as well, a breakdown of the Jewish sample by political affiliation turned up large differences. Less than half of right-wing respondents (44%) agreed with the statement that the state should ensure proportional representation of Israel’s Arab citizens in the civil service, as compared with a majority of centrist (65%) and left-wing respondents (76%) who were in favor. As the table below shows, segmentation according to religiosity—which, as we know, corresponds closely with political orientation—indicates that support for the proportional representation of Arabs in the civil service was highest among secular respondents.

Table 3.1 / Support for proportional representation of Arabs in the civil service (Jews, by religiosity, %)

Religiosity	Support proportional representation of Arabs in the civil service
Haredi	40
Religious	46
Traditional religious	42
Traditional non-religious	53
Secular	61

The older, more educated, and wealthier respondents also tended to agree more with the statement that Arabs deserve proportional representation in the civil service.

In previous surveys, we found a high percentage of Jewish respondents and a large majority of Arab respondents who think that Arabs suffer from discrimination relative to Jews. For example, in the *2016 Israeli Democracy Index*, 53% of Jewish respondents and 91% of Arab respondents agreed with the assertion that Arabs are discriminated against (even on the Jewish Right, 34% of the respondents agreed).⁴⁵ In light of this, we wished to find out whether the Israeli population supports the idea that steps should be taken to close the gap between Arabs and Jews. We asked whether “the state should prepare and implement a comprehensive plan to close the gaps between Arab citizens and Jewish citizens.” Almost all the Arab respondents agreed that a comprehensive plan of this sort was necessary, as did almost two-thirds of the Jewish respondents.


A plan for closing gaps between Arabs and Jews

Question 44

p. 188

⁴⁵ Hermann et al., *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*, 154–155.

Figure 3.4 / “The state should prepare and implement a comprehensive plan for closing the gaps between Arab citizens and Jewish citizens” (strongly agree and somewhat agree, Jews and Arabs, %)



Support for a plan to close the gaps between Jewish and Arab citizens is common to all the political camps in the Jewish population, but at different levels. A small majority of the Right supports such a plan, compared with sweeping support among respondents in the Center and on the Left. Segmentation by religiosity found that only among Haredi respondents was there a majority opposed to the implementation of such a plan, while among the other groups a majority was in favor.

Table 3.2 / Support for a comprehensive plan to close gaps between Jewish and Arab citizens (Jews, %)

Political Affiliation	
Right	53
Center	79.5
Left	90
Religiosity	
Haredi	34
Religious	61
Traditional religious	60
Traditional non-religious	64
Secular	72

Thus, while there is a fairly large minority of the Jewish population that opposes egalitarian policies on budget allocation, employment in the civil service, and active steps to redress existing disparities (a minority comprising mainly right-wing, Haredi, and religious respondents), our findings allow us to state that there is currently a majority of the Jewish population in favor of addressing this inequality.

The questions below were aimed at examining whether and to what extent there was willingness among the Jewish population to allow the Arab minority to play an active and significant role in making decisions on issues of substance—in other words, whether the relatively high democratic support for equality and inclusion also existed in areas with a decisive impact on decisions at the national level. As we will see below, and as we also found in previous surveys, while the Arab population would like to be full partners with the Jewish majority in running the state's affairs, most of the Jewish population is not interested in such a partnership.

The first question we examined in this context—which we have asked many times in the past surveys for the Israeli Democracy Index—was whether “decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority.” As in the findings of previous indices, here too an overwhelming majority of Jewish respondents in this poll was unwilling to allow Arabs a say in deciding essential issues such as returning territory or signing a peace


Decisions on issues of peace and security requiring a Jewish majority

Question 30

p. 180

treaty. It is important to note that such a position is in violation of the law, since in a democratic country there is no way to exclude an entire population from elections or from a referendum on the basis of religion or race. It is worth noting the increase in support for this statement over the last five years. In fact, this is the highest score since 2010, and the third-highest over the fourteen years in which this question has been asked.

Figure 3.5 / “Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority” (Jews, by year, %)



The very high percentage of Jewish respondents who agree that crucial decisions on issues of peace and security should be made only by a Jewish majority hints that this exclusionary view typifies the majority of subgroups in the Jewish population. Indeed, on this issue we found across-the-board agreement among the Haredi (96%), religious (93%), traditional religious (84%), and traditional non-religious respondents (83%), and a large majority among secular respondents (72.5%). Segmentation by political affiliation showed that even a majority of left-wing respondents (58%) supported this view, with support even higher among those in the Center (67%) and on the Right (94%).


**Decisions
on issues of
governance
and economy
requiring a
Jewish majority**

Question 39

p. 185

The next question also addressed decisions that we defined as crucial to the state's future, but this time concerning governance, the economy, and society, areas that would not seem to be directly connected to national security in the strict sense of the term. As in the data from previous surveys for the democracy indices, this year it is once again clear that the Jewish population is not willing to share its "ownership" of the state with Arab citizens, even on these issues. In addition, while the four previous indices showed that slightly more than half of the Jewish respondents supported requiring a Jewish majority for decisions on issues of governance and economy, this soared to almost three-quarters in the current survey.

Figure 3.6 / "Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, the economy, and society should be made by a Jewish majority" (strongly agree and somewhat agree, Jews, by year, %)



While most of the left-wing camp (55%) did not agree with the statement that decisions on issues of governance and the economy should be made exclusively by a Jewish majority, no fewer than 42.5% were in agreement. A majority of right-wing (85%) and centrist respondents (61%) agreed with the statement. In all the subgroups on the Haredi–secular scale, the majority agreed that a Jewish majority should decide on these issues (Haredi—96%; religious—87%; traditional religious—83%; traditional non-religious—73%; secular—61%).


Arab parties in government

Question 19

p. 147

In a democracy, the main way to influence national policy is through membership in the government. Thus, we asked the Arab respondents whether they would support or oppose Arab parties agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers. As can be seen, Arab respondents' position on this issue was unequivocally positive. In other words, the Arab population is very interested in changing the current situation.


Figure 3.7 / Do you support or oppose Arab parties agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (Arabs, %)



However, when we asked the Jewish respondents whether they supported or opposed having Arab parties join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers, we received an inverse pattern of responses, as we did in previous surveys: the majority of the Jewish population opposes bringing Arab parties into the government and appointing Arab ministers. In fact, in this survey, the rate of opposition to this idea is almost two-thirds, compared with approximately one-half in previous surveys.

On this issue, we found a large gap between the political camps. Right-wing respondents firmly oppose bringing Arab parties into the coalition (81% are opposed), while the Center is divided (51% opposed, 46% in favor), and a large majority of left-wing respondents (69%) are in favor.

Figure 3.8 / Do you support or oppose bringing Arab parties into the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (oppose, Jews, by year, %)



We have seen that the majority of the Jewish population, except for small fringe groups comprising mainly those on the Left, opposes the idea that decisions crucial to the state should be made together with representatives of the Arab population, and that Arab parties should be brought into the government and Arab ministers appointed. But is the Jewish population any more willing to include Arab professionals, as opposed to politicians, in decision making?

We asked whether the state should be required to include Arab professionals in decision making in public institutions. The overwhelming majority of the Arab population believes that there should be a requirement to include Arab professionals in all decisions, including those that affect the public as a whole, and not only the Arab population. Opinions were divided among the Jewish respondents. More than one-third believe that the state should not be required to

Involving Arab professionals in decision making in public institutions


Question 11

p. 170

include Arab professionals in making decisions in public institutions, while approximately one-third believe that there should be such a requirement. In addition, about one-quarter believe that Arab professionals should be included, but only in decisions having to do with the Arab population.

It appears then, that the Jewish population's suspicion toward Arabs is not limited to the political sphere, but also extends to decision making by professionals in public institutions.

Figure 3.9 / Should the state be required to include Arab professionals in decision making in public institutions? (Jews and Arabs, %)



Yes, the state should be required to include Arab professionals in decisions that affect Israel's population as a whole

Yes, the state should be required to include Arab professionals in decisions, but only those that affect the Arab population

No, the state should not be required at all to include Arab professionals in decision making in public institutions

Don't know

We found a large difference in the responses of those on the Right and those in the Center and on the Left. The majority view among right-wing respondents (53%) was that there was no need at all to require the state to include Arab professionals in decision making, while the majority view among centrist (53%) and left-wing respondents (64%) was that the state should be required to include Arab professionals in all decision making. A breakdown of the findings by religiosity showed that on this point as well the most hawkish views were held by the Haredi group, approximately three-quarters of whom opposed requiring the state by law to include Arab professionals in decision making.

The next question addressed an issue that has been in the headlines for some years: national civilian service for young Arab men and women. For many years, large numbers of Druze and Bedouin men have served in the IDF, and increasing numbers of Christian Arabs have also been volunteering for military service. Over the past decade, the National Civilian Service Administration has begun increasing the number of civilian service positions available to the Arab sector, and launched an advertising campaign to persuade young Arabs to participate in national civilian service. Arab members of Knesset, the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel, and Arab third-sector (non-governmental and nonprofit) organizations are firmly opposed to this trend, claiming that national civilian service could legitimize the current situation, in which the State of Israel does not grant full and inclusive citizenship to Arabs even as it recruits them for its own purposes. While the young people who serve will receive the status and benefits awarded to those who complete military service, by doing so they will strengthen the perception that Arabs must actively prove their loyalty to the state in order to be eligible for basic civil rights to which they are entitled in any case. The Arab leadership claims that this forces a process of “Israelization” onto young Arabs serving in an organizational framework that has a strong connection to the defense establishment without any commitment to making a substantial change to the existing structural discrimination. They also claim that such service is a “divide and conquer” tool used by the Jewish Israeli leadership against the state’s non-Jewish population.⁴⁶

We wanted to examine whether the proposal put forward from time to time to require national civilian service of all citizens—Jewish and Arab—is acceptable and desirable to everyone. As can be seen, the Arab population supports the Arab leadership’s view on this issue, with the majority being opposed to requiring national civilian service of any kind. However, the vast majority of the Jewish respondents supported requiring all young people exempt from military service, including Arabs, to perform national civilian service.


National civilian service for those who are exempt from military service

Question 16

p. 172


46 Sammy Smootha and Zohar Lechtman, *Civic Service for Arabs in Israel: 2010 Research Findings* (Haifa: Jewish-Arab Center, University of Haifa, 2011).

Figure 3.10 / Do you support or oppose the idea that every citizen, Jewish or Arab, who is of the appropriate age and exempt from military service be required by law to perform civilian service? (Jews and Arabs, %)



When we broke down the Arab sample by religion, we found substantial support among the Druze for requiring national civilian service of everyone, but there was still a plurality who were not in favor. The Muslim and Christian respondents were firmer in their opposition to mandatory national civilian service, although here too there was a not insignificant minority that supported this proposal (25% of Muslims and 21% of Christians). Segmenting by identity, we found that opposition to civilian service was strongest among those who gave their primary identity as Palestinian, but we also found majorities among those who gave their religion and their Arab identity as their primary identity. We found a majority in favor of such service only among those who defined themselves primarily as Israeli.

Figure 3.11 / Do you support or oppose the idea that every citizen, Jewish or Arab, who is of the appropriate age and exempt from military service should be required by law to perform national civilian service? (opposed, Arabs, by religion and primary identity, %)



Among the Jewish sample, a majority of Haredi respondents (64%), who themselves do not serve, opposed requiring civilian service, though a substantial minority of them (19%) supported it, while 6% said that only Jews should be obligated. The remaining groups on the Haredi–secular scale were clearly in favor of requiring civilian service as an alternative to military service for anyone who did not enlist: among the religious—62%, traditional religious—64%, traditional non-religious—75%, and secular—81%. Segmentation of the Jewish sample by political affiliation showed that support for requiring civilian service was very high among centrist (85%) and left-wing (84%) respondents, and lower among right-wing respondents (61%). It should be noted that even when we do not include those who define themselves as Haredi from the right-wing camp, the rate of support on the Right for requiring Arabs to perform civilian service is still low relative to the other two political camps. In other words, this difference does not reflect only the Haredi–secular divide; it is possible that some segments of the Right do not want civilian service to be required of all citizens by law so as to avoid giving Arabs equal rights. Finally, the support for mandatory civilian service for all those exempt from military service was higher among those who served or are serving in the IDF (78%) than among those who did not (54%).


Studying both perspectives on the conflict

Question 31

p. 180

The next question addresses the manner in which the Israeli education system teaches the history of the relations between Jews and Arabs, which of course is closely linked to the current state of relations between the two populations. Unlike some of the previous questions, in which equality between the sectors focused on more procedural and measurable dimensions (budget allocations, jobs, resources), here we are testing the willingness of both populations to make room in school curricula for the other side's narrative. In our view, the most surprising result was that a majority of both Jews and Arabs supports the idea that all schools in Israel teach both Jewish and Arab perspectives on the history of the conflict between them. It appears that not only is there consensus among most of the citizens, Jewish and Arab, to discuss the history of relations between the two peoples within the official education system, but there is also willingness to hear the other side's point of view in this setting.⁴⁷ However, it is also possible that certain groups in the Jewish population would like to teach the conflict from the Arab perspective in order to dispute the "other" point of view.

Figure 3.12 / "The Jewish and Arab perspectives regarding the history of the conflict between the two peoples should be taught in all schools in Israel" (Jews and Arabs, %)



⁴⁷ In order to check ourselves, we repeated this question in the Peace Index survey of March 2017. Once again, to our surprise, we found a similar distribution to that obtained in the current survey.

A significant difference was found between Haredi respondents and the other groups on the Haredi–secular scale. A clear majority of the Haredim (59%) disagreed with the statement, while in the rest of the subgroups a majority supported the study of both sides’ perspectives of the conflict in schools: religious—58%, traditional religious—68%, traditional non-religious—81%, and secular—77.5%. Segmentation by political camp showed that a majority of all of the groups supported studying both perspectives of the conflict, though at different rates, and in the anticipated direction: 62% of the right-wing respondents, 84.5% of the centrists, and 95% of the left-wing respondents.

Jews’ Willingness to Accept Equality


In order to provide an overall view of the Jewish population’s willingness to allow Arabs to integrate into public institutions and thereby participate in processes with national importance, we used all the questions relevant to this issue to create a single scale from 0 to 1.⁴⁸ The value 0 represents total opposition to allowing Arabs’ representation and equality in state institutions, and 1 represents complete willingness to do so.⁴⁹ The resulting average of the scores of all the respondents is 0.45 (with a standard deviation of 0.235). The meaning of this score is that on average, the Jewish sample was found to be below the midpoint and closer to the pole of opposition in terms of its willingness to allow involvement and inclusion for Arabs. The relatively high standard deviation indicates fairly high variability among the Jewish respondents in their attitudes on this issue.

The figure below shows the average scores on the involvement and inclusion scale by primary identity, political camp, religiosity, education, and income.

48 We could not create a parallel scale for the Arab respondents in our sample since only very few questions were found to be statistically relevant, and even in those cases there was no reason to do so because of consensus among the Arab respondents regarding their aspiration toward full integration.

49 We built the scale from questions 19, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39, and 44 in the current survey with a change in the order of the values, such that the high values express support for integration and equality of the Arab minority in state institutions. In a Cronbach’s alpha reliability test for each of the items with the missing values not included, a high and satisfactory value of 0.823 resulted. So as not to reduce the sample size, we decided to give the missing values in each item the average score for that item. We then built the scale as a summation of all the responses, and converted it into a scale of 0 to 1 for the sake of clarity.

Figure 3.13 / Openness or opposition to the involvement of Arabs in state institutions (Jews, by background variables)



The breakdown by political orientation shows that Jewish respondents' stance on foreign policy/security issues is the best explanation for their views regarding the integration and inclusion of Arabs in public institutions. Thus, right-wing respondents tend to take an unfavorable view of equality and involvement of Arabs in state institutions, while left-wing respondents tend to have the opposite opinion.

The internal distribution within the Right is particularly interesting. There is a fairly large and statistically significant gap between the Right and the moderate Right (or the "soft Right"): Those on the Right are much firmer in their opposition to the integration of Arabs than those on the soft Right, whose positions are close to the average of the population as a whole. In other words, members of the moderate Right are more willing to give equal treatment to Arabs on issues such as budget allocations, jobs in the public sector, or "giving a voice" to representatives of the Arab population. On this question, we found no significant difference on the Left between those who define themselves as left-wing and those who define themselves as moderate left-wing.

A breakdown by religiosity shows, once more, the extreme position of the Haredi sector in its attitude toward the Arab minority (a score of 0.26, the lowest score of all the subgroups that we examined). The religious and traditional groups seem to have identical opinions regarding issues examined in this chapter. (There is no statistically significant difference between these groups in their scores on the involvement and inclusion scale). On average, the secular group is more open to involvement and inclusion, but the standard deviation of its score is high, which indicates large internal differences within it. This variation within the secular group seems to stem from the differences in opinion regarding these issues between secular respondents who are right-wing, centrist, or left-wing.

Level of education was also found to be associated with the extent of openness to the involvement and inclusion of Arabs, as respondents with an academic education expressed a greater degree of openness to this idea. Income level was also found to be linked to the degree of willingness to involve and include Arabs. Finally, those who chose Jewishness as their primary identity were found to score lower on the involvement and inclusion scale than those who chose Israeli as their primary identity.

Chapter 4 / People in Day-to-Day Life

In this chapter we wanted to go down a level, and to understand the day-to-day, routine relationship between Arabs and Jews in Israel. We wanted to find out whether, and to what extent, the various disparities in opinions and behavior patterns that emerged in the previous chapters affect interpersonal relations between Jews and Arabs in their day-to-day lives, as opposed to the interactions between them regarding rights, politics, the state, and so on.

The resulting picture is complex. On the one hand, mutual suspicion and negative stereotyping are also noticeable on the ground. On the other hand, a fabric of positive relations is being woven between the two populations in some fields, and this provides a basis for a more optimistic assessment than at the two other levels that we examined. This is, therefore, an “encounter marked by suspicion”—an *encounter* because, in general, the Jews and Arabs whom we interviewed expressed a desire and willingness for contact with the other side, or at least were not deterred by the prospect; and *suspicion* because the inequality between the two sides, and their very different collective perceptions of the desirable ethos for the State of Israel, have penetrated deeply, reaching the interpersonal level as well.


Jewish-Arab relations in the present and the past

Questions 8, 9
pp. 168, 169

As we reported in Chapter 1, in recent surveys conducted for the Israeli Democracy Index, we found that the tension between Jews and Arabs was ranked as the strongest tension both in and of itself and relative to all other tensions in Israeli society. In the current survey, we asked the respondents to assess the current state of relations between Jews and Arabs and compare it to those during the state’s early years. While most of the Jews and Arabs alive today do not remember that period, we assumed that they share a collective “historical memory” that was transmitted via the formal education system and via informal discourse in their communities.

In terms of their assessment of the current state of relations, among both Jewish and Arab respondents the most common response was “so-so.” However, Arab respondents were slightly more optimistic: While the share of Jewish respondents who believe that relations are bad was larger than the share who believe that they are good, the percentages among the Arab respondents were close to one another. In addition, the proportion of Arab respondents who believe that relations between the two populations are good is double that among the Jewish respondents.

Figure 4.1 / Are current relations between Israel's Jewish citizens and Israel's Arab citizens...? (Jews and Arabs, %)



A breakdown of the Jewish sample into subgroups (see the table below) shows that no subgroup contains a majority that believes that relations with the Arabs are currently good. In fact, the most common response in all of them (with the exception of the Haredi group) was “so-so.” The Haredi and the religious respondents tend to express a more negative assessment of the relationship than the two subgroups of traditional and secular respondents. Contrary to expectations, segmentation by political camp revealed no large differences. However, when we broke down the responses by age group, we found that younger Jewish respondents’ assessment of relations between the two populations was more negative than that of those who were middle-aged or older.

Table 4.1 / Assessment of current relations between Jews and Arabs (Jews, by religiosity, political camp, and age, %)

	Current relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are bad	Current relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are so-so	Current relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are good
Religiosity			
Haredi	45	36	17
Religious	39	43	13
Traditional religious	28	46	23
Traditional non-religious	28	56	14
Secular	29	55	15
Political camp			
Right	34	47	15
Center	28	54	17
Left	29	53	18
Age			
18–34	39	46	13.5
35–54	31	51	15
55+	25	55	19

We also found an interesting difference between Jewish respondents who defined their primary identity as Israeli and those who defined their primary identity as Jewish. While the former tended toward the assessment “so-so,” the latter were more scattered toward either end, both positive and negative.

Table 4.2 / Assessment of current relations between Jews and Arabs (Jews, by primary identity, %)

Primary identity	Current relations are good	Current relations are so-so	Current relations are bad
Jewish	20.5	44.5	33
Israeli	13	59	26

While we found no large differences on this question in the Arab sample, when we broke down the data by religion, the variable of education turned out to be clearly influential. Higher percentages of respondents with an academic education said that relations between Jewish and Arab citizens are bad (34%), as compared with respondents who had lower levels of formal education (full secondary or post-secondary education—26%; less than full secondary education—23%). This pattern is consistent with the findings presented in earlier chapters, where we found that the higher the level of education, the stronger the negative feelings, such as the sense of not belonging to the state. Some difference was also found between those with first-degree relatives living in the West Bank or Gaza (37% believed that relations were bad) and those without (26%). We also found large differences in the Arab sample in the way primary identity groups defined relations with the Jews: Those who defined their primary identity as Israeli were the most positive, while those who defined their primary identity as Palestinian were the most negative.


Table 4.3 / Assessment of current relations between Jews and Arabs (Arabs, by primary identity, %)

Primary identity	Current relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are good	Current relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are so-so	Current relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are bad
Israeli	40	40	21
Religion (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	31	43	26
Arab	29	42	28
Palestinian	23	43.5	33

Regarding the comparison between relations in the present and the past, we found a highly unusual phenomenon in the Jewish sample. An exceptionally high percentage of respondents—approximately 20%—chose to respond “I don’t know” when making this comparison perhaps because, as stated earlier, most of them did not experience the state’s early years, so they feel that they cannot respond. Among those who did respond to the question, there is no clear majority opinion. Approximately one-third believe that current relations are better than they were in the early years of the state, somewhat fewer believe that relations have deteriorated, and roughly one-fifth believe that the situation has not changed. Segmentation by political camp shows a similar pattern, although among those who define themselves as left-wing, the percentage who believe that relations between Jews and Arabs are better today than in

the past (38%) is higher than that among those who define themselves as centrist (33%) or right-wing (26%). Moreover, this is the most commonly-held view on the Left, while the most commonly-held view on the Right is that relations today are worse than in the past. Incidentally, the percentage of those on the Left who said that they don't know (14%) is also the lowest (among those in the Center, it was 19%, and 21% among those on the Right).

Figure 4.2 / How do these relations compare with the relations that existed between Jewish and Arab citizens during the state's early years? (Jews and Arabs, %)



The positions of the Arab sample on this question were more unequivocal and more negative. While approximately one-quarter of the respondents thought that relations had not changed significantly, and another quarter said that relations had improved, the highest percentage—almost half—believed that relations today are worse than they were during the early years after the state was established, even though this was a time when Arabs lived under martial law, a status that imposed restrictions on movement and employment, as well as close surveillance by the security agencies in all areas of life. This stance signals that Arab respondents feel so badly about the present that the current situation seems even worse to them than the past, which was quite bleak indeed.

Breaking down the Arab sample's responses by religion shows a similar pattern, though the percentage of those who said that relations today were worse than in the past was highest among the Muslims (50%), as compared with the Christians (47%) and the Druze (40%). Segmentation by primary identity shows that the percentage of respondents who said that current relations were better than in the past was lowest among those who defined their primary identity as Israeli (37.5%) as compared with those who defined it as Arab (50%) and those who defined it as Palestinian or their religion (49%).

Thus, the Jews, more so than the Arabs, assess the current state of relations in Israel between the Jews and the Arabs as negative, but are slightly more positive when asked about the historical trend. On the other hand, the Arabs are slightly more optimistic regarding the current state of relations, but more pessimistic regarding progress since the state's early years.

It is important to note that in both the Jewish and Arab samples, we found a high correlation between the responses to both questions. In other words, those who felt that current relations between Jews and Arabs are good tended to state that there had been an improvement in this regard since the state's early years, while those who felt that current relations are bad also tended to say that the situation had deteriorated. Thus, among the Jewish respondents who said that current relations are good, a plurality said that they are better than in the past (44%), while a plurality of those who defined current relations as bad said that they are worse (40%). This also holds true for Arab respondents: The largest share of those who defined current relations as good said that they are better than in the past (40%), while those who defined current relations as bad said that they are worse than in the past (62.5%). This shows that when people are asked to assess the social situation in the past, they rely to a large extent upon their perception of reality in the present—in other words, most people have trouble separating between the two assessments.

At this stage, we asked ourselves what made the Arabs feel so negatively about their relations with the Jewish population. We decided to examine this with a question about hiring and academic admissions procedures.


We found that the Arab respondents perceive workplaces and educational institutions as places where considerations of nationality play an important role, and not to their benefit. We asked them how much they agreed with the following statement: "Even if Arab candidates are more suitable for studies or work, Jews are always accepted first." A clear majority of the Arab respondents agreed (complete agreement!) with this statement, while only a small minority rejected it. An examination of the findings by subgroup shows that this sense of discrimination in the areas of work and education is shared by the Arab population as a whole, and the differences among the groups are negligible.

**Discrimination
against Arabs
in hiring and
academic
admissions**

Questions 28, 29

p. 179

Figure 4.3 / “Even if Arab candidates are more suitable for studies or work, Jews are always accepted first” (Arabs, %)




There is no denying that these feelings on the part of the Arabs have a basis in reality. Various studies show that despite the existing legislation that prohibits discrimination, Arab candidates' chances of being hired are lower than those of Jewish candidates, even when their experience and skills are identical or even superior.⁵⁰ When push comes to shove, Jewish employers or managers prefer to hire Jewish candidates.

In order to find out whether the Jewish side sees such discrimination as justified, we asked our Jewish respondents to give their views on the following statement: “In Israel, jobs should be given to Jews first of all, and only then to Arabs.” While the majority (60%) disagreed with this discriminatory statement, slightly more than one-third still favored giving preferential treatment in hiring to Jews.

Where, then, is the higher support for giving Jews preferential treatment concentrated? As the figure below shows, a breakdown of the Jewish sample shows differences across all the background variables: Women, more than men, are willing to legitimize discrimination in employment and education; Haredi and religious respondents more than traditional and secular ones; those on the Right more than those in the Center or on the Left; and younger people more than older people. In breaking down the data by income and education, we found greater support for giving Jews preferential treatment among the less wealthy and less educated groups. Ethnic origin was also found to be associated with the willingness to discriminate against Arabs: Those who defined themselves as Sephardi or Mizrahi had a markedly greater tendency to support discrimination against Arabs in hiring.

⁵⁰ On this issue, see, for example, Talia Steiner, *Combating Discrimination against Arabs in the Workforce*, Policy Paper No. 97 (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2013) (Hebrew).

Figure 4.4 / “In Israel, jobs should be given to Jews first, and only then to Arabs” (strongly agree and somewhat agree, Jews, by background group, %)



**Shared
workplaces**

Questions 48, 49
pp. 190, 191

What happens in the workplace itself?


The workplace is where adults usually spend most hours of the day. Previous studies have already shown how workplaces reproduce the various hierarchies, reward systems, and relationships among national majority and minority groups, and have also shown that this discrimination has important ramifications beyond the workplace. Workplaces are often major sites for intensive inter-group encounters, and thus they are an effective “laboratory” for investigating actual relationships between groups of all kinds.⁵¹

Our first question was informational: “Do you work, or have you ever worked, in a place with both Jewish and Arab employees?” A very high percentage of the respondents replied in the affirmative (Jews—69%; Arabs—74%). This means that whether Jews receive preferential treatment in hiring or not, a substantial portion of both populations are employed in the same workplaces.

We then asked those who said that they had worked, or were working, in a shared workplace how they would define relations between the Jewish and Arab employees there. A large majority in both samples said that relations were very good or quite good. The positive impression in the Arab sample is even greater than in the Jewish sample.

51 See, for example, Israel Katz, Carlos Szyglic, Jabber Asakla, Rolly Rosen, Yuval Piurko, Marzouk Halabi, Gabi Neiman, Michael Sternberg, and Shahira Shalabi, “A Dialogue between Jews and Arabs in the Workplace: Who Benefits, Why Is It Important, and How Do We Start?” *Shatil*, November 12, 2013 (Hebrew); Alexandra Kalev, Hana Kupfer, Yafit Alfarandari, and Ayala Ginat, *Diversity Index: Ranking and Mapping the Representation and Pay of Disadvantaged Groups in the Israeli Private Sector* (Equal Opportunities Commission and Central Bureau of Statistics, December 2016) (Hebrew); “Race at Work 2015: Executive Summary,” *Business in the Community*, November 5, 2015.

Figure 4.5 / How would you define relations between Jewish and Arab employees in the workplace? (Jews and Arabs who reported working in a mixed workplace, %)



For Jewish respondents, the experience of working in a mixed workplace was found to be associated with their opinion about preferential treatment of Jews in hiring. Only 20% of those who described relations between Jewish and Arab workers in their workplace as very good and 31% of those who described them as quite good supported the preferential hiring of Jews. On the other hand, 74% of those who said that relations in their workplace were not so good and 87.5% of those who said that relations were not good at all supported preferential hiring of Jews. It turns out, once again, that the experience of day-to-day encounters affects general views toward members of the other nationality.

When we compared the assessments of relations at the state level between Jews and Arabs with these assessments at the level of the workplace, we found a correlation between them. Of the Jewish respondents who described relations between both nationalities in their workplaces as bad, 42% described relations between Jews and Arabs at the state level in the same way (in contrast with only 29% of those who described relations in their workplace as good). For Arab respondents as well, workplace relations have a positive effect on their feelings about relations between the two peoples at the state level: Only 25.5% of those who described their workplace relations as good described relations at the state level as bad, compared with 50% of those who described relations in their workplace as bad.


Do good relations in the workplace extend to other spaces as well?

Entering Jewish and Arab localities

Questions 40, 41
pp. 185, 186

We examined each population's attitude toward entering the other's cities, towns, and villages. We gave them the following statement: "I try to avoid entering Jewish/Arab localities in Israeli territory." Most of the Jewish sample responded that they indeed try not to go into Arab localities, as compared with only a tiny minority of Arabs who reported that they avoided entering Jewish localities. Unlike the "mixed" workplace, then, it appears that large portions of the Jewish population regard the Arab living space as threatening, either due to fear of a nationalistically-motivated attack or to the frequent reports in the media about the high crime rate in the Arab sector. On the other hand, Arabs perceive the Jewish living space as not all that threatening. However, it is certainly possible that the differences in the preferences of both populations may stem not only from the level of fear but also from the degree of necessity of going "there"—the necessity for Arabs to enter Jewish localities for work or commerce or to receive services from the state is far greater than for Jews to enter Arab areas.

Figure 4.6 / "I try to avoid entering Arab/Jewish localities" (Jews and Arabs, %)




Since the large majority of the Arab respondents (84%) said that they did not avoid entering Jewish localities, there was no reason to analyze this question by subgroups.

A breakdown of the Jewish sample, on the other hand, yielded intriguing differences between the subgroups. Women more than men reported that they tried to avoid going into Arab localities. Almost all the Haredi and religious respondents avoid doing so, as opposed to only half of the secular and traditional non-religious respondents. Those on the Right avoid entering Arab localities more than those in the Center or on the Left. This last finding leads us to hypothesize that Jewish respondents' preference to avoid entering Arab localities is not only driven by personal emotion (such as fear), but has a political basis as well. For example, after the violent incidents between Jews and Arabs within the boundaries of the Green Line in October 2000, most of the Jewish population avoided entering Arab localities in what both sides perceived as a financially punitive measure against the Arab population.⁵²

A breakdown of the data by ethnic self-definition yielded no significant differences. The fact that most of the Mizrahi respondents have roots in Arabic-speaking countries and share certain cultural similarities with Arabs does not help them feel at home in Arab localities. On the other hand, knowledge of the Arabic language is statistically correlated with a greater willingness to enter Arab localities, although this link is not all that strong. Fewer than half (42%) of those who are able to hold a fluent conversation in Arabic avoid entering Arab localities in Israeli territory, as opposed to slightly more than half (53%) of those who are able to hold a halting conversation in Arabic, and a clear majority (61%) of those who do not speak Arabic at all. Finally, those who chose "Jewish" as their primary identity reported that they avoid entering Arab localities more than those who chose "Israeli" as their primary identity.


52 Nir Yahav, "A Decade Since the October Incidents: The Jewish Boycott," *Walla News*, October 1, 2010 (Hebrew).

Figure 4.7 / “I try to avoid entering Arab localities” (strongly agree or somewhat agree, Jews, by subgroup, %)



After examining respondents' feelings about being in the space belonging to the "other," we wanted to find out whether the fact that the majority of the Arab respondents said they did not avoid entering Jewish areas meant that they felt at home there. We therefore asked them whether they feel free to speak Arabic when in a public place in a Jewish environment. As the figure below shows, a large majority responded in the affirmative. No large differences in this question were found among subgroups, with the exception of segmentation by religion. Christians feel more comfortable speaking Arabic in a Jewish public environment than do Muslims and Druze. Only 15.5% of Christians are worried by the prospect, as compared with 27% of Druze and 32% of Muslims.

Figure 4.8 / Do you feel free to speak Arabic when you are in a public place in a Jewish environment? (Arabs, %)



Freedom of expression in a democracy is measured not only by the government allowing citizens to publicly express their opinions and the existence of free media outlets, but also by the extent to which citizens feel they can express their views without fear of social sanction. Accordingly, we asked all the respondents whether they agreed with the following statement: "I prefer to keep silent and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know."

While a fairly small majority of the Jewish sample said that they do not remain silent, a fairly large minority said that they avoid expressing opinions on political issues in front of strangers. Segmentation by political camp reveals that the share of those who prefer not to express themselves politically in the presence of strangers is larger among participants in the Center (48%) than on the Right (40%) or the Left (42%). Education plays an interesting role here: Those with a lower level of formal education are less reticent about expressing a political opinion to strangers than those with a higher education level (respondents who prefer to stay silent: less than full secondary education—34%; full secondary education—42%; academic education—47%).

Holding a conversation in Arabic in a Jewish environment

Question 21
p. 175


Expressing political opinions in the presence of strangers

Question 24
p. 177

Unlike the Jewish sample, a majority of the Arab sample indicated that they prefer to keep quiet in such circumstances. An analysis of the responses did not find noticeable differences on this issue between the subgroups of the Arab population.

In any case, there has been some increase among both populations in the percentage of respondents who avoid expressing their political views in front of strangers as compared with the previous index in 2016.⁵³ There was a moderate increase of approximately 5% (close to the sampling error size) in the Jewish sample, while there was a higher increase—approximately 12%—in the Arab sample. While we do not yet have sufficient data to state whether this is a consistent trend of deteriorating confidence among Israel's citizens to express their political opinions, it is possible that the increased vitriol in Israeli public discourse has also had an effect on this aspect of free expression.

Figure 4.9 / “I prefer to keep silent and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don’t know” (strongly agree and somewhat agree, Jews and Arabs, by year, %)



53 Hermann et al., *The 2016 Israeli Democracy Index*, 150.


Next, we investigated what both populations think of one another, or how they visualize one another.

Stereotyping is the attribution of certain characteristics to entire social groups. While stereotypes usually have at least some basis in reality, they also exaggerate characteristics and apply them to all members of the group without distinction. Although there is some hesitation about addressing stereotypes (in research or otherwise) in this age of political correctness, anyone who deals with political culture and social dynamics knows that stereotypes determine groups' attitudes toward one another to a large extent.

In the next series of questions, we wanted to examine six stereotypes held by Jews about Arabs and by Arabs about Jews. Our goal was to examine the extent to which each group feels that the members of the other group are violent, modern, attach great importance to human life, honest, generous, and distance themselves from outsiders.

The findings show that Arab respondents' perception of Jews is equally or more positive than Jewish respondents' perception of Arabs across all parameters, except for the parameter of distancing themselves from outsiders. Here, the percentage of Arabs who believe that Jews tend to distance themselves from non-Jews was higher than the percentage of Jews who believe that Arabs tend to distance themselves from non-Arabs.

Figure 4.10 / Are the following characteristics regarding Arabs or Jews in Israel accurate or not? (fairly accurate and very accurate, Jews and Arabs, %)



Stereotypes of Jews and Arabs

Question 12
pp. 170, 171

As the graph shows, in both groups approximately half the sample thinks that the other group is violent. But mutual perceptions regarding whether each group greatly values human life are very different. Only about one-quarter (!) of the Jewish respondents believes that the Arabs attribute great importance to human life, while two-thirds of the Arab respondents think this way about the Jews.

An overwhelming majority (82%) of the Arab respondents sees Jews as modern (incidentally, modernity is not necessarily viewed as a positive trait in conservative societies if it is accompanied by excessive permissiveness, for example), as compared with a minority (39%) of Jewish respondents who define Arabs as such (most segments of the non-Haredi Jewish population see modernity as a positive trait).

Regarding honesty—the Israeli-Jewish ethos makes much of the supposed cunning and lack of honesty of the “Arab,” and indeed only one-quarter of the Jewish respondents believe that the Arabs are honest. This rate is doubled in the opposite direction. This means that most Jews do not trust Arabs’ honesty, but to a certain extent, approximately half of Arabs also have their own doubts as to the honesty of Jews.

As for the trait of generosity, slightly fewer than half of the Arab respondents and roughly the same percentage of Jewish respondents think that the members of the other group are generous. Finally, regarding insularity or the tendency to distance themselves from outsiders: As we noted above, the percentage of Arabs who believe that Jews are not accepting of those who are not “one of them” is clearly higher than the percentage of Jews who believe this to be true of Arabs.

We looked at whether there are real differences in the perception of the other among subgroups within each sample, both Jewish and Arab.

As the table below shows, a breakdown of the data by religiosity reveals that as a rule, Haredi respondents attribute more negative stereotypes to Arabs than do the other subgroups, while the secular respondents expressed less negative views. Respondents who defined themselves primarily as Jewish tended to attribute negative characteristics to Arabs more than those who defined themselves primarily as Israeli.

Table 4.4 / Perceived characteristics of Arabs (fairly accurate and very accurate, Jews, by religiosity, %)

Arabs:	Haredi	Religious	Traditional religious	Traditional non-religious	Secular
Are violent	87	62	50	54	40
Are not modern	59	37	45	67	51
Do not attribute great importance to human life	89	71	68	78	55.5
Are dishonest	85	63	67	68	49
Are not generous	62	44	44	50	26
Distance themselves from non-Arabs	46	43	40	45	35

As expected, segmentation by political camp revealed substantial differences.

Table 4.5 / Perceived characteristics of Arabs (fairly accurate and very accurate, Jews, by political camp, %)

Arabs:	Right	Center	Left
Are violent	64	36	31
Are not modern	56	50	48
Do not attribute great importance to human life	80	58	34
Are dishonest	72.5	52	28
Are not generous	52.5	20	16
Distance themselves from non-Arabs	48	34	20

A breakdown of the Jewish sample by ethnic group showed that Mizrahi and Sephardi respondents tended to attribute negative characteristics to Arabs more than did Ashkenazi respondents, but the differences were not all that large. The differences between the Mizrahi, Sephardi, and Ashkenazi respondents were salient only on the question about whether Arabs value human life: 57% of Ashkenazi respondents said that Arabs do not attach great importance to human life, as compared with 72% of Mizrahi respondents and 82% of Sephardi respondents.

A breakdown of the Arab sample found much smaller differences between the subgroups as compared with the Jewish sample, except for the differences by religion. This breakdown showed that more Muslim respondents attribute violence to Jews than do Druze or Christians. The proportion of respondents who said that Jews are not generous was highest among the Christians, while the proportion of those who said that Jews distance themselves from non-Jews was lowest among the Druze.

Table 4.6 / Perceived characteristics of Jews (fairly accurate and very accurate, Arabs, by religion, %)

Jews:	Muslims	Christians	Druze
Are violent	54	43	36
Are not modern	14	10	14.5
Do not attribute great importance to human life	34	31	27
Are dishonest	42	43	44
Are not generous	46	64	49
Distance themselves from non-Jews	51	50	42

Segmentation by report of relatives living in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip did not reveal large differences between the groups except on the question about whether Jews were violent. Among those who have relatives living in the territories, 63% said that Jews are violent, as compared with 49% of those who do not.

When responses were analyzed by self-defined primary identity, large differences were found on the questions about Jews' insularity and violence: Those who defined themselves primarily as Israeli consistently had more positive views of Jews, while those who defined themselves primarily as Palestinian were more negative.

Table 4.7 / Perceived characteristics of Jews (Arabs, by primary identity, %)

Primary identity	Think that Jews distance themselves from non-Jews	Think that Jews are violent
Israeli	37.5	21
Religion (Muslim, Christian, Druze)	48	48.5
Arab	48.5	57
Palestinian	61	58

When we cross-referenced the responses to the earlier question about whether Jews were willing to enter Arab localities with views of Arabs as violent, we found a close link between the two. Of those who see Arabs as a violent group, 69% avoid entering Arab localities, as compared with 44% of those who do not believe that Arabs are violent.

On the Arab side, we wanted to examine whether there is a link between the perception of Jews as violent and the degree of willingness to speak Arabic in public places in Jewish environments. We found that among those who think that Jews are violent, 38% are afraid to speak Arabic in a Jewish environment, compared with only 19% who believe that Jews are not violent.

There is much discussion today of virtual communities. There was some expectation that the advent of the Internet would abolish borders and limitations on connections between people. But current studies of social media show that users create a “bubble” of friends who are similar to them in terms of interests, opinions, and social characteristics, and thus the information and views that most users encounter online match the ones that are expressed in their own specific “echo chamber.” To put it another way, despite the previously widespread notion that social networks would expose users to a wide range of views, it is now fairly clear that they do not do so when it comes to routine matters. We therefore chose to investigate the extent to which Internet users are exposed to their counterparts on the “other side”—Jews to Arabs and vice versa (and we have already learned that language is a considerable barrier for Jews, who generally do not speak Arabic).

Thus, we asked Jewish respondents whether they had Arab friends on Facebook, and Arab respondents whether they had Jewish friends on Facebook (provided they were already on Facebook, of course). Slightly less than one-third of the respondents in both samples said that they do not use Facebook, but only a very small share said that they had many Facebook friends who belonged to the other group. We also found that Arab users have more exposure to Jewish


Jewish and Arab friends on Facebook

Question 33

pp. 181, 182

users than vice versa. One-fifth of Arab respondents said that they have no Jewish friends at all on Facebook, as compared with more than one-third of Jews who said they have no Arab friends. As we have already stated, minority groups have more exposure to majority groups, but it is interesting that this pattern is replicated in the virtual world as well, where (supposedly) there are “no borders.”

Figure 4.11 / Do you have Arab/Jewish friends on Facebook? (Jews and Arabs, %)



We found a significant connection in the Jewish sample between Facebook friendship with Arabs and religiosity. The proportion of Jewish respondents who said they have Arab friends on Facebook was very small among the Haredi group (4%), 13% among the religious group, and 22% among the traditional religious group, as compared with a much larger minority of the traditional non-religious (39%) and secular respondents (44%). Segmentation by political camp showed that right-wing Jews have the lowest rate of Facebook friendship with Arabs, though it is not insignificant (26%), as compared with higher rates among those who placed themselves in the Center (43%) or on the Left (39%). In a breakdown by age group, a higher percentage of younger respondents, who in general hold less conciliatory views regarding the Arab minority, reported that they have Arab friends on Facebook (more than 40% among those aged 18 to

34, as compared with 23% among those aged 55 and over). Part of the explanation for these percentages is, of course, the fact that young people use Facebook more than do older people.

Among Jewish respondents who described Jewish-Arab relations as “bad,” we found a much higher percentage who reported that they had no Arab Facebook friends at all (44%), compared with those who thought that relations were “so-so” (32%) or “good” (27%).

Knowledge of Arabic was also found to be somewhat linked to friendship with Arabs on Facebook, although the numbers are still rather small. Of the Jewish respondents who reported being able to hold a fluent conversation in Arabic, a relatively high percentage said that they had many Arab Facebook friends (19%, versus only 5% of the Jewish sample as a whole).


We found a large difference by sex in the Arab sample: 57% of the men said that they had Jewish friends on Facebook, as compared with only 36% of the women, most of whom had no Jewish Facebook friends at all. This difference may be explained by social norms, but also by the fact that Arab men have more contact with Jews than do Arab women, for example, in the workplace (and evidently also on Facebook).

Analysis of the findings by religion showed that most of the Druze respondents (62%) have Jewish friends on Facebook, perhaps from their military service, as compared with a minority of Muslims (46%) and Christians (38%). We also found that in the Arab sample, younger people have more Jewish friends on Facebook than the other, older age groups do, although—as we suggested before—this finding also results from the fact that social network usage rates are far lower among older people. Academic education also has a large impact on online connections with Jews. Two-thirds of the Arab respondents with an academic education have Jewish Facebook friends, as compared with approximately half of those who have a secondary education and less than one-third of those with a lower level of education. Analysis by level of religious observance shows that only a minority of the Arab respondents who defined themselves as religious (22.5%) have Jewish Facebook friends, as compared with a majority of the traditional (59%) and non-religious respondents (56%). Knowledge of Hebrew turned out to be a decisive variable for contact with Jews on Facebook: 59% of those who said that they can hold a fluent conversation in Hebrew had Jewish friends on Facebook, as compared with 23% of those who can hold a basic conversation, and none of those who are unable to speak Hebrew at all.

In sum, we found much larger internal differences in the Arab sample than in the Jewish sample in terms of the level of exposure to members of the other group in social networks.

Part 2

A Statistical Perspective on the Lives of Jews and Arabs in Israel



Statistical Data Set: Goals and Structure

The statistical data that appear below were collected with two main goals in mind. The first is to provide an overview of the situation of the Arab population in Israel in various spheres. Most of the data are taken either from official sources or from recognized and reliable non-establishment sources, and they are presented here after processing—in other words, not necessarily exactly as they appear in the original. There are many areas worthy of attention, but we chose to concentrate on those that we feel are the most critical for understanding the overall life circumstances of the Jewish and Arab populations in Israel. Furthermore, in cases where data were available, we chose to present statistics not only for the Arab population as a whole but also to provide breakdowns into subgroups, as we did in the first part of the report. Dividing the sample into subgroups makes it clear that this is a population with real differences among its composite parts across a great many parameters, which may explain, among other things, the differences in opinions and attitudes presented in the first part of this report.

The second goal of this data set is to provide a factual basis for the ongoing public debate over the situation and relative status of Israel's Arab citizens as compared with their Jewish counterparts. As can be seen from the numbers below, overall the Arab population lives in conditions that are far inferior to those of the Jewish population, and is marked by the typical characteristics of marginalization in major areas of life such as income, education, health, and geographic distribution. The data below also show a completely disproportionate allocation of the state's resources to the majority group in major areas, such as education. The large gaps in almost every one of the areas we examined do much to explain the deep sense of neglect that is prevalent in the Arab population, and among subgroups in the Jewish population for whom the principle of democratic equality is of cardinal importance.

The topics on which we chose to present data are as follows:

1. Population
2. Geography
3. Family
4. Age
5. Income
6. Education
7. Religiosity
8. Health
9. Employment
10. Political participation

11. Local authorities
12. Consumption
13. Internet and social media use
14. Crime
15. Cultural and leisure activities


Population

1. Total Population and Arab Population of Israel, 2016 (absolute number and percent)

Total population		Arab population	
Number	%	Number	%
8,546,000	100	1,777,500	21

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 2.1.

2. Arab Population of Israel, 2016 (by religion, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 2.19.

Geography

1. Residential District, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (%)

	Jews	Arabs
South	14.5	14
Haifa	11	14
Judea and Samaria	6	0
Jerusalem	11	19
Center	28	10
North	9.5	42
Tel Aviv	20	1
Total	100	100

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 2.19.

2. Residential District, Arabs, 2016 (by religion, %)

	Muslims	Christians	Druze
South	16	0	0
Haifa	14	13	19
Jerusalem	22	10	0
Center	11	3	0
North	36	71	81
Tel Aviv	1	3	0
Total	100	100	100

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 2.19

3. Distribution of Ownership of State Lands, Jews and Arabs, 2013 (%)

Jews	Arabs
96.5	3.5


Source: Yitzhak Reiter, "The Land Issue," in *Information Dossier on Arab Society in Israel*, Abraham Fund Initiatives, 2013.

4. Distribution of Industrial Zones in Israel, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (%)

Jews	Arabs
96.5	3.5

Source: Mossawa Center, *Industrial Zones in Arab Communities* (policy paper), 2016.

5. Satisfaction with Accessibility to Public Transport, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *2015 Social Survey*.

Family

1. Average Family Size, Jews and Arabs, 2016

	Jews	Arabs
Average number of persons	3.5	4.5

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 5.9.

2. Average Family Size, Arabs, 2015 (by religion)

	Muslims	Christians	Druze
Average number of persons	4.8	3.1	4.1

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, "Press Release: The Druze Population in Israel—A Collection of Statistics on the Occasion of the Nabi Shu'ayb Festival," April 20, 2016.

3. Fertility, Jews and Arabs, 2015

	Jews	Arabs
Average number of children per woman	3.11	3.13

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2016*, Table 3.11.

4. Average Age at First Marriage, Jews and Arabs, 2014 (by religion)

	Jews	Muslims	Christians	Druze
Women	29	26.5	28.6	28.2
Men	31.3	31.4	32.9	34

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2016*, Table 3.6.

5. Average Number of People per Household, Jews and Arabs, 2017

Total population	Jews	Arabs
3.36	3.12	4.91

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, "Population, Households, and Families 2017," Press Release, February 21, 2017.


6. Average Number of Rooms per Person per Household, Jews and Arabs, 2014

Jews	Arabs
1.22	0.74

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, "Economic Characteristics and Housing Density," *2014 Labor Force Survey*, Table 4.


Age

1. Age Distribution, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 2.3.

2. Age Distribution, Arabs, 2016 (by religion, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 2.19.

Income

1. Average Monthly Income, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (net, NIS)

	Jews	Arabs
Per-capita income	5,314	2,115
Per-household income	16,539	9,694


Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Household Expenditures Survey 2015*, Table 7.

2. Average Monthly Income, Jews and Arabs, 2014 (by sex, gross, NIS)

Jews		Arabs	
Men	Women	Men	Women
11,985	7,663	7,190	5,271


Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Household Expenditures Survey 2014*, Table 11.

3. Per Capita Income, Arabs, 2015 (by religion, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *2015 Social Survey*.

4. Per Capita Income, Arabs, 2015 (by education, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Social Survey 2015*.


5. Poverty Rates for Families, Individuals, Children, and the Elderly, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)

Jews				Arabs			
Families	Individuals	Children	Elderly	Families	Individuals	Children	Elderly
14	14	20	15	53	55	66	52

Source: National Insurance Institute, *Poverty and Social Gaps Report, 2015*.


Education

1. Education: Highest Qualification Earned, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

2. Education: Highest Qualification Earned, Arabs, 2015 (by religion, %)



■ Elementary / secondary without full matriculation

■ Full matriculation / post-secondary

■ Academic degree

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

3. Students, Jews and Arabs, 2013–2014 School Year (%)

	Total	Jews	Arabs
Bachelor's degree studies	100 (197,818)	86.5	13.5
Master's degree studies	100 (54,738)	90	10
Doctoral studies	100 (10,719)	95	5

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2016, Table 8.56.

4. Average Budget per Student, Jews and Arabs, 2013–2014 School Year (by school level, NIS)

	Elementary	Middle	High
Jews	14,715	18,303	24,344
Arabs	15,373	16,597	18,667

Assaf Wininger, "Data on Ministry of Education Budget Allocations to Schools by Sector," Knesset Research and Information Center, 2015.

5. School Dropout Rate, Jews and Arabs, 2013–2014 School Year (by grade, %)

	Grades 1–6	Grades 7–9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Jews	0.6	1.7	2.4	5.4	1.4
Arabs	0.2	3.8	4.3	3.7	1.5


Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Society in Israel* 8, 2016.

6. School Dropout Rate, Arabs, 2013–2014 School Year (by subgroup and grade, %)

	Grades 1–6	Grades 7–9	Grade 10	Grade 11	Grade 12
Bedouin	0.4	5.5	6.2	5.3	1.6
Druze and Circassian	0.1	2.3	4.8	3.2	0.6
Arabs (non-Bedouin)	0.2	3.5	3.8	3.3	1.6


Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Society in Israel* 8, 2016.

7. Meitzav Standardized Test Scores for Fifth-Graders, Jews and Arabs, 2006/07 to 2015/16 School Years



Source: Ministry of Education—The National Authority for Measurement and Evaluation in Education, *Meitzav Standardized Tests, 2016: Main Findings, 2016*.

8. Meitzav Standardized Test Scores for Eighth-Graders, Jews and Arabs, 2006/07 to 2015/16 School Years



Source: Ministry of Education—The National Authority for Measurement and Evaluation in Education, *Meitzav Standardized Tests, 2016: Main Findings, November 15, 2016*.



9. Average Number of Students per Classroom, Jews and Arabs, 2015–2016 School Year (by school level)

	Elementary	Middle	High
Jews	26.3	29.8	26
Arabs	27.1	29.4	27.1

Assaf Wininger, "Average Number of Students per Classroom in the Education System," Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016.

Religiosity (Self-Defined)

1. Religiosity, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (%)





Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *2016 Social Survey*.

2. Religiosity, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (by sex, %)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016 Social Survey.

3. Religiosity, Jews and Arabs, 2014 (by age, %)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2014 Social Survey.

4. Religiosity, Arabs, 2015 (by religion, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.


5. Religiosity, Arabs, 2015 (by education, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.


Health

1. Average Life Expectancy, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (by sex)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2016*, Table 3.24.

2. Infant Mortality, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (per 1,000 live births)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 3.2.

3. Definition of Health Condition as “Not Good,” Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

Employment

1. Workforce for Ages 25–54, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)

	Employed	Unemployed
Jews	84	16
Arabs	56	44

Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2016*, Table 12.1.

2. Workforce for Ages 25–54, Arabs, 2015 (by sex, %)

	Employed	Unemployed
Men	78	22
Women	34	66


Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2017*, Table 3.2.

3. Arabs as Percentage of Civil Service Employees, 2007–2015 (by sex, %)

	Proportion of Civil Service Arab Employees	Of Which: Men	Of Which: Women
2007	6.17	65	35
2008	6.67	63	37
2009	6.97	62	38
2010	7.52	62	38
2011	7.78	62	38
2012	8.37	61	39
2014	9.27	61	38
2015	9.71	61	39

Source: Civil Service Commissioner, Senior Strategic Planning and Policy Department, "Appropriate Representation in the Civil Service for Members of the Arab Population, Including Druze and Circassians," 2015 Annual Report, 2016.

4. Salaried Employees Versus Self-Employed, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

Political Participation

1. Voter Turnout in Knesset Elections, Arabs versus Total Population, Selected Years (%)


	Arabs	Total Population
1949	69	87
1951	85.5	75
1955	91	83
1996	79	77
1999	75	79
2003	62	68
2006	56	63.5
2009	54	65
2013	57	68
2015	62	72

Sources:

For 1949–2013: Amtanas Shahada, "Voting as an Expression of Collective Interest: Arab Voters in the 2013 Elections." In *The Elections in Israel 2013*, Michal Shamir ed., (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2015, Hebrew), 225–254.

For 2015: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 2016*, Table 10.4.

2. Voter Turnout in Local Elections, Jews and Arabs, Selected Years (%)




Sources:

For 1978–2008: Avi Ben-Bassat, Momi Dahan, and Esteban Klor, *Representativeness and Efficiency in Local Government* (Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute, 2013, Hebrew).

For 2013: Nir Atmor, “Participation in Local Elections: Findings and Conclusions” (processing of data from the Ministry of Justice, 2013), *Parliament 77* (2013), The Israel Democracy Institute website.

Local Authorities

1. Jewish and Arab Local Authorities by Socioeconomic Cluster, 2013 (absolute numbers)



Source: Processing of data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, *Socioeconomic Index of the Local Authorities, 2013*, Table 1.

(Note: 1 is the lowest socioeconomic cluster, and 10 is the highest.)


Consumption

1. Apartment Ownership or Rental, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)

Jews		Arabs	
Own	Rent	Own	Rent
74	26	89	11

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

2. Vehicle Ownership, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (by number of vehicles per household, %)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

3. Vehicle Ownership, Arabs, 2015 (by number of cars per household and by religion, %)

Number of vehicles per household	Muslims	Christians	Druze
0	47	25	29.4
1	41	54	55
2	10	18	No data available
3+	3	No data available	No data available


Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

4. Households Owning Computers, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.


5. Households Owning Computers, Arabs, 2015 (by religion, %)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *2015 Social Survey*.


Internet and Social Media Use

1. Used the Internet in the Past Three Months Using a Computer or Mobile Phone, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

2. Frequency of Internet Use, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

3. Used Social Media in the Past Three Months, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (by age, %)


Age	Jews		Arabs	
	Of those who have used the Internet in the past three months	As proportion of total population	Of those who have used the Internet in the past three months	As proportion of total population
20–44	89	80.5	91.5	70.5
45–64	81	66	83	32
Total (20–64)	84	67.5	90	60

Note: Since no data exist for older people in the Arab population (aged 65 and over), we have not presented the equivalent (existing) data for the Jewish population.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.


Crime

1. Prison Population, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (%)




Source: Noam Rotem, "Prison Service Statistics: Only Around One-Quarter of the Prisoners in Israel are Jews." *Siha Mekomit* (Local Call) *Magazine*, August 31, 2016 (Hebrew; official statistics obtained by the publication).

2. Incarcerated Minors, Jews and Arabs, 2016 (%)



Source: Noam Rotem, "Prison Service Statistics: Only Around One-Quarter of the Prisoners in Israel are Jews." *Siha Mekomit* (Local Call) *Magazine*, August 31, 2016 (Hebrew; official statistics obtained by the publication).

3. Crime Victims as Proportion of Total Population, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *2015 Personal Security Survey*, Table 1.1.


4. Murder of Women, Jews and Arabs, 2013–2015 (incidence and percent)

Arabs		Jews and Others		Total Female Murder Victims	
Incidence	Percentage of all female murder victims	Incidence	Percentage of all female murder victims	Incidence	Percentage of all female murder victims
26	36	46	64	72	100

Source: Shelly Mizrahi-Simon, "Violence against Women: Anthology of Data for 2015," Knesset Research and Information Center, 2015 (Hebrew).


Culture and Leisure

1. Vacated in Israel in the Past Twelve Months (Involving Lodging Outside the Home), Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

2. Vacated Abroad in the Past Twelve Months, Jews and Arabs, 2015 (%)



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2015 Social Survey.

3. Engagement in Physical Activity, Jews and Arabs, Aged 21 and Over, 2012 (%)



Source: Ministry of Culture and Sport and Ministry of Health, *Survey of Physical Activity among Israeli Residents Aged 21 and Over*, Publication 349, 2012 (Hebrew).

Summary / Jews and Arabs, Israel 2017—A Troubled Relationship

The existence of a large Arab minority within the State of Israel posed a challenge to the state's leadership and its Jewish society that has implications for the very essence of the state. From the moment that Israel was defined as being Jewish and democratic, it took upon itself the task of preserving two basic principles in light of the Arab minority: preserving the state's *raison d'être* as fulfilling the Jewish national vision, while also implementing the democratic principle of full equality for all citizens. In reality, a proper balance between the two principles was never achieved, and the implementation of the second principle in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel has been flawed.⁵⁴

The goal of this two-part research report is to provide an up-to-date picture of the views and perceptions of Israel's two large national populations—Jewish and Arab—about one another. Based on the survey findings, it also describes (in somewhat less depth) the reciprocal relationships between the State of Israel and these two groups—the Jewish majority, and the indigenous Arab minority. The first part of the report focused on perceptions, attitudes, and opinions, while the second part presented statistical data that we viewed as relevant. We plan to review this picture in a future report, to be published two years from now, in order to examine whether any changes have taken place, for better or worse.

In any case, we can already state with a great degree of certainty that this relationship is charged, sensitive, not necessarily consistent across the board, and completely unequal, although it does have the potential to improve, particularly if there should be positive developments in the efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The inconsistency in opinions and feelings characterizes both populations. On the Jewish side, highly undemocratic positions, such as support for denying Arab citizens the right to vote because of their views on the issue of the state's Jewishness, can be found alongside democratic ones, such as widespread support for equal allocation of national resources. This inconsistency is noticeable not only in the overall levels of support for various ideas, but also in the views of subgroups within the Jewish population, especially when broken down by political orientation and by religious self-definition.

The Arab population's views are also not entirely consistent. On the one hand, the data show a strong desire to integrate into the life of the state and into politics; on the other, large segments of the Arab population are not willing to accept the current definition of the state as the nation-

54 Shimon Shamir, "Introduction." In *The Nakba in Israel's National Memory*, Amal Jamal and Ephraim Lavie eds. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2015), 9.

state of the Jewish people. As with the Jewish population, much variation exists among the Arab population, both by religion and by self-defined identity (Arab, religious, Palestinian, or Israeli).

We concentrated on four topics in the first part of this report: the primary and secondary identities of the Jewish and Arab respondents, and the effect of those identities on the way both populations view one another (Chapter 1); attitudes toward the land and the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state through the prism of majority-minority relations (Chapter 2); the extent of willingness to involve and include the Arab population in running the affairs of the general population, and equal allocation of material and symbolic resources (Chapter 3); and the character and content of encounters between Jews and Arabs in daily life (Chapter 4).

The most important finding, in our opinion, is that the points of contact between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel take place simultaneously at three levels: national, societal, and day-to-day personal. The nature of the contact across these three levels is not uniform—not only across the levels, which is to be expected, but also within each level. We found that relations at the national level are more troubled than they are at the societal and interpersonal levels. At the same time, we found that there are also rays of light and not only areas of darkness, at the state level as well as in the other two.

Regarding identity, within the Jewish population the competition between the two leading primary identities, Israeli and Jewish, is closely linked to a number of opinions and attitudes, including on Arabs' place in the state. Thus, again and again, those who choose the self-definition "Israeli" are much more willing to include the Arab population, see its budgets increased, and have it integrate into general society. As a group, those who choose "Jewish" as their primary self-definition are much less willing to open this door, even when it comes to closing economic gaps between the Jewish and Arab populations, and even more so regarding involvement in state institutions, at any level or in any area of activity. We believe that this difference stems largely from the fact that those who choose "Israeli" as their primary identity are mostly secular people who lean politically toward the Left or the Center, while those who choose "Jewish" as their primary identity usually place themselves on the religious side of the Haredi–secular scale and on the Right politically.

Thus, the distinction between "Israeli" and "Jewish" has far-reaching implications for the civic relationship between Jews and Arabs in Israel. Those who choose "Israeli" as their primary identity are still slightly more numerous than those who choose "Jewish." But if the link between the choice of a particular identity and religiosity and the political spectrum is really as strong as the data seem to show, and since many studies indicate that the Jewish-Israeli population is becoming more religious and right-wing, there does not seem to be much chance that in the future the Jewish majority group will be more willing to entertain the idea of involvement and inclusion of the indigenous minority group.

This finding, in and of itself, tells us nothing new when we consider the findings of previous Democracy Index surveys. But here, because of the clear connection that was found between

one's chosen identity and one's views on questions of Arabs' status as citizens, this position has become clearer and sharper than in the past.

Among the Arab population, the antithetical identities—Palestinian and Israeli—were chosen as primary identities by the lowest share of respondents. The most common choices were the Arab identity or the religious one (Muslim, Christian, or Druze). The fact that most of the respondents did not choose the Palestinian identity as their primary identity is not a trivial finding, and it stands in clear contradiction of the spirit that seems to underlie the statements and writings of Arab politicians, social activists, and intellectuals. However, it is likely that this surprising response by the Arab sample stemmed from their unwillingness to “get themselves into trouble” by choosing an identity that the majority group considers threatening, or, alternatively, one that they cannot espouse openly within the minority group. Another explanation, and one that is no less likely (this issue having been checked more than once), is that this is a faithful representation of the actual views of Arabs in Israel, however displeasing a prospect this may be for certain political leaders or intellectuals, Arab and Jewish alike.

In our analysis of the responses to the various questions, we consistently found that those given by the members of the (small) “Palestinian” group and those of the (slightly smaller) “Israeli” group were diametrically opposed. The responses of those who defined themselves primarily as Israelis were found to be further apart from and more positive than those given by respondents who held the three other identities (Arab, a particular religious identity, and Palestinian). Yet of the latter three, the positions of the Palestinian identity group are the most critical of the notion of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, the state's treatment of its Arab population, and the relationship between the indigenous Arab minority and the national Jewish majority. It is also possible that the causality runs in the opposite direction, and that those who view the state's treatment of the Arab population more negatively and define relations between the minority and majority groups as more troubled tend more toward choosing the Palestinian identity as their primary identity.

We also found consistent differences between the views of the Muslim, Christian, and Druze subgroups of the Arab sample. This means that even though some may prefer to blur this difference for political reasons, it cannot be ignored that within the Arab minority there are subgroups that hold implicitly different views on the subjects we examined, and that have different desires and needs.

However, the study's findings reveal a consensus among all subgroups of the Arab population regarding the longstanding neglect that they have suffered from State of Israel. This neglect—which is clearly evident in the statistical data presented in the second part of this report; for example, in investment in education, participation in the workforce (particularly among Arab women), income from work, life expectancy, and standard of living—does not serve to reduce the Arabs' obvious desire to integrate into the life of the general population and the state, and may even strengthen it. In almost every area we examined, we found that Arab respondents

wanted to be partners in decisions at all levels and in decision-making forums that exist in the state. We found no indication of a desire for seclusion or any isolationist tendencies. On the contrary, there is a great deal of displeasure at the lack of possibilities for attaining equality in the Israeli public sphere.

But the path to integration is blocked by the Arab population's widespread denial of Israel's right to define itself as the nation-state of the Jewish people. We found—and not for the first time—that a majority of Arabs find this definition unacceptable. While there may be many ways to improve the situation regarding such issues as budget allocations, improvement of infrastructure, and greater involvement, and perhaps allay the sense of discrimination and neglect, it is difficult to conceive of a solution to the question of Israel's national character. The data do not make it possible to identify what factor might serve as a bridge between this view and the prevalent view among the Jewish population (held by approximately half of the Jewish respondents who define themselves primarily as "Israeli" and by a large majority of those who define themselves primarily as "Jewish") which advocates limiting the civil rights of those who do not recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people by denying them the right to vote.

As stated, we found that the strongest contrast in the viewpoints of the Jewish majority group and the Arab minority group exists at the state level. The Jews—including even a substantial segment of those who define themselves as left-wing (and even more so among those who define themselves as centrist or right-wing) and who are usually also far more willing to include the Arab population in the various systems of the state—are not willing, for example, to include Arabs in making crucial decisions for the state not only on foreign policy and security affairs, but also on governance and the economy. In this survey, as in previous surveys, we found that a consistent majority of Jews was not eager to include Arab parties in the government or appoint Arab ministers. Although we might have been able to attribute this attitude to the large (and evidently increasing) percentage of Jews who believe that the Arabs have not reconciled themselves with the existence of the State of Israel and may even wish for its destruction, we cannot ignore the contradiction between the declared stance of the majority of the Jewish respondents in principle—that Jewish citizens should not be given additional rights—and their opposition in practice to giving Arabs equal representation in strategic decision-making forums. The widespread unwillingness among the Jewish population to establish an official shared civic holiday, as opposed to the obvious desire of most of the Arab population for one, signals the limits of the majority group's willingness to include the (large) minority group at the state level. Similarly, a large majority of the Jewish population also rejects the feasibility of the idea that an Arab, at one and the same time, can feel part of the Palestinian people and still be a loyal Israeli citizen.

The data reveal another complex issue regarding the Arab population, which, as stated, reports being eager to participate on the political plane. The Arab respondents acknowledged—at a higher rate than did the Jewish respondents in the reverse direction—the strength of the Jewish

population's connection to the land, and are even willing to institute symbols that demonstrate comradeship, such as a shared civic holiday. To the extent that hypothetical questions have validity, our findings show that even if the state were to treat its Arab citizens fairly and equally, this would not result in a majority of them recognizing Israel as the Jewish nation-state. In other words, Israel's Arab citizens are demanding much larger public investment and representation in civil service systems that should at the very least be proportional to their size in the overall population, but view these as unconditional civil rights, and thus are not prepared to offer "compensation" for them in the form of recognizing Israel as the Jewish nation-state. It is also interesting to note that a majority of the Jewish population does not expect such recognition in exchange for more equality and fairness in the state's treatment of its Arab population, though it definitely makes such rights conditional upon the Arab population giving up some of its national demands, at the very least.

This disparity, which is becoming more evident as the years go by, is one of the reasons why a majority of the Arab respondents feel that Israel's system of government is not democratic as far as they are concerned. Worse still, many of them state explicitly that their feelings toward the State of Israel have become more negative since the events of October 2000 (and the majority of Jewish respondents say the same when asked about their feelings toward Arabs). They feel this way even though the situation of the Arab minority is improving according to objective economic parameters, and their representation in government institutions is definitely increasing. Dissatisfaction with the current situation is so widespread among the Arab population that the most widely-accepted view among its members is that relations between the two groups were better during the state's early years, even though it is well known that the Arabs lived under martial law at the time and were greatly restricted in their freedom to enter areas populated by Jews.

The findings show that the situation is slightly better at the societal level than at the state level, so there is a bit more room for cautious optimism. It is realistic to anticipate that the situation can be improved by taking the appropriate steps. More than half of the Arab respondents said that they see themselves as part of Israeli society, and a clear majority said that they feel pride in Israel's achievements in sports and science. On the other hand, a clear majority of Jewish respondents reported feeling that the Arabs do not see themselves as part of Israeli society. Moreover, most of the Jewish respondents said that they are afraid to enter Arab residential communities, while we found that most of the Arab respondents are not at all afraid to enter Jewish residential communities, although more than one-quarter said that they felt uncomfortable speaking Arabic publicly in a Jewish environment. Another perceptual disparity we found relates to employment. While most of the Jewish respondents disagreed with the premise that Jews should be given preferential treatment over Arabs in hiring, most of the Arab respondents believed that Jewish candidates are given higher priority in acceptance to jobs or to educational institutions even when there are Arab candidates who are more suitable. As for living together, Jews were divided on the question of whether it is better to live in separate

communities in order to preserve Jewish identity, while most of the Arab respondents rejected such a separation.

In short, the profound lack of consensus between the Arab and Jewish populations at the state level does not seem to exist at the societal level. Moreover, the dominant perceptions of “the other” held by each side on major issues turn out to be absolutely wrong when we examine the other side’s viewpoints on those issues, and these erroneous opinions feed into the mutual suspicion.

The situation seems somewhat more promising on the ground in day-to-day life, though when it came to stereotypes, we found that on all questions, Jewish respondents expressed more suspicion of Arabs than Arab respondents expressed regarding Jews. For example, approximately half of each group sees the members of the other group as potentially violent. Moreover, most of the Jews believe that the Arabs do not attribute great importance to human life. The Arabs, for their part, believe that the Jews keep their distance from anyone who is not Jewish.

At the same time, we found that a large percentage of respondents, Jewish and Arab alike, were or are employed in “mixed” workplaces; here, too, the majority report that relations between Jewish and Arab employees are quite good or very good. These data show that workplaces are a platform for fruitful and positive interactions between Arabs and Jews, and that personal encounters are a counterweight to the differences and misgivings at the state and societal levels.

In conclusion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to give a single overall grade to the entire complex of Jewish-Arab relations in 2017 Israel. Our findings show that this is a troubled relationship; at the heart of the matter are issues related to civic equality (or lack thereof) and the definition of Israel as a “Jewish state.” A large segment of the Arab population rejects this definition, either as a matter of principle, or due to the deep sense of neglect and rejection that developed over the years due to discrimination against the Arab population in Israel, discrimination which shows up clearly in the statistical data, and which even a majority of the Jewish population acknowledges.


On the other hand, most of Israel’s Jewish citizens would like to strengthen their national ownership over the state, whatever their interpretation of the state’s Jewishness may be. They are completely uninterested in involving Arab citizens in strategic policy-making and decision-making processes. In addition, a majority of the Jewish population does not feel, in principle, that Arabs can be loyal citizens of the State of Israel while maintaining their separate national identity, even as they accept the idea that Jews living in the Diaspora can define themselves as both Jews and Americans, French, British, and so on.

Of course, this opinion of the Jewish respondents toward Arabs might well change if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is resolved. But until then, there appears to be agreement (particularly among Israel’s Arab citizens) that relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel are deteriorating, despite the growing number of Arabs in the civil service, and the large investment of government

resources in the Arab residential communities, which is increasing slowly but steadily. Particularly enlightening in this context is the finding that neither Jews nor Arabs believe that fairness and equality on the part of the state's institutions will lead to acceptance of the state's Jewish character by the Arab minority. This may be because, in the current situation, the Arab population sees fairness and equality as a pipe dream, and because the Jewish population—though the stronger side in this equation—is still driven by a sense of being a minority subject to existential threats from the surrounding geographical region, in which the majority is Arab and hostile. Even so, it would still be a mistake not to take into account the Arab population's obvious desire to integrate into the life of the state and the Jews' willingness—limited though it be—to adhere to standards of equality regarding issues such as budget allocation and employment.

Are Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens trapped by circumstances, or are their views matters of principle that will not be altered by changing those circumstances? To put it another way, are continual neglect and inequality the causes of the Arab minority's unwillingness to accept Israel in its present form as a Jewish and democratic state? And are the Jewish population's undemocratic views on questions about Israel's Arab citizens rooted in the continued, bloody Arab-Israeli conflict and repeated acts of terrorism, along with the identification by large segments of the Arab population with the views of the Palestinian side, even if they do not define themselves as Palestinian? These critical questions can be answered only when full equality exists between the Jewish and Arab populations in the State of Israel, and only once the conflict and bloodshed have ended.

Appendices



Appendix 1 / Distribution of Survey Responses (Jews and Arabs, %)

1. To what extent do you feel that you are part of Israeli society?

Discussion
on p. 39

	Jews	Arabs
Very much	52.9	19.2
Quite a lot	29.1	34.8
Not so much	13.8	33.2
Not at all	2.5	12.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read*)	1.7	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0

* Throughout the questionnaire, "not read" refers to responses that were not presented as options, but were recorded when volunteered by respondents.

2. In your opinion, to what extent do Arab citizens of Israel feel part of Israeli society? (Jews)

Discussion
on p. 40

	Jews
Very much	10.0
Quite a lot	19.9
Not so much	49.6
Not at all	13.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	7.5
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 40

3. In your opinion, to what extent do Jews see Arab citizens of Israel as part of Israeli society? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Very much	5.4
Quite a lot	23.2
Not so much	46.6
Not at all	22.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	2.6
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 76

4. In your opinion, has the overall attitude of Arab citizens of Israel toward the State of Israel become more positive or more negative than in the past, and particularly since the events of October 2000? (Jews)

	Jews
Much more positive	3.0
Somewhat more positive	10.3
Somewhat more negative	30.6
Much more negative	29.3
There has been no change in their attitude toward the state in recent years	18.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	8.6
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 76

5. Have your own feelings toward the State of Israel become more positive or more negative in recent years, and particularly since the events of October 2000? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Much more positive	9.2
Somewhat more positive	13.2
Somewhat more negative	20.6
Much more negative	22.2
There has been no change in my attitude toward the state in recent years	32.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	2.4
Total	100.0

6. Do you see yourself primarily as: (Jews)

	Jews
Israeli	38.2
Jewish	29.0
Mizrahi/Ashkenazi/Mixed	3.8
Secular/traditional/religious/Haredi	23.5
All of the above equally (not read)	4.8
None of the above (not read)	0.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.3
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 29

Discussion
on p. 29

7. Do you see yourself primarily as: (Arabs)

	Arabs
Israeli	9.6
Palestinian	13.8
Arab	38.8
Muslim/Christian/Druze	33.8
All of the above equally (not read)	1.6
None of the above (not read)	1.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.0
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 96

8. Do you feel that present relations between Israel's Jewish citizens and Israel's Arab citizens are:

	Jews	Arabs
Very good	2.0	7.4
Good	13.7	22.8
So-so	50.7	42.2
Bad	20.8	19.4
Very bad	10.5	7.8
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	2.3	0.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 96

9. How do these relations today compare with the relations that existed between Jewish citizens and Arab citizens during the state's early years?

	Jews	Arabs
Much better than during the state's early years	11.5	7.8
Somewhat better	18.1	15.4
Neither better nor worse	18.8	23.8
Somewhat worse	18.9	26.6
Much worse	13.1	21.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	19.6	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0

10. In your opinion, who has a stronger connection to the country—Jews or Arabs?

Discussion
on p. 56

	Jews	Arabs*
Both peoples have an equally strong connection to the country	27.3	44.5
Jews have a stronger connection	66.3	6.6
Arabs have a stronger connection	4.1	46.6
Neither side has a connection to the country (not read)	0.4	0.5
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.9	1.8
Total	100.0	100.0

* The data for Arabs' responses to this question are taken from the **Peace Index Survey** of February 2017. In that survey, the question was asked with a different translation of the word "connection," due to the multiple understandings of the phrase "connection to the country" that were evidently created by the translation in our questionnaire.

Discussion
on p. 87

11. In your opinion, should the state be required to include Arab professionals in making decisions in public institutions?

	Jews	Arabs
Yes, the state should be required to include Arab professionals in decisions that affect Israel's population as a whole	32.8	71.0
Yes, the state should be required to include Arab professionals in making decisions, but only for those that affect the Arab population	25.6	15.6
No, the state should not be required to include Arab professionals in making decisions in public institutions	38.0	11.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.6	2.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 111

12.1.1–12.1.6 Are the following characteristics regarding Arabs in Israel accurate or not? (Jews)

	Not at all accurate	Not so accurate	Fairly accurate	Very accurate	Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	Total
12.1.1 Keep their distance from anyone who is not Arab	18.6	32.5	25.3	14.6	9.0	100.0
12.1.2 Generous	17.7	21.3	29.9	14.1	17.0	100.0
12.1.3 Honest	27.8	32.8	19.8	5.8	13.8	100.0
12.1.4 Attach great importance to the life of every human being	35.5	31.4	18.3	5.3	9.5	100.0
12.1.5 Modern	17.2	36.3	30.4	8.2	7.9	100.0
12.1.6 Violent	8.7	31.4	26.4	24.9	8.6	100.0

12.2.1–12.2.6 Are the following characteristics regarding Jews in Israel accurate or not? (Arabs)

Discussion
on p. 111

		Not at all accurate	Not so accurate	Fairly accurate	Very accurate	Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	Total
12.2.1	Keep their distance from anyone who is not Jewish	18.8	29.2	34.4	15.0	2.6	100.0
12.2.2	Generous	27.4	21.6	35.4	8.4	7.2	100.0
12.2.3	Honest	19.8	22.6	40.2	13.2	4.2	100.0
12.2.4	Attach great importance to the life of every human being	11.4	21.2	35.8	30.0	1.6	100.0
12.2.5	Modern	5.2	9.2	37.2	45.0	3.4	100.0
12.2.6	Violent	18.8	26.8	35.4	15.2	3.8	100.0

13. Identity: Arabs (see Appendix 2, p. 194)

14. In your opinion, is Judaism:

Discussion
on p. 60

	Jews	Arabs
A religion only	22.0	30.6
A nationality only	3.9	12.8
Both a religion and a nationality	72.7	51.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.4	5.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 35

15. Every society on earth is divided into strong groups and weak groups. To which group in Israeli society do you feel that you belong?

	Jews	Arabs
To a strong group	38.1	17.8
To a fairly strong group	40.4	28.4
To a fairly weak group	10.4	25.8
To a weak group	5.4	24.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	5.7	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 89

16. Do you support or oppose the idea that every citizen, Jewish or Arab, who is of the appropriate age and exempt from military service should be required by law to perform civilian national service?

	Jews	Arabs
I support mandatory civilian national service for <i>all citizens</i> of the appropriate age who are exempt from military service	69.7	27.0
I support mandatory civilian national service <i>only for Jews</i> of the appropriate age who are exempt from military service	8.2	11.2
I oppose mandatory civilian national service for citizens of the appropriate age who are exempt from military service	17.5	56.8
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	4.6	5.0
Total	100.0	100.0

17. In your opinion, have Israel's governments treated Israel's Arab citizens fairly and equally over the years?

Discussion
on p. 69

	Jews	Arabs
Not at all	19.2	36.6
Not so much	33.1	40.6
Quite a lot	22.6	16.0
Very much	19.4	4.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	5.7	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0

18. In your opinion, is it possible or not possible for an Arab citizen of Israel who feels part of the Palestinian people to also be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel? (Jews)

Discussion
on p. 37

	Jews
I'm certain it's possible	8.5
I think it's possible	20.9
I think it's impossible	26.1
I'm certain it's impossible	41.9
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	2.6
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 86

19.1 Do you support or oppose including Arab parties in the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly oppose	43.2
Somewhat oppose	23.1
Somewhat support	22.2
Strongly support	7.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.9
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 86

19.2 Do you support or oppose Arab parties agreeing to join the government, including the appointment of Arab ministers? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly oppose	6.8
Somewhat oppose	8.4
Somewhat support	37.4
Strongly support	44.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.4
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 71

20. In your opinion, should Arab citizens of Israel be allowed to: (Jews)

	Jews
Purchase land anywhere in Israel	29.2
Purchase land only in Arab towns and neighborhoods	41.4
Arabs should not be allowed to purchase land in Israel at all	24.7
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	4.7
Total	100.0

21. When you are in a public place in a Jewish environment, do you feel free to speak Arabic? (Arabs)

	Arabs
Very free	42.4
Fairly free	28.4
Not so free	17.0
Not at all free	11.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.6
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 109

Discussion
on p. 47

22–31. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

22. The Arab members of Knesset represent the Arab sector well in terms of reflecting the differences and points of agreement within the Arab population in Israel.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	20.5	23.0
Somewhat agree	14.4	33.4
Somewhat disagree	24.2	18.2
Strongly disagree	31.9	22.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	9.0	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 42

23. I feel pride when Israel attains an important achievement, such as in sports or in science.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	73.5	37.4
Somewhat agree	14.4	28.4
Somewhat disagree	3.8	10.4
Strongly disagree	5.3	19.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.0	4.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 109**24. I prefer to keep silent and not express my political opinions in the presence of people I don't know.**

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	22.5	42.0
Somewhat agree	20.0	15.0
Somewhat disagree	16.8	11.6
Strongly disagree	39.4	28.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.3	3.0
Total	100.0	100.0

25. In Israel, Jewish citizens should have more rights than Arab citizens. (Jews)Discussion
on p. 70

	Jews
Strongly agree	26.6
Somewhat agree	13.6
Somewhat disagree	23.2
Strongly disagree	32.7
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.9
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 67

26. The system of government in Israel is also democratic toward Arab citizens.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	39.8	17.0
Somewhat agree	27.5	28.0
Somewhat disagree	19.3	21.6
Strongly disagree	9.9	32.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.5	1.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 50

27. The Joint List represents Arab citizens well.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	17.4	24.2
Somewhat agree	14.7	32.2
Somewhat disagree	21.7	18.6
Strongly disagree	31.4	19.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	14.8	5.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 101**28. Even if Arab candidates are more suitable for studies or work, Jews are always accepted first. (Arabs)**

	Arabs
Strongly agree	60.0
Somewhat agree	19.4
Somewhat disagree	5.6
Strongly disagree	12.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.0
Total	100.0

29. In Israel, jobs should be given to Jews first of all, and only then to Arabs. (Jews)Discussion
on p. 101

	Jews
Strongly agree	26.8
Somewhat agree	9.7
Somewhat disagree	23.9
Strongly disagree	35.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	4.0
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 83

30. Decisions crucial to the state on issues of peace and security should be made by a Jewish majority. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly agree	65.8
Somewhat agree	15.2
Somewhat disagree	7.6
Strongly disagree	8.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.4
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 92

31. The Jewish and Arab perspectives regarding the history of the conflict between the two peoples should be taught in all schools in Israel.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	48.3	62.6
Somewhat agree	22.7	15.0
Somewhat disagree	6.5	6.6
Strongly disagree	16.7	12.8
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	5.8	3.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 62**32. In your opinion, can the State of Israel be both a fully Jewish state and a fully democratic state at one and the same time?**

	Jews	Arabs
Certain it can	33.2	26.0
Think it can	25.9	25.8
Think it can't	20.5	13.0
Certain it can't	17.5	30.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	2.9	4.8
Total	100.0	100.0

33.1 Do you have Arab friends on Facebook? (Jews)Discussion
on p. 115

	Jews
I don't have/don't use Facebook	31.2
I have many Arab friends on Facebook	5.0
I have a few Arab friends on Facebook	27.8
I have no Arab friends at all on Facebook	35.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.8
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 115

33.2 Do you have Jewish friends on Facebook? (Arabs)

	Arabs
I don't have/don't use Facebook	31.6
I have many Jewish friends on Facebook	15.6
I have a few Jewish friends on Facebook	31.4
I have no Jewish friends at all on Facebook	21.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.4
Total	100.0

34–39. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Discussion
on p. 60

34. It is important that the State of Israel be strong in terms of security.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	93.8	67.4
Somewhat agree	4.5	16.6
Somewhat disagree	0.2	4.0
Strongly disagree	0.8	5.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.7	6.6
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 65

35. The right to vote in elections should be taken away from those who refuse to affirm Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.
(Jews)

	Jews
Strongly agree	43.4
Somewhat agree	14.8
Somewhat disagree	16.2
Strongly disagree	21.8
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.8
Total	100.0

36. The Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel represents Israel's Arab citizens well.

Discussion
on p. 53

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	9.6	20.6
Somewhat agree	13.1	34.0
Somewhat disagree	17.1	15.2
Strongly disagree	14.1	14.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	46.1	16.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 77

37. The State of Israel should allocate budgets equally to Jewish and Arab localities. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly agree	31.2
Somewhat agree	26.9
Somewhat disagree	14.7
Strongly disagree	23.3
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.9
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 79

38. The state should ensure that Arab citizens of Israel are represented in the civil service in accordance with their proportion in the population.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly agree	24.8	79.6
Somewhat agree	28.2	11.0
Somewhat disagree	18.4	3.4
Strongly disagree	22.0	5.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	6.6	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 85**39. Decisions crucial to the state regarding governance, the economy, and society should be made by a Jewish majority. (Jews)**

	Jews
Strongly agree	55.2
Somewhat agree	17.4
Somewhat disagree	13.9
Strongly disagree	9.9
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	3.6
Total	100.0

40. To what extent are you worried that you or members of your family will be victims of violent crime where you live?Discussion
on p. 106

	Jews	Arabs
Very much	9.4	33.8
Quite a lot	12.5	13.2
Not so much	37.2	25.4
Not at all	39.9	27.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 106

41–46. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

41.1 I try to avoid entering Arab localities inside Israel. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	21.1
Somewhat disagree	18.8
Somewhat agree	20.1
Strongly agree	38.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.6
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 106

41.2 I try to avoid entering Jewish localities. (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly disagree	75.4
Somewhat disagree	8.4
Somewhat agree	10.6
Strongly agree	5.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.6
Total	100.0

42. A new holiday marking the shared citizenship of all of Israel's citizens, Jewish and Arab, should be added to the Israeli calendar.

Discussion
on p. 73

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	52.1	24.2
Somewhat disagree	12.7	5.4
Somewhat agree	18.7	25.0
Strongly agree	12.4	41.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	4.1	3.8
Total	100.0	100.0

43.1 In order to preserve Jewish identity, it is preferable that Jews and Arabs in Israel live separately from one another. (Jews)

Discussion
on p. 45

	Jews
Strongly disagree	25.0
Somewhat disagree	20.0
Somewhat agree	16.6
Strongly agree	35.7
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	2.7
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 45

43.2 In order to preserve Arab identity, it is preferable that Arabs and Jews in Israel live separately from one another. (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly disagree	64.6
Somewhat disagree	12.0
Somewhat agree	9.6
Strongly agree	12.4
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.4
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 81

44. The state should prepare and implement a comprehensive plan for closing the gaps between Arab citizens and Jewish citizens.

	Jews	Arabs
Strongly disagree	20.0	5.4
Somewhat disagree	11.6	3.0
Somewhat agree	29.1	10.2
Strongly agree	34.8	80.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	4.5	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0

45. Israel has the right to be defined as the nation-state of the Jewish people. (Arabs)

	Arabs
Strongly disagree	59.0
Somewhat disagree	8.4
Somewhat agree	12.6
Strongly agree	13.8
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	6.2
Total	100.0

46. Most of Israel's Arab citizens are unreconciled to the state's existence and support its destruction. (Jews)

	Jews
Strongly disagree	18.2
Somewhat disagree	24.3
Somewhat agree	21.5
Strongly agree	31.0
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	5.0
Total	100.0

Discussion
on p. 64

Discussion
on p. 58

Discussion
on p. 72

47. In your opinion, would fair and equal treatment by the state enable Arab citizens to accept the definition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people?

	Jews	Arabs
Certain it would	11.2	11.2
Think it would	27.6	17.8
Think it wouldn't	24.4	19.8
Certain it wouldn't	31.7	44.2
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	5.2	7.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 104

48. Do you work, or have you ever worked, in a place with both Jewish and Arab employees?

	Jews	Arabs
Yes	68.8	74.2
No	30.5	25.6
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	0.7	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Discussion
on p. 104

49. How would you define relations between Jewish and Arab employees in this workplace? (Those who work or have worked in a workplace with both Jewish and Arab employees)

	Jews	Arabs
Very good	43.3	65.5
Quite good	46.2	29.4
Not so good	7.1	3.2
Not at all good	2.3	1.1
Don't know/Refuse to answer (not read)	1.1	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0

Appendix 2 / Sociodemographic Data and Self-Definitions (2017 sample, percent)

Sex	Jews	Arabs
Men	49.5	51.6
Women	50.5	48.4
Total	100	100

Age	Jews	Arabs
18-34	30.8	41.8
35-54	35.0	38.8
55+	34.2	19.4
Total	100	100

Education	Jews	Arabs
Primary or partial secondary	13.4	35.0
Full secondary, with matriculation certificate	20.6	21.2
Post-secondary (teachers' college, nursing school, engineering school)	14.6	11.0
Post-secondary yeshiva	2.5	–
Partial academic (no degree)	9.2	5.2
Full academic (bachelor's degree and above)	36.3	25.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.4	2.0
Total	100	100

Monthly household income ¹	Jews	Arabs
Below average	43.3	44.0
Average	15.5	23.0
Above average	26.8	28.0
Don't know / refuse to answer / not applicable	14.4	5.0
Total	100	100

Religion	Arabs
Muslim	73.8
Christian	11.6
Druze	11.0
Don't know / refuse to answer	3.6
Total	100

- 1 The average income presented to respondents in this poll was taken from Central Bureau of Statistics net income data for each population group.

Arab respondents were asked to select one of five self-definitions to describe their identity, as follows: “Of the following five definitions, do you see yourself primarily as...?”*

Identity (Arabs; choice of five definitions)	Total Arab sample	Bedouin sample
Israeli	9.0	5.4
Palestinian	12.6	8.1
Arab	39.6	20.3
(By religion) Muslim / Christian / Druze	31.8	41.9
Bedouin	3.6	23.0
All of the above equally / none of the above	2.2	1.3
Don't know / refuse to answer	1.2	–
Total	100	100

Ethnicity (self-defined)	Jews
Ashkenazi	41.0
Mizrahi	16.0
Sephardi	22.6
Mixed / both**	8.9
Neither Ashkenazi nor Mizrahi / Israeli**	6.9
Other/ don't know / refuse to answer	4.6
Total	100

* When asked directly “Are you Bedouin?”, 20.2% of the Muslim respondents (14.8% of the total Arab sample) gave a positive response.

** These options were not read out by the interviewers, but were recorded when given by respondents.

Religiosity (self-defined)	Jews
Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)	9.5
Haredi leumi (national ultra-Orthodox)	3.1
National religious	7.7
Traditional religious	12.0
Traditional non-religious	23.8
Secular	43.6
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3
Total	100

Religiosity (self-defined)	Arabs
Very religious	5.0
Religious	25.2
Traditional	50.2
Not at all religious	18.1
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.8
Total	100

Voting Patterns in the 2015 Elections	Jews	Arabs
Likud	21.3	2.0
Zionist Union	10.4	3.4
Yesh Atid	14.4	1.4
Habayit Hayehudi	7.3	--
Kulanu	4.9	1.6
Yisrael Beytenu	2.4	1.0
Meretz	3.1	2.0
United Torah Judaism	5.6	--
Shas	4.0	1.0
Yachad	0.9	--
Joint List	0.9	43.8
Other	3.3	0.2
Didn't vote / blank ballot / refuse to answer	21.5	43.6
Total	100	100

Political Orientation (self-defined)	Jews	Arabs
Right	30.4	4.8
Moderate right	26.5	5.4
Center	23.3	19.8
Moderate left	11.1	16.8
Left	3.6	18.2
Don't know / refuse to answer	5.1	35.0
Total	100	100

Ability to Converse in One Another's Language	Jews (conversing in Arabic)	Arabs (conversing in Hebrew)
Completely unable	73.7	4.0
Slightly able / non-fluent conversation	19.9	26.2
Able to converse fluently	6.1	69.4
Don't know / refuse to answer	0.3	0.4
Total	100	100

Research Team

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The Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) is an independent center of research and action dedicated to strengthening the foundations of Israeli democracy.

IDI works to bolster the values and institutions of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. A non-partisan think-and-do tank, the institute harnesses rigorous applied research to influence policy, legislation and public opinion. The institute partners with government, policy and decision makers, civil service and society, to improve the functioning of the government and its institutions, confront security threats while preserving civil liberties, and foster solidarity within Israeli society. Israel recognized the positive impact of IDI's research and recommendations by conferring upon the institute its most prestigious award, the Israel Prize for Lifetime Achievement.

A Conditional Partnership is a research report produced periodically on the relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. This year, we chose to examine this relationship at three levels—state, society, and interpersonal—and included in our survey questions about personal and national identity, sense of ownership over the land of Israel, the fairness of the state in its dealings with the Arab minority, willingness to share resources and to partner on decision-making processes, mutual stereotypes, and more.

IDI's **Arab-Jewish Relations Program** seeks to mitigate the tensions between Israel's Jewish majority and Arab minority and create a shared, inclusive society. The program seeks to address the social, cultural, economic and legal barriers to the integration of Israel's Arab minority into the Israeli state and society. Program staff members devise and promote policy recommendations designed to allow Israel's Arabs to prosper as citizens with equal rights and opportunities.

Among other initiatives, the program is initiating a regular survey of facts and figures about the Arab-Israeli population, developing a model of shared workspaces for Israeli employers, advancing the inclusion of Arab citizens in government decision-making, promoting mutual understanding between Jews and Arabs, and organizing forums for dialogue between Jews and Arabs and Arabs and state institutions.

The Guttman Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research holds the largest, most comprehensive database on public opinion surveys in Israel. Over a span of 60 years and through more than 1,200 surveys, the center has applied rigorous, innovative and pioneering research methods to document the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding thousands of issues in all aspects of life: politics, culture, ideology, religion, education and national security.

The center surveys attitudes and measures social indicators, helping policymakers understand trends in Israeli society and craft sound policies that are grounded in data.

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