Arab Identity in a Jewish and Democratic State

In order to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel, as well as Israeli Arabs' complex identity, one must consider the different periods in which they were fashioned:

1. The War of Independence - this war is remembered differently by Jews and Arabs, and each group actually has a completely separate narrative, relying on separate sets of facts, statistics, and interpretations. As far as the Jewish narrative is concerned, most of the Palestinian refugees fled of their own free will, whereas Arabs claim that most of the refugees were driven out of their homes. In any case, following the ceasefire that ended the war, there were 160,000 Arabs left residing in Israel, whose status had been changed from a majority to a minority. They were considered by the Jewish population as a "fifth column", and were entirely cut off from the rest of the Arab world. These conditions have had a major effect on Jewish–Arab relations in Israel.
   
2. The Military Regime of 1949–1966 - in this period, Israeli Arabs were subject to all sorts of limitations, which regulated their freedom of speech, transportation, and monetary assets. In addition, the Military Regime dealt with individual tribal leaders and prominent Hamula members, thus ignoring any collective Israeli-Arab identity and preventing the development of a political entity that could represent the Arabs as one unified group.
   
3. Economic and Political Development followed the dismantling of the Military Regime in 1967 and the removal of the restrictions and regulations which had limited Israel's Arabs. The level of education improved greatly in this period of time, and the Arabs learned Hebrew and began to lead a more modern lifestyle. The Arab society in Israel became much more politically involved, and the traditional Muchtar leadership was replaced by a national leadership, with high levels of political awareness. The Arabs came forward with their own political demands – equal government funding, working to minimize socio-economic gaps between Jews and Arabs, and resistance to the expropriation of Arab lands by the government. These years also led to a major change in Arab voting patterns, which first moved from supporting Mapai satellites to the communist party, and later to national Arab parties, such as Albalad and Raam.
   
4. The Formulation of an Arab-Palestinian Identity – On June 24th 1987, the Arab leadership decided to declare an all-inclusive strike, titled "The Day of Equality", and protesting inequality in the realms of education, construction, budget, health and social welfare. After the first Intifada broke out, the Arab leadership declared a second strike, titled "The Day of Peace", protesting the IDF's use of force and showing support for the Palestinian population. In October 2000, concurrent with the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli Arabs held a number of violent protests throughout the country. These protests, also known as "the October Events", went on for three days and included rallies, road-blocking, and stone-throwing. The Or committee, which was appointed for the purpose of looking into the Events, pointed out several reasons that led to their outbreak – including the discrimination against Arab citizens, as well as religious and political extremism and violence, which became an integral part of the Palestinian struggle and those identifying with it. Since then the situation has cooled down, but the memory of the October Events will not be easily forgotten.

According to Samucha, there are six key factors that affect the relationship between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel:

1. Jewish Dominance – The Jewish population built Israeli society and structured it according to its own specific insight and needs. The Arab minority, on the other hand, joined an existing society as a defeated minority. Therefore, the Arab population is inferior in the Israeli social structure, when it comes to the distribution of resources and policymaking.
   
2. Arabs' Link to the Palestinians and Arab Nationality – The ethnic roots, language, culture, and historical point of view of Israeli Arabs were all identical to their Palestinian counterparts until 1948. Therefore, they are loyal to Palestinian nationality, and many of them see their destiny as one they share with the Palestinians.
   
3. Islam - Religious views rarely limit themselves to lifestyle, and in the case of Arab Israelis, often affect their position towards the state and the Jewish majority. We can witness this development in the founding of Islamic political parties.
   
4. National Security – The complex link of Israel's Arabs with the Palestinians arouses suspicion among many Jews in Israel, and some see them as enemies. This is the reason for regulations and constraints to which Israeli Arabs are subject, which are meant to thwart the threat they supposedly pose to national security.
   
5. The Definition of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State – Zionist ideology maintains that Israel is "the home of the Jewish People"; the dominant language is Hebrew language; and its institutions and laws are of Jewish disposition. For example, the Law of Return applies only to Jews and not to Arabs.
   
6. Democracy – The state of Israel is committed to democracy, and therefore grants its Arab population, which is a religious, cultural and lingual minority, special individual rights and special group rights.  

All of the above shape the relationship between Jews and Arabs, and one should note that of all six factors, only Democracy works to bridge the gap between Jews and Arabs, whereas the rest push both sides further and further away from each other.

Data collected in the Democracy Index show that the relationship between Jews and Arabs is not good, according to both groups (see figure 1). What is also clear is that Jews are much quicker to rate the relationship as bad than Arabs: in 2000, 83% of Jews said that the relationship between Jews and Arabs is not good, as opposed to 50% of Arabs. After the October Riots of 2000, there was an increase in the rate of those who assessed the relationship as not good (93% of Jews and 76% of Arabs). The numbers stayed quite static for some years, but in the 2007 Democracy Index, only 66% of Arabs evaluated the relationship between Jews and Arabs as less than good. The discrepancy between the percentages of negative raters amongst Jews and Arabs could very well stem from the fact that the Jews perceive the Arabs as disloyal; moreover, since they are mostly unfamiliar with the Arab population, base most of their opinions on the media. The media usually focuses on the negative aspects of Jewish¬–Arab relations, and usually describes the Arab population in a particularly negative fashion, while the Jewish population is often presented as much more humane and enlightened. This may also stem from stereotypes – 75% of Jews think Arabs have a tendency towards violence, and 55% think Arabs are incapable of achieving the same cultural level that characterizes the Jewish population.

Figure 1: The Relaionship between Jews and Arabs 2000 - 2007

(Not good or Not good at all; in percentages)

Whereas many more Jews than Arabs are of the opinion that the relations between Arabs and Jews are not good or not good at all, when it comes to the public's view regarding discrimination – the numbers are reversed. Eighty percent of the Arab population agrees that they are discriminated against in comparison to the Jews, as opposed to just 55% of Jews who agree that the Arab population is indeed discriminated against.

As to a process of fully normalizing Arab rights and creating true equality between the groups, 56% showed support (figure 2). This number is an increase from 2003 (when only 47% supported the idea), but still very low compared to the levels of 1999 and 2000 (73% and 65%, respectively). Some 50% of Jews justify the discrimination against Arabs based on Israel's definition as a Jewish and Zionist state.\

Figure 2: Support of Equal Rights for Israeli Arabs

(among Jews; in percentages)

The data that describes how the Arabs feel about Israeli Democracy is also somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, one-quarter of them say that th