The Flotilla Investigation: Findings of the Eiland Committee [12.7.2010]

On 12 July 2010, the Eiland Committee, which was set up by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to investigate the naval event of 31 May 2010 known as the "Gaza Flotilla incident" or the "Mavi Marmara incident," submitted its report to the IDF Chief of Staff. [1] According to the report, the IDF operation was executed in accordance with the intelligence available at the time and was inhibited by a lack of technological alternatives that would have enabled IDF forces to peacefully arrest the ship on the high seas. The committee also found that available intelligence was lacking and that the IDF failed to anticipate the level of violent resistance on board the Mavi Marmara.

In this article, IDI’s Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter presents a brief discussion of the Eiland Committee's report as part of our ongoing coverage of the flotilla incident. Since this incident relates to a conspicuous counter-terrorism measure – the naval blockade on Gaza – analysis of its aftermath will contribute to a broader understanding of Israel’s counter-terrorism policies.

On 7 June 2007, the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi, ordered the establishment of an internal IDF investigative committee to examine the events and actions that occurred during the takeover of the Mavi Marmara, one of the ships in the Gaza-bound flotilla. On 31 May 2010, nine civilians were killed aboard the Mavi Marmara in a violent confrontation with Israeli naval commandos. Major General (ret.) Giora Eiland was appointed to head the committee.

The investigative team, composed of eight IDF officers, reviewed the preparations for the operation and its modus operandi. The committee investigated the performance of the Navy, Air Force, and Commando units that were involved in the operation, as well as that of intelligence personnel, the General Staff, and the IDF spokesperson. The Committee also inspected the relevant technological alternatives available to the forces in question and the legal advice offered by the IDF Military Advocate General unit.

On 12 July 2010, the Eiland Committee submitted its classified report to the IDF Chief of Staff.

According to published portions of the report, there was a lack of cooperation between the IDF's intelligence unit and Naval intelligence, a failure which led to an erroneous assessment of the level of resistance that would be encountered on board the Mavi Marmara. Moreover, the report reveals that the operation was executed on the basis of a fixed plan of action, with no alternative prepared in case of escalation. With regard to technological alternatives, the report concludes that there are no effective means for peacefully arresting a ship in high seas at the present time. The Committee's recommendation concerning this limitation was to speed up the process of developing and testing suitable operational alternatives.

With regard to the functioning of the IDF Spokesperson's Unit, the report held that this department was very well prepared; however, there was a delay in the release of information and footage. This delay resulted from the desire to maintain the credibility of the information released, as well as from an unnecessarily cumbersome series of required approvals.

The report concluded that the soldiers on the scene acted properly and that the decisions of the commanders during the operation were reasonable. According to the report, the use of live ammunition by IDF soldiers was unavoidable under the circumstances and the conduct of the commandos during the entire operation was commendable.

The Eiland Committee's report deals with the tactical aspects of the IDF’s handling of the flotilla incident. Although the report is critical of some elements of the army’s preparations for the operation, its key findings exonerate the raiding commando unit from any wrongdoing. It should be noted that the Eiland Committee served internal IDF purposes only. A more comprehensive and public investigation is still being conducted by the Turkel Committee, an independent fact-finding committee comprised of three Israelis and two international observers, which was established by the Israeli government to investigate the event.[2]   

1. For information on the formation of the Eiland Committee and the general legal framework of the flotilla incident, see the eighteenth issue of the Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter.
   
   
2. For more information on the Turkel fact finding committee, see the eighteenth issue of the Terrorism and Democracy Newsletter.